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Introduction 
This chapter intends to deal with disputes between the seller (beneficiary) and the 
buyer (applicant) on the sale contract, in relation to letters of credit. The letter of 
credit contract is created by virtue of the sales agreement between buyer and seller. 
Its purpose is to provide security to the seller to replace that which was represented 
by the shipping documents, which he gives up in exchange for the credit. Although 
the sale contract imposes a duty on the buyer to open a documentary credit in the 
seller's favour, the letter of credit contract is entirely a matter between the seller 
and the banker. However, as will be discussed later, the involvement of the buyer is 
vital in both the opening and alteration of the credit. Although the contract between 
the buyer and seller is the cause of the letter of credit contract, they are totally 
independent. 
The chapter consists of two sections: the first section will examine the contract 
between the buyer and the seller, under which several matters will be discussed, 
namely: (i) questions of interpretation concerning the nature of the buyer's 
obligation, in relation to his duty to open the credit; (ii) agreed variation and the 
effect of non-compliance by the buyer, where the seller accepts a non-conforming 
letter of credit; (iii) the seller's remedies for the buyer's failure of duty; (iv) the 
seller's duties upon the opening of a credit; (v) buyer's remedies after realisation of 
credit; (vii) whether payment by letter of credit is considered as absolute or 
conditional; and (viii) suggestions for the buyer and the seller to safeguard their 
rights. Although all these issues will be addressed, the main issue for discussion 
here will be centred around whether payment is absolute or conditional and this will 
also act as the main focus point of section two, where it will be evaluated in light of 
the basic principles. There are, for example, some possible conflicts with the well- 
established principles of letters of credit. On one hand, the principle of 
independency requires the payment by letter of credit to be absolute; on the other 
hand, as will be seen later in the chapter, there is a line of authorities which go 
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against this supposition. So, if the seller cannot get payment out of the bank which 
should be a matter under the letter of credit, he may still have recourse against the 
buyer. 
Section One: Contract Between Buyer and Seller 
1. Questions of Interpretation Concerning the Nature of the Buyer's 
Obligation in Relation to his Duty to Open the Credit 
1.1. Condition Precedent 
A letter of credit arrangement occurs when the buyer and seller agree in the sale 
contract that the payment should be effected by opening a credit. By incorporating 
this particular clause, the buyer is under a duty to procure the opening of a credit 
in the seller's favour. This obligation is not necessarily a condition precedent to 
the performance of all the seller's duties, but it is often a condition precedent to 
his duty to deliver the goods. ' There may be in place, certain conditions precedent 
to the buyer's duty, which provide a credit under the sales contract in which the 
seller has to perform. For instance, in a case where a sale of copra was 
concerned2, there was a requirement for a provisional invoice, which was a 
condition precedent to the buyers' obligation of opening the credit. Upon the 
seller's failure to provide such a provisional invoice, it was held that "The buyers' 
obligation to provide a letter of credit did not arise until a provisional invoice was 
tendered by sellers and proper notice given by him as to the form of credit he 
required". 3 Therefore, it was evident from the judgment that as both the seller and 
the buyer had initially agreed, under the sale contract, that the seller would 
provide the buyer with a provisional invoice, then it followed that this would be a 
condition precedent to the buyer's obligation to procure the opening of a 
confirmed credit. It is usual, within the well-established principle of letters of 
I Benjamin's Sale of Goods, Fifth edition. (edited by A. G. Guest) (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1997) n15 
at § 23-064 p. 1684. See also Tiplady, D., Introduction to the Law of International Trade (London, 
1989) p. 176. 
2 Knotz v. Fairclough, Dodds and Jones Ltd. [1952] 1 Lloyd's Rep 226. 
3 Ibid. 
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credit, that it is the duty of the buyer to open a letter of credit, as required by the 
sale contract. If the contract terms are themselves incomplete, and unresolvable by 
reference to custom, the supposed duty to cooperate would be no more than an 
agreement to agree, which is not a workable contractual term. Moreover, "the 
scope of the proposed duty in any given case would be impossible to define with 
the degree of precision necessary for a workable term. s4 In the case of Giddens v. 
Anglo-African Produce Ltd., s an action was brought by the purchasers against the 
sellers for damages for non-fulfillment of the contracts of sale. The sellers claimed 
that the credit required by the sales contract had not been opened. Thus, the 
condition precedent for their performance had not arisen. Bailhache J., in 
delivering judgment for the sellers said: 
"Here is a contract which calls for an established credit and in purported satisfaction of 
what this contract calls for what they get is this: `Negotiations of drafts under these 
credits are subject to the bank's convenience. All drafts hereunder are negotiated with 
recourse against yourselves. ' How that can be called an established credit in any sense 
of the word absolutely passes my comprehension. "6 
Further, in the case of Trans Trust S. P. R. L. v. Danubian Trading Co. Ltd., 7 upon 
failure of the buyers to open the credit in accordance with the requirements of 
sales contract, Denning L. J. was of the view that, since the buyer did not procure 
the opening of the credit, the sellers were not obliged to perform at all. He 
continued to say: 
"What is the legal position of such a stipulation [that a credit should be provided]? 
Sometimes it is a condition precedent to the formation of a contract, that is, it is a 
condition which must be fulfilled before any contract is concluded at all. In those cases 
the stipulation `subject to the opening of a credit' is rather like a stipulation `subject to 
contract'. If no credit is provided, there is no contract between the parties. In other cases 
a contract is concluded and the stipulation for a credit is a condition which is an essential 
term of the contract. In these cases the provision of the credit is a condition precedent, 
not to the formation of the contract, but to the obligation of the seller to deliver the goods. 
If the buyer fails to provide the credit, the seller can treat himself as discharged from any 
further performance of the contract and can sue the buyer for damages for not providing 
° Siporex v Banque Indosuex [1986] 2 Lloyd's Law Rep, 146, at 162. 
S Giddens v. Anglo African Produce Ltd (1923) 14 L1. L. Rep. 230. 
6 Ibid., at p. 230 (col. 2). 
7 Trans Trust S. P. R. L. v. Danubian Trading Co. Ltd [1952] 2 Q. B. 297. 
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the credit. "8 
Todd9, on commenting on the above quote, claims that there are significant 
differences between the two types of cases. He states that in the first type, both the 
seller and the buyer are equally exempt from an obligation to perform in situations 
where no credit has been issued. In contrast, the second type reveals that the buyer 
remains liable in damages unlike the seller, who is relieved of such a performance 
obligation. Denning L. J. regarding the above case, held that in this particular case, 
the credit was of the second type, and that this was the normal situation. '° 
Accordingly, the buyers were liable for damages for breach. " It has been submitted 
that the buyer's contractual obligations, with regard to payment in the case of a 
documentary credit, are different from the case in which he contracts to make 
payment directly. With regard to the former case which involves the opening of a 
letter of credit, the buyer's obligation is to procure the opening of such a credit in 
conformity to the seller's demand. Having done so, the buyer is deemed to have 
fulfilled his obligations. 12 
1.2. The Importance of the Buyer's Co-operation in Relation to Opening of a 
Credit 
The buyer's cooperation may be required for the credit to operate, for instance, 
where the credit provides that shipment is to be on a vessel nominated by the buyer. 
Where the seller cannot make the shipment and thus is unable to operate the credit 
because no vessel is nominated, the buyer will be in breach of contract by reason of 
his failure. 
The credit may require the buyer to inform the bank of the nomination of vessel. If 
the shipping documents show shipment on the vessel and otherwise conform to the 
e [1952] 2 Q. B. 297,304. 
9 Todd, P., Bills of Lading & Bankers' Documentary Credits p. 61. 
10 [1952] 2 Q. B. 297, Lord Denning observed that "it is clear that the stipulation for a credit was not a 
condition precedent to the formation of any contract at all. It was a condition which was an 
essential term of a contract actually made". at 305. 
11 [1952] 2 Q. B. 297,305. 
12 Ventris, F. M., 'New Problems of Financing Oil Shipments' LMCLQ (1975) p. 38 at 42. 
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credit, the bank will have to pay. It may otherwise be necessary for the seller to 
provide documentary evidence to the bank, that the vessel named in the shipping 
documents has been nominated by the buyer. 13 
Another example where the cooperation of the buyer may be necessary, is in the 
completion of the documentation to be tendered under the credit. Thus, the buyer 
or his representative may be required to sign a certificate of inspection of the goods. 
If he fails to do so, he will again be in breach of the contract with the seller, and he 
will have rendered the credit inoperable. The buyer may be ordered by the court, if 
an appropriate situation arises, to complete the document, and should he fail to 
comply, a third party, usually a court official, may be empowered to do so in his 
place. 14 
1.3. Type of Credit to be Opened, and Problems where Contract is Silent 
The type of credit which the buyer opens in favour of the seller, must be the exact 
type of credit", conforming in both form and substance, as specified under the 
documentary credit clause. A confirmed credit was called for in the case of Wahbe 
Taman & Sons Ltd. v. Colprogeca Sociedade Geral de Fibras. Cafes e Produtos 
Coloniais Lda. 16 In the course of his alleged confirmation, the correspondent 
reserved right of recourse against the seller, in relation to the total bills drawn and 
negotiated under the documentary credit, which was not a requirement at the time 
when the contract of sale was formulated. It was therefore agreed, that in doing so, 
13 Cf Banque de l 'Indochine et de Suez SA v JH Rayner (Mincing Lan) Ltd. [1983] Q. B. 711 where the 
requirement in the credit provided: "Shipment to be effected on vessel belonging to Shipping 
Company that member of an International Shipping Conference". It was held that reasonable 
documentary proof was required (p. 719B), confirmed by the CA on this point at [1983] Q. B. 728, 
729. 
14 See Astro Exito Navegacion SA v Chase Manhattan Bank NA [1983] 2 AC 787; See also Jack, R., 
Documentary Credits, at § 3-42 p. 54. 
15 If, for instance, a confirmed credit was agreed upon, the furnishing of a revocable credit (as in Panoutsos 
v. Raymond Hadley Corporation [1917] 2 KB 473) or of an irrevocable but unconfirmed credit (see 
Soproma S. p. A v. Marine and Animal By-Products Corporation [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 367,386. ) 
is insufficient. If an irrevocable credit was agreed to be opened in London, the opening of a credit 
in another place does not discharge the buyer's duty, see Enrico Furst & Co. v. WE Fischer Ltd. 
[1960] 2 Lloyd's Rep 340. 
16 Wahbe Tamari & Sons Ltd. v Colprogeca Sociedade Geral de Fibras, Cafes e Produtos Coloniais 
Lda[1969] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 18. 
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the buyer had failed to provide the type of credit that was initially prescribed". 
If the contract is silent as to the type of documentary credit, the courts tend to 
accept the presumption that an irrevocable credit was agreed upon18, as indicated in 
the case of Giddens v. Anglo-African Produce Co. Ltd. 19 In that case, there was a 
provision in the contract of sale that a letter of credit was to be `established' with a 
certain bank. When the buyers furnished the sellers with a revocable credit, the 
seller, not being very happy about the type of credit, refused to deliver the goods. 
Commenting on Bailhache J. 's judgment, as previously discussed under section 
1.1. ), Benjamin offers his interpretation of the outcome by initially clarifying the 
meaning of the term `established'. In clarifying the judge's interpretation, he 
confirmed that Bailhache J., "read the word `established' as describing the word 
`credit' and explained that the revocable credit furnished by the buyers could not be 
considered an `established credit "'20. In doing so, his Lordship dismissed the 
buyers' application. In other words, Bailhache J. perceived the term `established 
credit' as equivalent to an `irrevocable credit, and since a revocable credit does not 
constitute good security, it cannot be regarded as `established'. However, it should 
be noted that finalisation of a sales contract has not occurred in cases where the 
nature of the credit to be provided or the documents against which payment is to be 
made has not been determined. 
1.4. Time of the Availability of the Credit and Related Problems with Regard 
to Ambiguous Clauses. The Implication of C. I. F. and F. O. B. Contracts 
The buyer has a duty to furnish the documentary credit in time; he is responsible 
even for the delay which is caused by factors out of his control. 21 The time as to 
17 Ibid at 19. 
18 Cf. UCP art 6(c), under which a credit is assumed to be irrevocable if not stated to be revocable; See also 
Appendix C for update of the related section of UCC. 
19 Giddens v. Anglo African Produce Ltd (1923) 14 LI. L. Rep. 230. 
20 Benjamin's Sale of Goods, at § 23-066 p. 1685. 
21 In Lindsay (AE) & Co Ltd v Cook [1953] 1 Lloyd's Rep 328, where a delay was caused by the inter-bank 
communication, the seller was held entitled to repudiate the contract of sale. Cf Baltimex Baltic 
Import and Export Co Ltd v Metallo Chemical Refining Co Ltd [1955] 2 Lloyd's Rep, 438, where 
the parties contemplated a delay. See also Benjamin's Sale of Goods, at § 23-074 p. 1688. 
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when the credit is to be available should be followed according to the date indicated 
on the contract of sale. 22 Usually the sales contract should contain a provision 
regarding the time within which the credit is to be available, although no problems 
will arise in its absence. If a situation arises where time, for instance, is not 
stipulated, or in using the term, it remains unclear as to how it will be implemented 
within the contract agreement, it is left to the courts to determine whether or not 
the seller is relying on the provision of the credit in order to finance the transaction 
and if so, the buyer would be required to open the credit within a reasonable period 
of time. 23If, rather than specifying a clear date, it is required that a credit be opened 
immediately, the buyer must have such time, as is needed by a person of reasonable 
diligence, to get such a credit established. 24 Alternatively, if a credit is to be opened 
within a few weeks, then it must be opened within a reasonable time, the period of 
which is to be judged on the facts of individual cases. 25 If it is agreed that the 
opening of the credit is to be conditional upon the seller fulfilling his role and 
responsibilities, such as informing the relevant party of the readiness of the goods 
for shipment, then as soon as the event has occurred, it is compulsory that the credit 
is opened. 26 Sometimes the shipment is agreed to be over an expanded period; in 
such cases, the credit must be available over the whole period of shipment. In 27 
22 Hedley, W., Bills of Exchanges and Bankers' Documentary Credits pp. 286-7. 
23 Todd, P., Bills of Lading & Bankers 'Documentary Credits p. 61. 
24 Garcia V Page & Co. Ltd. (1936) 55 Ll LR 391,392. See generally, Hedley, p. 286. 
25 See generally, Etablissements Chainbauz SARL v Harbormaster Ltd [1955] 1 Lloyd's Rep 303; see also 
Sinason Teicher Inter American Grain Corp v Oilcakes and Oilseeds Trading Co Ltd. [1954] 1 
WLR 1394. See also Benjamin's Sale of Goods, at § 23-068 p. 1685. 
26 Hedley, W., Bills of Exchanges and Bankers' Documentary Credits, (Lloyd's of London Press Ltd., 
1997) p. 286. See generally, Jack, R., Documentary Credits (Butterworths, London, 1993), at § 3- 
26 p. 46. Plasticmoda SpA v Davidson Manchester [1952] 1 Lloyd's Rep 527. See also Knotz v 
Fairclough Dodd & Jones Ltd. [1952] 1 Lloyd's Rep 226, In this case a provisional invoice was 
sent as a prerequisite to a credit being opened. These cases must be distinguished from those where 
the opening of a credit is a condition precedent to the existence of a contract of sale. In such a case, 
in the absence of a credit facility, there is no contract at all. Trans Trust SPRL v Danubian Trading 
Co Ltd. [1952] 2 Q. B. 297. 
27 Pavia & Co SpA v Thurmann-Nielsen [1952] 2 Q. B. 84; See also, Hedley, W., Bills of Exchanges and 
Bankers' Documentary Credits p. 287. 
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Garcia v. Page & Co Ltd28 there was no express stipulation of time of opening of 
the credit in the contract itself. Porter J. was of the view that three months was an 
unreasonably long time for the buyer to establish the credit29. Regarding the 
reasonability of time, the courts have adopted Lord Watson's test from Hick v. 
Raymond & Reid: 30 
"When the language of a contract does not expressly, or by implication, fix any time for 
the performance of a contractual obligation, the law implies that it shall be performed 
within a reasonable time. The rule is of general application, and is not confined to 
contracts for the carriage of goods by sea. In the case of other contracts the condition of 
reasonable time has been frequently interpreted; and has invariably been held to mean 
that the party upon whom it is incumbent duly fulfils his obligations, so long as such 
delay is attributable to causes beyond his control, and he has neither acted negligently nor 
unreasonably. 9931 
When addressing ambiguous clauses, it appears that clauses which encompass a 
time specification, but are vague as to their requirements for opening of a 
documentary credit, can be potentially problematic. This is evident in the Sohio 
Supply Co. v Gatoil (USA) Inc 32case, where the buyer was asked to provide a 
documentary credit 10 days before the expected date of loading, as a requirement 
stipulated by the contract of sale. The argument was based on the exact 
interpretation of the `10 day period', where the seller understood it to mean 10 days 
prior to the commencement of the shipping period, unlike the buyer who believed it 
ought to be calculated from either the last day or based on the buyer's estimation of 
the day when the ship would arrive. The Court of Appeal found this particular point 
irrelevant, but Staughton L. J. demonstrated his preference with the sellers 
proposition. His Lordship observed that: 
"I have no doubt that the sellers show a good arguable case on that point; I do not think it 
would be right for me to say more than that. That makes it unnecessary to consider 
whether the affidavit which they produced sufficiently displays a good arguable case on 
28 Garcia v Page & Co Ltd (1936) 55 Ll L Rep 391. 
29lbid at 392. 
30 Hick v. Raymond & Reid [1893] A. C. 22. 
31 Ibid at pp 32-33. In this regard, it was said that this case is not a banking case, but concerns the 
obligations of a consignee under a carriage contract. However, the test is of general application. 
Cited by Todd, P., Bills of Lading & Bankers' Documentary Credits p. 61. 
32 Sohio Supply Co. v Gatoil (USA) Inc. [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep 588. 
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the point of custom". 33 
Another example which can be offered to illustrate an ambiguous term, regarding 
the time within which the credit is to be opened, can be seen in Etablissements 
Chainbaux S. A. R. L. v. Harbormaster Ltd. 34 It was a condition in the contract of 
sale, that the credit was to be "opened in London within a few weeks". Devlin J., in 
the course of his judgment, treated this as too ambiguous a term regarding time. He 
therefore, allowed a reasonable time for opening of the credit. Devlin J. observed 
that the requirement to open a credit, within a reasonable time prevails, even where, 
under the contract, delivery is postponed until a considerable time into the future. In 
the above case, where the delivery was not to take place for eight months, he said: 
"It is to be observed that the provision as to the letter of credit is to be contrasted with the 
provision as to delivery. Delivery is not to start until the lapse of eight months; the letter 
of credit , on the other 
hand, is to be 'opened in London within a few weeks'. It is plain, 
therefore, that although the letter of credit is to provide for payment against shipping 
documents, and therefore payment could not in any event be due until some eight months, 
when deliveries started, the buyers offered to establish the letter of credit before that. One 
can well understand the business reason for that. Sometimes a letter of credit is wanted 
merely because the seller is unwilling to make arrangements for shipment, which may 
involve him in expense, unless he knows he is going to be paid. That might be the normal 
case where the seller has got the goods and the only expense he has to incur in relation to 
them is to put them on board ship or otherwise arrange for their transport, but in this case 
it plainly is not so: the seller had to manufacture the goods, and what he desires is to have 
the letter of credit for it is plainly so that he will have assurance, within a few weeks and 
before he begins manufacture, that he is certain to be paid and that the labour of 
manufacture will not therefore be done in vain. "35 
The documentary credit clause, as put to use in Transpetrol Ltd. v. Transöl 
Olieprodukten Nederland BV36, was significantly more perplexing, where the buyer 
agreed to provide the letter of credit within a period of one day, following his 
receipt of the seller's appointment in relation to a vessel. The ambiguity arose when 
it was provided that the seller should give an additional three days to the buyer, of 
his notice of intention to nominate. Phillips J. observed that: 
"It seems to me that the concept of being required to give a minimum of three days' 
notice of intention to nominate is nonsensical. Prima facie such a notice is of no value to 
33Ibidat591. 
34 Etablissements ChainbauxS. A. R. L. v. Harbormaster Ltd [1955] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 303. 
35 Ibid at 305 (col. 2). 
36 Transpetrol Ltd. v Transöl Olieprodukten Nederland BV [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep 309. 
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the buyer for it is implicit that there is the intention to nominate in any event"" 
Therefore, it was held that the seller's failure to comply with the stipulation could 
not be used as an excuse for the delay in the furnishing of a letter of credit and the 
seller had the right to repudiate the contract of sale. 38 
1.4.1. Application to C. I. F. Contracts 
Most c. i. f. contracts of sale do not specify a time for the furnishing of the credit, but 
a date or period for the shipment of goods is usually provided. 39 
If an actual date, as opposed to a period, of shipment is specified in the contract, it 
is well established40 that the buyer is obliged to furnish the documentary credit at a 
reasonable time before that date. The rationale behind this is that, the seller is 
entitled to have the credit before he actually prepares the goods for shipment. 
Nevertheless, different provisions concerning the time for opening the credit can be 
made. For example, if the parties agreed by contract that the buyer's duty to furnish 
a credit is dependent on the prior receipt of explicit instructions from the seller, then 
the buyer is not obliged, in the meantime, to furnish a letter from the issuing 
bankers indicating that the documentary credit will be established as soon as these 
instructions are received. 4' 
When the contract provides a period of shipment, there is an ambiguity over 
whether the documentary credit must be furnished on the first day of shipment or at 
a reasonable time before that. In the case of Pavia & Co. S. p. A. v. Thurmann- 
Nielsen42 where a sale of groundnuts was concerned, a period of shipment, namely 
February-April 1949, was provided for in the contract, but the required 
37 Ibid at 310-311.. 
38 Ibid at 309. 
39 Jack, R., Documentary Credits at § 3-16 p. 42. See also Benjamin's Sale of Goods, at § 23-069 pp. 1686- 
7. 
40 Plasticmoda Societa perAzioni v Davidsons (Manchester) Ltd. [1952] 1 Lloyd's Rep 537,538 
41 Nicolene Ltd v Simmonds [1952] 2 Lloyd's Rep 419, affd. [1953] 2 Q. B. 543.; See also Benjamin's Sale 
of Goods, at § 23-069 pp. 1686-7. 
42 Pavia & Co. S. p. A. v. Thurmann-Nielsen [1952] 2 Q. B. 84; For notes of the case, see Chorley & Smart, 
Leading Cases in the Law of Banking, 6s' ed., (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1990) pp. 265-268. 
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documentary credit was not furnished until April 22, which was held by the court to 
be too late. Denning L. J. said that if there is no express stipulation, the credit must 
be opened at the beginning of the shipment period "because the seller is entitled, 
before he ships the goods, to be assured that, on shipment, he will be paid. The 
seller is not bound to tell the buyer the precise date when he is going to ship; and 
whenever he does ship the goods, he must be able to draw on the credit. He may 
ship on the very first day of the shipment period. 2243 It is possible to draw two 
perspectives from this assertion, one of which is at the very latest, a letter of credit 
must be opened on the first day of shipment. Secondly, this in effect also suggests 
that the documentary credit should be opened at the very latest, at a reasonable time 
before commencement of the shipping period, since the seller is entitled to be 
assured of payment before he actually initiates the shipment. 44 
Two years later, in the case of Sinason-Teicher Inter-American Grain Corporation 
v. Oilcakes and Oilseeds Trading Co. Ltd. 45, Lord Denning expressly supported the 
second view. In this particular case, a contract for the sale of barley called for 
shipments during October-November 1952, but the sellers cancelled the contract 
when the buyers failed to furnish a bank guarantee by September 10, which was 
long before the shipping period. The Court of Appeal held that the buyers had not 
been in default. Lord Denning said "The correct view is that, if nothing is said about 
time in the contract, the buyer must provide the letter of credit within a reasonable 
time before the first date for shipment. The same applies to a bank guarantee". 46 
1.4.2. Application to F. O. B. Contracts 
In an f. o. b. contract, the buyer often has the right to determine the date of 
43 Ibid at pp. 88-89. 
44 Benjamin's Sale of Goods, at § 23-069 p. 1686. 
°S Sinason-Teicher Inter-American Grain Corporation v Oilcakes and Oilseeds Trading Co. Ltd. [1954] 1 
WLR 1394. 
46 Ibid at 1400. 
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shipment47 (though an f. o. b. contract allows the seller to make a shipping 
arrangement). It was argued in Ian Stach Ltd. v, Baker Bosley Ltd. 48 that, the 
documentary credit had to be opened at a reasonable time before the date 
nominated by the buyer in the shipping instruction. Diplock L. J. in that case 
disagreed with such a rule since; 
"the buyer would not know how long it would take to bring the goods from the place 
where they were and transport them to the port: he would not know in a case of this kind, 
and did not know, whether or not the goods had to be rolled to order or whether they 
were in stock or whether they were partly rolled. It seems to me that in a case of this 
kind, and in the case of an ordinary f. o. b. contract financed by a confirmed banker's 
credit, the prima facie rule is that the credit must be opened at latest... by the earliest 
shipping date 7A9 . 
To sum up, no hard and fast rule can so far be drawn from the study of the cases 
involving either c. i. f. or f. o. b. contracts on when the buyer should open the 
documentary credit in cases where the sales contract only provides for a period of 
shipment without an exact date for furnishing the documentary credit. The rule 
expressed by Lord Denning in Sinason-TeicherS° was that the documentary credit 
should be opened at a reasonable time before the first day of the shipment period is 
to be welcomed by the seller. This view enables the seller to prepare the goods for 
on-time shipment. 5' 
2. Agreed Variation and the Effect of Non-Compliance by the Buyer where 
the Seller Accepts a Non-Conforming Letter of Credit 
2.1. The Amendment of the Credit. Both the Buyer's and Seller's Consent are 
Necessary 
The amendment of a credit is possible, if it is proposed by the buyer (the applicant 
of the credit) either with the seller's (the beneficiary's) agreement or at his request. 
The amendment itself is a matter between the issuing bank and the seller, perhaps 
47 Jack, R., Documentary Credits, at § 3-20 p. 43. 
48 Ian Stach Ltd. v Baker Bosley Ltd [1958] 2 Q. B. 130. This is a case where a sale of steel plates on f. o. b. 
terms was concerned. 
49 Ibid at 143-4. 
so Sinason-Teicher Inter American Grain Corporation v Oilcakes and Oilseeds Trading Co. Ltd. [1954] 1 
WLR 1394. 
51 Ibid at 1400. 
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via an advising bank and the seller. 52 
2.1.1. The Legal Position 
A bank's undertaking embodied in a letter of credit, constitutes a binding contract 
between the bank and the beneficiary. In the same way that a contract can only be 
altered by the consent of all parties to it, a bank's undertaking contained in a 
documentary credit can only be amended by the bank giving the undertaking and 
the seller. The consent of the advising bank is required, if it needs to confirm the 
credit. For the obvious reason, that the credit is issued on the buyer's instruction, it 
is implicitly necessary to have his agreement for any amendment to the credit. " 
In practice, the applicant initiates the amendment of the credit by instructing the 
issuing bank of such amendment. Such amendment may also be initiated by the 
seller. The seller will make such a request, if he is unhappy about the terms and 
conditions of the credit at the time the credit is advised to him. Amendment could 
also take place where the seller is in need of extension of the shipping period or 
where the type of certificate that is required in the credit is not obtainable. If the 
seller finds the terms of the credit, as advised to him, are unacceptable, very often, it 
will amount to a rejection of the credit. In practice, the seller is often reluctant to 
object to an amendment that has been initiated by him, and it may be the case that 
he is not even entitled to do so, depending on the merits of each case. Where a 
seller is faced with an amendment to a credit, which is unacceptable, he is entitled 
to inform the bank that it is unacceptable to him, stating that he intends to comply 
with the credit as originally advised in accordance with Article 9(d) of the UCP, 
which provides that the bank's undertaking cannot be amended without the consent 
of the other parties concerned i. e. banks and the beneficiary. Without the consent of 
those who are involved in the credit transaction, the credit remains unchanged. 54 
52 Jack, R., Documentary Credits, at § 3-33 p. 49. 
53 See Article (9Xd) of the UCP.; see also, Rosenblith, R. M., `Modifying Letters of Credit: The Rules and 
the Reality' 19 Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal (1987) 245, at 246, n. 3. 
54 For an example of amendments being accepted and rejected, see Ficom SA v Sociedad Cadex Lida 
[1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep 118 at 127 and of amendments simply not being accepted, see United City 
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2.1.2. Problems in Practice 
After the buyer instructs the issuing bank to make an amendment, if the issuing 
bank agrees with it, it will instruct the advising bank of the amendment. Finally, the 
amendment will be advised to the seller, usually in the form of a statement, 
confirming that the credit has been amended. It is not always the case that the seller 
will be requested to inform the bank of the acceptance of the amendment. It is not 
surprising to note that it is frequently not so, and it is then for the seller himself to 
object to the amendment of his own accord, assuming that he is aware of his right 
to reject amendments. " This is particularly the case, when it is evident that the 
document neglects to suggest that it is an offer from the bank to the seller that the 
credit should be amended as such56. Following rejection of the amendment on the 
part of the seller, it is conceivable that the seller can regard any insistence by the 
bank in relation to such an amendment, as a repudiation of the credit and thus claim 
damages against the bank. Or another option is that the buyer may be specifically 
requested, by the seller to withdraw the instructions for the amendment. Should the 
buyer refuse to accept such a request, then taking both positions into consideration, 
it is evident that the sellers' would prevail. It has been suggested that in compliance 
with the unamended credit, the seller could alternatively present the documents 
Merchants v Royal Bank of Canada [1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep 267 at 275, per Mocotta J; See also Jack, 
R., Documentary Credits, at § 3-34 p. 49. 
55 For the seller to have a right to reject amendment is quite an odd and excessive right as the seller is 
required to do nothing for the credit to be established, why should not the same rules apply upon an 
amendment? But as suggested by an American commentators, Rosenblith, supra note 53, p. 245, at 
248. "where all parties are proceeding in good faith, there is no problem... But parties may not 
always proceed `in good faith' or their interest in performance of the underlying sales contract may 
change, and that is where resort to legal niceties leads". In the United States, the legal position is 
that the applicant's consent is not necessary for the amendment to bind issuer and beneficiary, as 
long as these two players both consent. Consideration is not essential to support a modification to 
issuer's engagement under a letter of credit. (UCC § 5-105) (see Givray, A. J.; Chapman, C. J.; 
Doub, J. C; Gabriel, H. D; Hisert, G. A; Luttrell, R. T., III; Wunnicke, B., 'UCC Survey: Letters of 
Credit' 46 The Business Laxyer (1991) p. 1579, at 1621. 
56 The position was illustrated by the standard form for amendments issued by the ICC (ICC Publication 
No. 416, page 47. The new forms, Publication No. 516, which says, "[t]he above mentioned credit 
is amended as follows", and "this amendment is to be considered as part of the above mentioned 
credit and must be attached thereto". As an example of an amendment which beneficiaries felt 
bound to accept even though it was strongly against their interest to do so, see Astro Exito 
Navegacion SA v Chase Manhattan Bank NA [1983] 2 AC 787, headnote. Cited by Jack, R., 
Documentary Credits, at § 3.36 p. 51. 
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directly to the bank and should the bank thereupon refuse to accept them, it would 
follow that the bank would then be held liable to the seller. 57 
The new Article 9d (iii) of the UCP, covers the situation where the seller is silent 
following receipt of an amendment. The position is the same as that established by 
legal principle. If the seller does not indicate his acceptance or rejection of 
amendment, either by words or conduct, the Article provides that his silence is not 
to be taken as an acceptance of it. SB This sounds justifiable when advice of the 
amendment is to be construed as an offer from the bank to the beneficiary: unless 
something can be found which is to be taken as indicating his acceptance of that 
offer, it remains simply an offer. 59 
In accordance with Article 9(ii) of the UCP, it is provided that although the credit 
itself appears not to have been amended following acceptance of it by the 
beneficiary, it is not down to the issuing bank to revoke an amendment which it has 
advised. 60 From this, it is evident that a confirming bank will be found to be obliged 
by an amendment, which it has merely passed on, without making it specifically 
clear upon doing so, that they have no intention of adding to its confirmation, but 
are merely advising it. A consequence of it adding its confirmation is that, until such 
amendment is accepted, the credit remains unamended and the bank continues as a 
confirming bank in regard to it. Upon acceptance of such amendment, the credit can 
then be amended, and it is a requirement that the bank ceases to be bound by its 
57 See Jack, R., Documentary Credits, at § 3-36 p. 51. See same source for seller's remedies at p. 105. 
58 The same position holds in the US as well, see Atari, Inc. v Harris Trust and Savings Bank 559 F. Supp. 
592 (N. D. Ill. 1984) [Note, Rosenblith, supra note 53 at 252 criticised that "[t]he 
Atari 
court ... 
made a correct conclusion but for a possibly incorrect reason". ]. 
59 Compare Opinions (1980-1981) of the ICC Banking Commission, ICC Publication No. 399, Reference 
71, where the Commission decided by a majority that the beneficiary's consent to an amendment 
had to be an express acceptance and could not be implied merely from his silence. See also, 
Rosenblith, supra note 53 p. 245, at 249. 
60 Jack, R., Documentary Credits, at § 3-39 p. 52. 
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confirmation. 61 Consequently, the seller has the choice of whether or not to 
continue with a confirmed credit. 
It is also evident from Article 9d (iv) of the UCP, that the seller cannot be selective 
of which amendments to accept and which to disregard, where several options are 
initially offered in one advice. This is based on the legal theory of `offer and 
acceptance'. In cases where there are a number of amendments within one advice, if 
the buyer accepts certain amendments, this would constitute a counter offer in 
which it is up to the bank to accept or not. Where the beneficiary demonstrates such 
selective choices in relation to which amendments to accept and to reject, this 
constitutes a counter offer and the bank can subsequently decide on whether to 
accept it or not. Yet, such an amendment may become binding if all parties 
concerned have agreed to it. However, one cannot assume from Article 9d (iv) of 
the UCP, that a partial acceptance necessarily signifies that the amendments have 
been totally refused. Conversely, such partial amendment will not be given any 
significance. Therefore, after partial acceptance, the seller's position, will be similar 
to that if he had kept silent, in that his options would remain open62. 
2.2. The Seller's Waiver of Non-Furnishing the Credit 
It is submitted that it is open to the seller to accept a different type of credit, where 
that accepted type provides less security. It sometimes happens that a seller raises 
no objection to a credit which does not conform but proceeds as if it was a 
conforming credit. There are three potential possibilities which can arise as a result 
of this situation63. Firstly, it may be possible that the seller is observed as having 
waived the irregularity. Another possibility is that he may be held to be estopped 
from objecting at a later date. However, in practice, it is apparent that little 
distinction is made between the above mentioned two possibilities, and there is a 
tendency to focus on the former. The final possibility is that a variation may be held 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid at 53. 
63 Ibid at 48. 
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in relation to the underlying contract. In other words, from viewing the actions of 
the parties, where they are seen to be in agreement of utilising the same format of 
credit as they had when they had initially opened it, it can be presumed that they are 
open to utilising a flexible and varied approach. 
The seller may, by his conduct, be assumed to have waived his right to demand 
another type of credit which is of greater security even without giving reasonable 
notice. This can be seen in the case of Panoutsos v. Raymond Hadley 
Corporation, 64 where the seller accepted payments for a number of shipments by 
means of a credit which was not confirmed instead of the one agreed upon in the 
sales contract which was by confirmed credit. The seller was held not to have the 
right to repudiate such payment since he had apparently waived the buyer's breach 
of condition, in failing to provide a confirmed credit. In this regard, Viscount 
Reading CJ. observed: 
"In Bentsen v. Taylor. Sons & Co. 65 Bowen L. J. stated the law as to waiver thus: `Did the 
defendants by their acts or conduct lead the plaintiff reasonably to suppose that they did 
not intend to treat the contract for the future as at an end, on account of the failure to 
perform the condition precedent? ' Reading sellers for defendants and buyer for plaintiff 
in that passage, it applies exactly to the present case. The sellers did lead the buyer to 
think so, and when they intended to change that position it was incumbent on them to 
give reasonable notice of that intention to the buyer so as to enable him to comply with 
the condition which up to that time had been waived. t, 66 
With reference to the doctrine of estoppel, it is apparent that it shares similar 
features to that of the doctrine of waiver. To illustrate this, it is evident in situations 
where the seller has made representation to the effect of claiming his strict legal 
rights, upon which the buyer has relied at his expense. 67 In this case the seller will 
be estopped. In addition to this, when considering the waiver, representation could 
still be implied from words or behaviour, and the estoppel would thus act as a 
64 Panoutsos v. Raymond Hadley Corporation [1917] 2 K. B. 473. 
65 Bentsen v. Taylor, Sons & Co[1893] 2 Q. B. 283, a case on a sales contract. 
66 [1917] 2 K. B. 473, at p. 478. 
67 Todd, P., Bills of Lading & Bankers' Documentary Credits p. 67. However, Lord Denning MR., in WJ 
Alan & Co. Ltd. v El Nasr Export and Import Co [1972] 2 Q. B. 189, at 213 stressed that a person 
was entitled to rely on the waiver despite no detriment having occurred as a result of acting on it. 
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preventative mechanism by stopping the seller from later going back on his word 
with relation to representation, without giving adequate notice. 68 In Soproma S. n. A 
v. Marine and Animal By-Products Corporation69, McNair J. clearly emphasised 
that there was no apparent difference when the matter was addressed as either 
waiver, variation or estoppel. He said: 
"the material question is as to the effect of the seller's acceptance of the letters of credit. 
On the assumption stated, the sellers could, I think, plainly have treated the buyer's 
failure to open proper letters of credit as a breach of condition entitling them to rescind 
and claim damages.... In my judgment, by so acting, the sellers must be taken to have 
accepted the position that their letters of credit were in order, and not having at any time 
given notice to the buyers that they required letters of credit in strict conformity with the 
contract, they are precluded (whether the matter is put as waiver, variation or estoppel) 
from now saying that the letters of credit were not in order and did not accurately define 
the contractual mode of obtaining payment including the period of availability .... Unless the concession asked for by the sellers had been granted, the sellers would have been in 
plain default since by shipping the whole 600 tons under one bill of lading they had put it 
out of their power to tender two bills of lading, namely, a separate bill of lading under 
each letter of credit. Accordingly, they can only succeed in the present case if they can 
establish that in law they made a valid tender of documents under the letters of credit as 
modified and within the period of availability of these letters... "70 
It is practically important, especially when a series of shipments are involved in a 
contract, to consider whether the seller has waived the breach or has agreed to a 
variation of the contract. If the seller waives an objection concerning a documentary 
credit furnished regarding one shipment, he is entitled to give notice to insist on 
strict compliance regarding the remaining shipments. However, if the acceptance of 
a non-conforming credit involves a variation of the contract of sale, it may affect 
the entire transaction. Very often, the courts treat the seller's acceptance of a non- 
conforming credit as waiver. 7' In the leading case of waiver, Panoutsos v. Raymond 
Hadley Corporation72, the sellers did not insist on the confirmed credit after the first 
68 See the judgment of Balihache J. in Panoutsos v. Raymond Hadley Corporation [1917] 1 K. B. 767, at 
pp. 769-770. 
69 Soproma S. p. A v Marine and Animal By-Products Corporation [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep 367. 
70 [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 367,386 (col. 2). 
71 For more authorities on waiver, see Panoutsos v Raymond Hadley Corporation [1917] 2 KB 473,477- 
478. See also Plasticmoda Societa PerAzioni v Davidsons (Manchester) Ltd [1952] 1 Lloyd's Rep 
527; Ian Stach Ltd v Baker Bosley Ltd [1958] 2 Q. B. 130; Frust (E) & Co v WE Fischer Ltd [1960] 
2 Lloyd's Rep 340; Soproma S. p. A. v Marine and Animal By Products Corporation [1966] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 367. 
72 Panoutsos v Raymond Hadley Corporation [1917] 2 KB 473. 
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of a number of shipments. The sellers were held to have waived their right to a 
confirmed credit, not only in relation to the shipment in question, but also in 
relation to the subsequent shipments. To avail themselves of a confirmed credit, the 
sellers are required to lodge the buyers with reasonable notice before any 
confirmation takes place. However, waiver of a right in respect of the first shipment 
will not necessarily preclude the seller from reasserting his right in respect of a 
subsequent shipment. It was made clear in Cape Asbestos Co Ltd v. Lloyds Bank 
Ltd. 73 that the bank was able to revoke a revocable credit even without notice. The 
defence raised by the bank was that the bill of lading tendered did not conform to 
the terms of the credit because it (the bill of lading) was made out to the order of 
the buyers instead of being to the order of the defendant bank. The sellers had 
argued that since the bank had accepted the bill of lading, it had waived its right to 
reject on those grounds regarding the following shipment. Bailhache J. said, 
"That case [Panoustos] was an authority for the proposition that where an act had to be 
done by the buyer of goods, such, for instance, as the opening of a confirmed banker's 
credit, and he did not perform that act, and the seller nevertheless went on delivering the 
goods with knowledge that the act had not been performed, the seller could not suddenly 
cancel the contract and refuse to make further deliveries without giving the buyer 
reasonable notice of his intention so as to give the buyer an opportunity of putting himself 
right. That case was no authority for the proposition, that where an act had to be done 
periodically, as, for instance, the delivery of a bill of lading in such a case as the 
present, the fact that it had been done irregularly in the past justified the assumption that 
the irregularity would be waived in the future. The Panoustos case had only reference to 
an act which had to be done once and for all, and not to an act which had to be done 
periodically. 04 
From the above mentioned cases, it can be gathered that there appear to be two 
ways in prescribing how the waiver act is to be accomplished. The first method 
prescribes that the act should be done "once-and-for-all" as was the case in the 
confirmation of the credit in Panoustos's. The other method which has to be done in 
a periodical fashion, can be illustrated in the case where tendering bills of lading 
takes place for each shipment, as in Cape Asbestos. 76 
7' Cape Asbestos Co Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1921] W. N. 274. 
74 Cape Asbestos Co Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd[1921] W. N 257 (col. 2). [emphasis added]. 
'5Panoutsos v Raymond Hadley Corporation [1917] 2 KB 473). 
76 As explained by Todd. P., Bills of Lading & Bankers' Documentary Credits p. 69. 
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The Court of Appeal in W. J Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El Nasr Export and Import CO . 
77, 
had a difference of opinion. It was evident in this case that the buyers were in 
agreement, under the contract of sale, to provide a confirmed credit which would 
cover the sale on the terms of f. o. b. of two cargoes of coffee priced at 262 Kenyan 
shs, per ton. When the buyers offered sterling, in order to represent their confirmed 
credit, no objection was voiced. At the same period of time, an extension was 
requested on the part of the sellers once they had started to utilise the credit. 
Following the second shipment, but prior to the documents being presented, the 
pound sterling was devalued, whilst the Kenyan currency did not alter. Subsequent 
to the payment being made in sterling under the confirmed credit, the court refused 
the seller's application, which attempted to claim damages based on the difference 
in the exchange rate. The court said "the sellers, by their conduct, waived the right 
to have payment by means of a letter of credit in Kenyan currency and accepted 
instead a letter of credit in sterling"78. Lord Denning MR., stressed that a person 
was entitled to rely on the waiver even though no consideration had moved from 
him and despite no detriment having occurred as a result of acting on it. 79 Megaw 
L. J. offers the following judgment which appears to support the above, but based 
on a different foundation; "As I see it, the necessary consequence of that offer and 
acceptance of a sterling credit is that the original term of the contract of sale as to 
the money of account was varied from Kenyan currency to sterlingi80. In offering 
his point of view, his Lordship went on further to say that; "if there were no 
variation, the buyers would still be entitled to succeed on the ground of waiver"". 
In the case of Glencore BV v. Lebanese82, a sale of 25,000 tons of wheat at the 
n WJAIan & Co. Ltd. v El Nasr Export and Import Co [1972] 2 Q. B. 189. 
78 Ibid, at 214, per Lord Denning MR. 
79 lbid at 213. 
8° Ibid at 217. 
81 Ibid, at 218. 
82 Glencore BVv Lebanese [1997] 4 All ER 514. 
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price of US$135 per tons was concluded. The buyers undertook to pay an addition 
of $7 per tons if they failed to accept the quantity as contracted. The terms of the 
contract specified f. o. b. shipment on a vessel chartered by the buyers and that 
payment was to be by an irrevocable and confirmed letter of credit. The buyers 
stipulated that payment under the letter of credit would be made based on the terms 
that the sellers presented bills of lading issued as `freight pre-paid' in order to 
comply with the requirements imposed on them by the principal. The buyers' vessel 
was late arriving at the loading port and gave notice of readiness one day later than 
the agreed date. Due to the delay, the sellers refused to load and made extra- 
contractual demands for pre-payment of the price and for an additional payment of 
$7 per tons. The buyers claimed for damages for the sellers' act. The Court of 
Appeal held in favour of the seller. Evans L. J. commented obiter that: 
"what may be called the classic rules of estoppel and waiver can apply in circumstances 
such as these (the acceptance of non-contractual goods delivered under a sales contract), 
so as to prevent a party who fails or refuses to perform the contract from relying upon 
conduct by the other party which would otherwise justify his doing so. The occasions 
when these rules may be involved in these circumstances are limited, for example, by the 
fact that it is rarely if ever possible to imply an unequivocal representation of fact from a 
party's silence on the relevant issue. 983 
In the absence of any unequivocal representation by the sellers that they 
relinquished or would relinquish their rights arising out of the buyers' failure to 
open a letter of credit in the form required by the sales contract, the sellers could 
not be said to have misled the buyers into believing that the freight pre-paid 
requirement was no longer important to them. 
In conclusion, it can be established that both the waiver and estoppel doctrine are 
only considered effective in situations where, the stipulation has only been added 
for the purpose of directly benefiting the party who initially waived it, or who has 
been estopped from relying on it. 84 It should be noted that whether the seller's 
conduct amounts to waiver or evidences a variation of contract, depends on the 
83 Ibid at 527. Since the buyers in that case did not suggest that these rules apply there, and therefore Evans 
LJ just left it at that. 
94 Todd, P., Bills of Lading & Bankers'Documentary Credits p. 69. 
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circumstances of individual cases. 85 A variation cannot be effective unless it is 
supported by consideration. S6 
3. The Seller's Remedies for the Buyer's Failure of Duty 
3.1. The Seller's Right to Terminate the Sales Contract if the Credit is Not 
Opened 
No doubt, the seller is under no obligation to ship the goods until a credit 
conforming to the sales contract has been opened. Since "time is of the essence", 
the seller is entitled to terminate the contract if the credit is not opened by a date as 
stated in the contract or by a time which may be determined from it. Very often, the 
time for the opening of the credit can only be determined by the interpretation of 
"reasonable time". 87 The seller can terminate the contract by serving a notice giving 
the buyer a reasonable date by which the credit must be provided. If the buyer 
defaults, the seller may then cancel the contract and claim damages. 
Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V-C said in British and Commonwealth Holdings 
plc v. Quadrex Holdings Inc. " that, "where, if a time for completion had been 
specified in the contract, time would have been of the essence, the innocent party 
can make time of the essence by serving a reasonable notice to complete even 
though the guilty party has not been guilty of improper or undue delay". 89 
The seller's right to repudiation is justified where, upon the buyer being allowed to 
open a credit within a specified time, the seller must equally hold a right to end the 
contract. 9° This is because the behaviour of the buyer merely signifies a repudiation 
of the contract. 
$s See Siporex v Banque Indosuez [1986] 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 146, at 163-164, where the buyer failed to 
establish a waiver nor an estoppel; See also Benjamin's Sale of Goods, at § 23-076 pp. 1688-89. 
86 See Chitty, J., Chitty on Contracts: General Principles Vol. 1 (28th ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
1999) at § 23-034 p 1156. 
87 See, Section, (1.3) supra. 
8B British and Commonwealth Holdings plc v. Quadrex Holdings Inc[1989] Q. B. 842. 
89 Ibid at 858. 
90 Jack, R., Documentary Credits, at § 3-25 p. 46. 
Chapter Seven: Disputes on the Underlying Contract 368 
3.2. The Seller's Remedies Against the Buyer for Damages 
The seller holds the right to claim damages from the buyer, if the nonperformance 
of the contract is due to the buyer's failure in opening a conforming credit. 9' The 
assessment of the seller's loss in these cases, stems from the same fundamental 
principles that are applicable in situations in which a buyer is found to have rejected 
a sale contract. However, it is claimed that other relevant rules concerning damages 
are referred to. 92 In summary, the damages will usually be assessed by deducting the 
contract price from the market price of the goods. 93 If the buyer knows of some 
special circumstances during the conclusion of the contract, an alternative measure 
of damages will be applied. For instance, it is evident from Trans Trust SPRL v. 
Danubian Trading Co. Ltd. 94, that the buyers were already aware that the sellers 
would not be able to buy in the goods if they, the buyers, had failed to open the 
credit. The plaintiffs were awarded "a sum equal to the profit which they would 
have made if the credit had been opened and the successive sales had gone 
through' . 
9s 
Section 2-325(2) of the UCC states that issuance of the credit discharges the 
applicant only if the credit is not dishonoured. 96 Therefore, the seller is entitled to 
sue the issuer on the credit and sue the buyer on the underlying obligation97, if the 
credit is dishonoured. 
91 For more on the question of damages, see the case of Heisler v Anglo-dal Ltd. [1954] 2 All ER 770. See 
on damages generally, Schmitthoff, C. M., Schmitthof''s Export Trade: The Law & Practice of 
International Trade 9th ed (London, Stevens & Sons, 1990) p. 421. 
92 Jack, R., Documentary Credits, at § 3-28 pp. 47-48. 
93 See Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 50. In Ian Stach Ltd. v Baker Bosley Ltd_ [1958] 2 Q. B. 130, the plaintiff 
sellers were entitled to recover the difference between the contract price and the market price, 
which they had already obtained on a re-sale of the goods. 
94 Trans Trust SPRL v Danubian Trading Co Ltd [1952] 2 Q. B. 297. 
95 Ibid at 300. 
96 For more authorities, see Bank of United States v Seltzer (233 AD 255 NY 637 (1931)); Greenough v 
Munroe (46 F2d 537 (SDNY), afid, 53 F2d 362 (2d Cir. ), cert. Denied sub nom; Irving Trust Co. 
v Oliver Straw Goods Corp., 284 US 672 (1931)). See also § 5-117 of the UCC. 
97 Cf UCC § 3-310 (similar rule for transactions involving negotiable instruments). 
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According to Dolan, it is argued that, the duty of the buyer to pay the seller on the 
banker's default is justifiable. "If the applicant is a general depositor, he loses his 
deposit and becomes a general creditor and must then pay the beneficiary; yet there 
is no double loss. The applicant, even though he must pay the beneficiary, faces 
only one loss - that of his deposit. The money he pays the beneficiary is in return 
for the benefit the applicant receives out of the underlying contract". 98 
3.3. Consequences of Failure to Open Credit, or Failure to Provide Reliable 
and Solvent Paymaster" 
3.3.1. The Seller's Right to Claim Loss of Profit on Transaction 
The provision of a credit is more than simply a way of paying the price, since the 
seller may use such a credit as security to raise finance for the transaction, for 
instance by purchasing the goods. Thus, if the buyer fails to open such a credit he is, 
then, in breach of contract. The seller, therefore, will be entitled to claim damages 
that are available under ordinary principles applicable to contractual damages. This 
can be seen in the case of Trans Trust S. P. R. L. v. Danubian Trading Co. Ltd. '°° 
The buyers failed to open the credit related to the sales contract. The sellers 
subsequently used the loss of profit, which they could have potentially made 
following the sale, as the basis to their claim of damages. The buyers were held"' to 
be in breach of contract. The buyers' argument was that the sellers could have 
resold at a profit since the steel market was rising. 102 Thus, the damages should be 
nominal only. The sellers for their part, claimed that they had not resold the steel at 
profit because in the absence of a credit, they were unable to purchase it from the 
manufacturers. That is to say, they were relying on the provision of the credit to 
98 Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit. Commercial and Standby Credits. Revised edition. (Warren, 
Gorham and Lamont, 1996) p. (12-18). 
99 Todd, P., Bills of Lading & Bankers' Documentary Credits p. 69. 
'°°Trans Trust SPRL v Danubian Trading Co Ltd [1952] 2 Q. B. 297; see also Todd, P., Bills of Lading & 
Bankers' Documentary Credits p. 71. 
101 Trans TrustSPRL v Danubian Trading Co Ltd [1952] 2 Q. B. 297,298. 
102 Ibid at 305. 
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finance the transaction. Denning L. J., regarding treating the provision of the credit 
as simply an alternative way of paying the price, said: 
"This argument reminds me of the argument we heard in Pavia & Co. v. Thurmann- 
Nielsen. 103 It treats the obligation to provide a credit as the same thing as the obligation 
to pay the price. That is, I think, a mistake. A banker's confirmed credit is a different 
thing from payment. It is an assurance in advance that the seller will be paid. It is even 
more than that. It is a chose in action which is of immediate benefit to the seller. It is 
irrevocable by the banker, and it is often expressly made transferable by the seller. The 
seller may be relying on it to obtain the goods himself. If it is not provided, the seller may 
be prevented from obtaining the goods at all. The damages he will then suffer will not in 
fact be nominal. Even if the market price of the goods has risen, he will not be able to 
take advantage of the rise because he will not have any goods to resell. His loss will be 
the profit which he would have made if the credit had been provided. Is he entitled to 
recover that loss? I think he is [subject to the normal rules of remoteness of damage in 
contract]... "°4 
Upon the same ruling, this could be applied to a falling market. In the case of Ian 
Stach Ltd. v. Baker Bosley Ltd. 'os, the sellers repudiated the sales contract due to 
the fact that the credit had not been opened in time. Diplock J., in the course of his 
judgment, explained that the measure of damages was the difference between the 
contract price and market price at the time of repudiation"' 
3.3.2. Position Where There are a Number of Shipments107 
In the case of Urquhart Lindsay & Co. v. Eastern Bank Ltd., 118 the sales contract 
was for a number of shipments of machinery by installments. It was agreed that 
payment for each installment was to be by irrevocable letter of credit. The buyer, 
upon completion of two installments and having paid for them, disputed the amount 
payable on the third installment. The bank, on the buyer's instructions, refused to 
pay. When the seller sued the bank, the main question was in relation to the 
measure of damages. In the main course of judgment, the bank was of the view that 
1°3 Pavia & Co SpA v Thurmann-Nielsen [1952] 2 Q. B. 84. 
104 [1952] 2 Q. B. 279,305 (bottom). 
105 Ian Stach Ltd. v Baker Bosley Ltd [1958] 2 Q. B. 130. 
106 Ibid at 145. Diplock LJ. said "The measure of damages is the loss of profit on the transaction, since the 
defendants must have known that their failure to provide the letter of credit would make it 
impossible for the plaintiffs to carry out the transaction. I think, therefore, that probably the right 
basis is loss of profit". 145. 
logy Todd, P., Bills of Lading & Bankers'Documentary Credits p. 71. 
los Urquhart Lindsay & Co. v. Eastern Bank Ltd [1922] 1 K. B. 318. 
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they had merely undertaken to pay money, and that the amount of damages for non- 
payment of money was only the amount of the money itself. The sellers, on the 
other hand, were of the view that the position was the same as if the buyers had 
themselves refused to pay for the goods. Rowlatt J. expressed concern to the 
consequences of the buyers' refusing to pay on the installment. He reached the 
conclusion that the sale by installments would entitle the sellers to cancel the entire 
transaction. That is to say, the sellers were able to deem the non-payment of the one 
installment as a ground for bringing the entire sales contract to an end. By doing so, 
the sellers would be released from any obligation, not only under this particular 
shipment, but under any further shipment as well. Indeed, the sellers' loss was 
therefore their loss of profit on the entire transaction, not only non-payment for one 
shipment. Similarly, on the same grounds, the sellers could have recovered this in an 
action against the buyers. Rowlatt J. said: 
"Now if a buyer under a contract of this sort declines to pay for an installment of the 
goods, the seller can cancel and claim damages upon the footing of an anticipatory breach 
of the contract of sale as a whole. These damages are not for non-payment of money. It is 
true that non-payment of money was what the buyer was guilty of; but such non-payment 
is evidence of a repudiation of the contract to accept and pay for the remainder of the 
goods; and the damages are in respect of such repudiation. "ßo9 
To conclude, the buyer is seen to be in breach of the sales contract in cases where 
he fails to open a credit, or if the credit fails to operate. Moreover, if the breach has 
occurred, it should not be regarded as simply being non-payment of money. It is 
submitted that the credit means much more than simply payment of money. Thus, as 
summarised by Todd, "the damages are not limited to the payment of the price, but 
will be anything that is recoverable under ordinary principles applicable to 
contractual damages". ' ° 
4. The Seller's Duties Once a Credit Has Been Opened 
4.1. Seller's Duty of Warranty 
Under s. 5-111(1)11 of the UCC the seller has a duty of warranty (that the 
'09 lbid at 323 (bottom)- 324 (top). 
'lo Todd, P., Bills of Lading & Bankers'Documentary Credits p. 72. 
111 See Appendix C for update, Section 5-110. 
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documents actually comply with the terms of the credit), an obligation that is 
usually neglected by commercial lawyers and courts. Dolan suggested that warranty 
should play an important role in letter of credit disputes, in which the account party 
alleges that the seller (the beneficiary'12) has engaged in fraud. "' 
First of all, what does the warranty do? The warranty often gives the complaining 
buyer (the account party"4), an adequate remedy at law which deprives him of the 
equitable relief. It also gives independent significance to the seller's certificate 
(common in standby letter of credit transactions) and thereby overcomes the 
implication that the purpose of the certificate is to give the buyer a fraud defence to 
a claim for payment under the credit. Furthermore, the warranty relieves the buyer 
from the sometimes burdensome proof problems in his action for damages against a 
seller who has obtained payment under the credit with latently defective documents. 
4.1.1. The Nature of the Warranty 
4.1.1.1. "Conditions of the Credit" 
To understand the nature of the warranty, first of all, knowing the meaning behind 
the term "conditions of the credit" 115 is vital, since only under those "conditions" 
should the warranty apply. In letter of credit law, that term signals the independence 
principle, i. e. the concept that the credit and the transaction, out of which it grows, 
are independent. 1' It is of utmost importance that the warranty does not extend to 
112 See the beneficiary's duty of warranty under § 5-111(1) when it transfers or presents the documents. 
See also Dolan, J. F., 'Letters of Credit, Article 5 Warranties, Fraud, and the Beneficiary's 
Certificate' 41 The Business Lawyer (1986) 347 at 351. 
113 Dolan, supra note 112 at 347. See also, Ballen, R., and Diana, N., 'UCC Article 5 (Letters of Credit), 
45 The Business Lawyer (1990) 1521, at 1590; Givray, AI; Chapman, C. J.; Doub, J. C; Gabriel, 
H. D; Hisert, G. A; Luttrell, R. T., III; Wunnicke, B., supra note 55 at 1682; Barnes, J. G., and Byrne, 
J. C., 'Letters of Credit: 1995 Cases' 51 The Business Lawyer (1996) 1417 at 1430. 
114 The § 5-111(1) warranty runs to "all interested parties", which means people other than the account 
party can enforce the warranty. See also, Givray, 'Letter of Credit' 44 The Business Lawyer (1989) 
1567, at 1651; Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit. Commercial and Standby Credits p. (4-15). 
115 UCC § 5-111(1) provides: "Unless otherwise agreed the beneficiary by transferring or presenting a 
documentary draft or demand for payment warrants to all interested parties that the necessary conditions 
of the credit have been complied with. This is in addition to any warranties arising under Article 3,4,7 
and 8. 
116 In an American case of Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co v Pacific Nat'l Bank, 493 F. 2d 1285, 
1286 (9t' Cir. 1974), it was noted that: "the basic purpose of letters of credit [is] ... providing a 
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the "condition of the underlying transaction". 117 (See Appendix D, Section (5), for 
more on `warranty' under the revised Article 5 of the UCC). 
The seller's warranty, under article 5, does not extend to obligations under the sales 
agreement between himself and the buyer. "' Section 5-111 relates only to the 
beneficiary's (seller's) obligations under the credit. The obligations under the credit, 
imposed on the seller, may be harsher or less harsh than the ones under the sales 
contract depending on each individual case. 119 The buyer will often stipulate that the 
seller should present a commercial invoice, bill of lading, certificates of origin and 
insurance, and a draft in negotiable form. The seller may not have any obligation 
under the sales contract to provide some of those documents to the buyer, but the 
seller must tender those documents to the bank (the issuer of the credit) in order to 
fulfill his obligations under the credit, and thus to get paid. 12' This independency of 
the letter of credit is dealt with under section 5-114(1) of the UCC and Article 3 of 
means of assuring payment cheaply by eliminating the need for the issuer to police the underlying 
contract. " Because the letter of credit is independent of the underlying transaction, it can operate 
quickly to achieve payment and can avoid involving the issuer in underlying contract disputes. 
Without the independence principle, the letter of credit would be simply a surety arrangement. "If a 
conforming presentation of documents is made, the issuer of a credit is obligated to pay without 
reference to the rights and obligations of the parties to the underlying contract. " Republic Nat 7 
Bank v Northwest Nat? Bank, 578 S. W. 2d 109,114 (Tex. 1978) (holding that the independence 
principle distinguished a bank letter of credit from an impermissible bank surety contract). "[I]t is 
important to stress that the letter of credit arrangement is completely independent of the underlying 
contract between the beneficiary of the letter of credit and the issuing bank's customer who has 
procured the letter of credit. " New York Life Ins. Co. v Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 173 
Conn. 492,498-99,378 A. 2d 562,566 (1977) (holding that a defence to the underlying contract is 
no defence in the letter of credit transaction). See Dolan, supra note 112 at 347. 
117 This is supported by the independence principle. See Overseas Trading Corp. v Irving Trust Co., 82 
N. Y. S. 2d 72 (Sup. Ct. 1984); Imbrie v D. Nagase & Co., 196 AD 380,187 NYS 692 (1921); Bank 
of East Asia, Ltd. v Pang, 140 Wash. 603,249 P. 1060 (1926). See also, Dolan, The Law of Letters 
of Credit. Commercial and Standby Credits p. (9-57). 
118 Givray, supra note 114 p. 1567, at 1652: `By seeking payment under the letter of credit, beneficiary 
warrants that the `necessary conditions of the credit have been complied with' (UCC § 5-111) Does 
beneficiary warrant that all the `conditions' of his own performance have been met in the 
underlying contract with customer? No, most would agree that § 5-111(1) refers to the `conditions' 
(requirements) of the letter itself, not to conditions of the customer-beneficiary contract. This 
accords squarely with the independence principle, which isolates the letter of credit from all 
underlying deals. " 
119 In commercial credit transactions, for instance, the sales agreement may call for a confirmed letter of 
credit and may make no reference to the documents the credit will require. See Dolan, supra note 
112 at 348. 
120 See the American authority, AMP' Head Sportswear, Inc. v Ray Scott's All-American Sports Club, 448 
F. Supp. 222 (D. Ariz. 1978). See Dolan, supra note 112 at 348. 
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the UCP. 121 
4.1.1.2. Patent and Latent Defects 
Secondly, it is important to distinguish patent defects from latent defects in the 
documents. When applying the independence principle to the seller's (beneficiary's) 
warranty, the rules for the banker's examination of the seller's documents are 
presumably employed. The UCC (5-109) requires the banker to examine the 
documents to see if, on the face of it122, they comply with the terms of the credit. 
Bank document examiners are only competent to decide the facial conformity of the 
documents not the de facto compliance 123, and the UCC excuses them from having 
to do so. 124 The bank's duty to examine the documents, according to above section, 
puts the buyer at risk. One of the critical features of the credit is that it provides for 
prompt payment and thus promotes commercial efficacy. In other words, to require 
the document examiner to determine whether documents are genuine, where he has 
a duty to discover latent defects, would utterly jeopardise that critical feature. The 
warranty, which is imposed by the Code, is to let the buyer (the account party) have 
an unfailing remedy in the event of latent defects. The warranty requires the seller's 
documents to comply with the terms of the credit, not just on their face, but in fact. 
The buyer may be entitled to obtain damages (under the seller's warranty), if the 
bank pays against an invoice in which the goods are not properly described12' or 
against a document which does not have the a required signature. 126 However, the 
121 The leading American case on this point is Maurice 0 Meara Co. v National Park Bank, 239 NY 386, 
146 NE 636 (1925). It was held that the issuer cannot refuse payment under a letter of credit even 
though it has reason to believe that the goods shipped pursuant to the underlying contract were 
defective and even though the issuer might have an interest in those goods. See Dolan, supra note 
112 at 348. 
tu UCC § 5-109(2). See Appendix C for the related section 5-109(a) for update. 
123 See Board of Trade v Swiss Credit Bank, 728 F. 2d 1241 (9t' Cir. 1984). 
124 UCC § 5-109, cmt 2: "The fact that the documents may be false or fraudulent or lacking in legal effect is 
not one for which the issuer is bound to examine. ". 
125 UCP Article 41(c) requires the commercial invoice submitted under a credit to describe the goods as 
they are described in the credit. 
126 See, e. g., Eximetals Corp. v Pinheiro Guimaress SA, 73 AD 2d 526,422 NYS 2d 684 (1979), afl'd, 51 
NY 2d 865,414 NE 2d 399,433 NYS 2d 1019 (1980). 
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issuer will be free from liability if it pays in good faith against a false invoice or a 
forged document. '27 
Patent defects often exist in a seller's document. The banker should obtain the 
buyer's (the account party's) waiver of the defects or notify the sellers of the 
defects and return the documents to or hold them for the sellers. 128 Very often, the 
buyer will waive a defect and the banker will pay the seller without mentioning the 
waiver to the seller. 129 If the seller is not informed about the defects promptly, the 
banker is arguably estopped to assert them. 130 If the banker pays, it is natural and 
thus justifiable for the seller to assume either that the presentation was conforming 
or that patent defects have been waived. In an American case, which was later 
considered as an "unfortunate decision" 131, the defects of the documents that the 
sellers presented could be spotted without any extrinsic investigation, i. e. the 
defects were patent. The Fifth Circuit held that the beneficiary's warranty extends 
to patent defects, which is contrary to the position of the Code and industry 
practices for document examination, and which state that the duty of detecting 
patent defects should be on the bank (the credit issuer). Dolan is of the opinion that 
section 5-111(1) warranty "relates only to the performance of the credit transaction, 
not the underlying transaction, and that it covers defects in the documents that are 
latent, not patent" 132 
127 See UCC § 5-109, cmt 2. 
128 See UCC § 5-112, cmt 2; UCP., art 16(d). 
129 See Dolan. supra note 112, at 347, n. 14. 
130 See UCP Art. 16(e). Most of the cases require a showing of detrimental reliance on the issuer's silence 
before they will invoke an estoppel rule under the Code. See, e. g., United Commodities-Greece v 
Fidelity Int'1 Bank, No. 513 (NY Apr 4,1985); cf. Bank of Cochin Ltd. v Manufacturers Handover 
Trust Co., No. 83 Civ. 1767 (JMC) (SDNY July 9,1985) (adopting a similar rule for credits 
subject to the 1974 version of the Uniform Customs). 
131 Philadelphia Gear Corp v Central Bank 717 F. 2d 230 (50, Cit. 1983) Dolan, supra note 1112 at 350. 
Dolan commented (at p. 351) that this case "stands the beneficiary-issuer relationship on its head 
... The court 
did not give adequate weight to the efficiencies the Code, the Uniform Customs, and 
credit practices have achieved. ". 
132 Dolan, supra note 112 at 351. 
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The proper functioning of letters of credit depends on prompt payment under them, 
when seller's documents are well in order, otherwise they will lose their economic 
viability. Although courts are well aware of the high costs of fraud in the 
commercial sphere and concerned about the credit being a device for perpetrating 
fraud, they are not in a position to know the validity of the buyer's claim of fraud, 
and usually reluctant to entertain the fraud defence of a bank or of a buyer seeking 
to enjoin honour of the credit. The fraud inquiry entails considerable time for 
extensive investigation 133 If courts routinely delay honour of a credit until the 
parties have litigated the fraud issue, then the credit cannot serve as an efficient 
commercial device. If banks are to investigate into fraud claims concerning letters 
of credit, this would jeopardise the two main functions that the credit serves. 
Namely, (i) the forum-shifting function and (ii) the litigation cost-shifting function. 
With regard to the former, one of the main reasons why the seller insists on a letter 
of credit is to ensure that they are paid prior to any disputes in the underlying 
contract commencing. With regard to the latter, it is to ensure that the buyer will 
have to start that action. Very often, parties to a sale contract are located in distant 
forums. This demonstrates that the buyer will have to bring an action in the seller's 
forum, "in which the court has jurisdiction of the seller, rather than that of the 
buyer". 134 Yet, courts have fabricated an important threshold for this kind of 
equitable relief. As a general rule, before the buyer can be granted an injunction 
against honour of the credit, he must demonstrate that he has no adequate remedy 
at law. 135 
133 See Dynamics Corp. of Am v Citizens & S. Nat? Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991 (ND Ga 1973); Intraworld 
Indus., Inc. v Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343,336 A. 2d 316 (1975). 
134 Dolan, supra note 112, n. 41 p. 356. 
135 See, e. g., Enterprise Intl, Inc v Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 762 F. 2d 464 (5s` Cit. 
1985); Warner v Central Trust Co., 715 F. 2d 1121 (6`h Cir. 1983); KMW Intl v Chase Manhattan 
Bank, NA, 606 F. 2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979); Foreign Venture Ltd. Partnership v Chemical Bank, 59 
App. Div. 2d 352,356,399 NYS2d 114,116 (1977); See also Harfield, H., `Identity Crises in 
Letter of Credit Law' 24 Arizona Law Review (1982) 239 at 251: "if the account party (applicant 
for the injunction) seeks the remedy in the context of a commercial dispute with the beneficiary, 
e. g., a claim for breach of contract, the injunction will not issue. ". 
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4.2. Seller's Duty to Claim Payment From the Bank 
In accordance with the contract of sale, it is stipulated that payment should be made 
by the provision of a letter of credit. In applying this to practice, the seller would 
therefore have to initially, claim payment from the banker, however, his right to 
claim payment directly from the buyer is conditional upon him first presenting the 
documents rejected by the banker. 136 If the seller fails in his duty in providing the 
appropriate documentation to the banker, he is then accountable for the loss of 
security in relation to the payment by credit. Consequently, the buyer is also 
relieved from his duty to pay137 
In situations where the confirming banker refuses documents tendered by the seller 
under a confirmed credit, the question which arises is whether or not the seller 
should claim payment from the buyer or whether he should initially offer the 
documents to the issuing banker. This position has to date, not been determined. It 
has been claimed by Benjamin138, however, that both the confirming bank and the 
issuing bank, work in collaboration, whereby the confirming bank acts as the agent, 
and that any decision made by the confirming bank, can be considered by the seller, 
as the final. 
5. The Buyer's Rights 
5.1. Buyer's Remedies Upon Realisation that the Seller has Tendered False 
Documents 
Once the bank discharges the credit, in most cases this would result in the 
termination of the transaction. Regardless of the application of the independency 
rule 139, the bank's payment [honouring] of the credit, does not in all cases, infer that 
mutual rights and duties of the parties to the underlying contract are discharged. 
The buyer is therefore entitled to bring an action in deceit, or in cases where the 
136 See Benjamin's Sale of Goods, at § 23-078 p 1690, n 46. 
137 Ibid, n 47; See also Ventris, F., supra note 12 at 42. 
138 See Benjamin's Sale of Goods, at § 23-155 p 1733. 
139 Benjamin's Sale of Goods, § 23-120 p. 1712. 
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contract has been breached, where it is evident that the seller has presented forged 
documents 140. Thus, the buyer can utilise a quasi-contractual action, based on total 
failure of consideration, as a tool to sue the seller in cases where documents are 
regarded as `waste paper' 141 
5.2. Buyer's Right to Repudiate the Contract of Sale Upon Failure of the 
Seller to Tender the Required Documents 
If the seller fails to tender the required documents, the buyer is entitled to repudiate 
the contract of sale and to reject the goods as decided in the case of Shamsher Jute 
Mills v. Sehtia (London)142. In this case, it was a provision in the sale contract that 
the seller was to tender a set of documents complying with the terms of the 
irrevocable credit opened at the buyer's request. When the seller failed to present 
the bank with the required documents, it was held that since the seller failed to 
tender the required documents, he was not only refused entitlement to have the 
credit honoured, but he was also unable to recover the price from the buyer. '43 
Notwithstanding that there was no evidence to show that the goods were defective. 
6. Short-Circuiting and Conditional/Absolute Payment" 
6.1. No Short-Circuiting of Credit 
Given the mutual nature of the credit, it is not open to the seller to short-circuit the 
credit by tendering the documents directly to the buyer and demanding payment 
directly from him. In the case of Soproma S. P. A. v. Marine & Animal By-Products 
Corporationlas, the sales contract (of fishmeal c. & f. ) stipulated that payment was 
to be made by an irrevocable letter of credit. The bank rejected the first tender of 
140 See, cg Famouri v Dialcord Ltd (1983) 133 NLJ 153. 
141 Benjamin's Sale of Goods, at § 23-090 p. 1696. 
142 ShamsherJute Mills v. Sehtia (London[1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep 388; See also Darg Offshore Ltd v Emerald 
Field Contracting Ltd [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep 142 at 155. 
143 ShamsherJute Mills v. Sehtia (London[1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep 388,393. 
144 Jack , 
R., Documentary Credits, at § 5-17 p. 84; Todd, P., Bills of Lading & Bankers' Documentary 
Credits p. 73. 
145 Soproma S. P. A. v. Marine & Animal By-Products Corporation[1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 367. See 
Schmitthoff, C. M., SchmitthoJf's Export Trade: The Law & Practice of International Trade 9th ed 
(London, Stevens & Sons, 1990) p. 439. 
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documents following valid instruction from the buyers. The sellers made a second 
tender directly to the buyers but the buyers refused to accept the documents. 
McNair J. held that the buyers were entitled to do so, because the presentation of 
documents directly to the buyer were not valid. '46 In his course of delivering 
judgment, his Honour observed that: 
"It seems to me to be quite inconsistent with the express terms of a contract such as this 
to hold that the sellers have an alternative right to obtain payment from the buyers by 
presenting the documents direct to the buyers. Assuming that a letter of credit has been 
opened by the buyer for the opening of which the buyer would normally be required to 
provide the bank either with cash or some form of authority, could the seller at his option 
disregard the contractual letter of credit and present the documents direct to the buyer? 
As it seems to me, the answer must plainly be in the negative". 1" 
Todd's analysis of McNair J'. s decision suggests that it was advantageous to both 
parties when payment was made by documentary credit, and that it was not a right 
unique to the seller which he could "unilaterally waive". "' McNair J. said: 
"[Documentary credit is] of advantage to the seller in that by the terms of the contract [of 
sale] he is given... `a reliable paymaster' generally in his own country whom he can sue, 
and of advantage to the buyer in that he can make arrangements with his bankers for the 
provision of the necessary funds, his banker retaining the drafts and the documents as his 
security for making payment to the seller and the buyer being freed from the necessity of 
having to keep the funds available to make payment against presentation of documents to 
him at an uncertain time which is no further defined in the authorities [on c. i. f. contracts] 
than being at a reasonable time after shipment by the seller of documents covering goods 
which he has shipped or are already afloat. s149 
That is to say, if the seller is to be allowed to short-circuit the credit, the result 
would be unfair as the buyer would be denied his advantages of the credit, while the 
seller is still allowed to retain his. 150 McNair J. continued: 
"Under this form of contract, as it seems to me, the buyer performs his obligation as to 
payment if he provides for the sellers a reliable and solvent paymaster from whom he can 
obtain payment-if necessary by suit- although it may well be that if the banker fails to pay 
by reason of his insolvency the buyer would be liable; but in such a case, as at present 
advised, I think that the basis of the liability must in principle be his failure to provide a 
proper letter of credit which involves (inter alia) that the obligee under the letter of credit 
is financially solvent. (This point as to the buyer's liability for the insolvency of the bank 
was not fully argued before me and I prefer to express no concluded opinion upon it as I 
146 Another reason for the tendering of documents being invalid in that case was that the presentation was 
outside the time stipulated in the credit. 
147 Soproma S. P. A. v. Marine & Animal By-Products Corporation[l 966] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 367, at 386. 
148 Todd, P., Bills of Lading & Bankers' Documentary Credits p. 73. 
149 [1966]1 Lloyd's Rep. 367,385 (col. 2). 
150 Todd, P., Bills of Lading & Bankers' Documentary Credits p. 73. 
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understand that it may arise for decision in other cases pending in this Court. )". 151 
It is a common practice, in some parts of the world (e. g. India), for credits to 
involve drafts drawn on the applicant'52 , and 
it is also apparent that they appear not 
to function any better in practical terms than a draft drawn on a bank. It is, 
moreover, proposed that it would be undesirable to introduce a draft drawn by 
either the beneficiary or the applicant, within the operation of the credit, which aims 
to act as a source of obligation between them. In accordance with the 1993 
Revision, it is provided therefore, that the credit should not be drawn on the 
applicant"' It is clear that upon a credit being issued and which allows a draft to be 
drawn on an applicant, problems surface. Articles 9 (a) (iv) and 9 (b) (iv) of the 
UCP state that if this situation happens, such documents will be perceived as 
additional documents, on the part of the bank. It is provided that banks are 
presumed to regard the document as a draft, to be offered in conjunction with other 
documents required by the credit. However, it should not be perceived to be 
involved in any component of the payment system or being involved in any of the 
bank's obligationslsa Sometimes, the banks may have to further consider the term 
of the credit provided for drafts on applicants. An example which demonstrates how 
Article 10(b)(iii) in the 1983 Revision was applied, is evident in the case of Forestal 
Mimosa Ltd. v. Oriental Credit Ltdlss The basis on which the defendant bank was 
believed liable, was that the bills, which had been drawn on the buyers, had not been 
accepted by them. 156 
151 [1966]1 Lloyd's Rep. 367,385 (col. 2). 
152 The 1983 Revision Articles 10. a. iii and 10. b. iii provided for this kind of drafts. See Jack, R, 
Documentary Credits, at § 5.17 p. 84. 
153 Article (9XaXiv) and (9)(bXiv) makes it clear that the credit should not be drawn on the applicant. 
154 Jack, R, Documentary Credits, at § 5.17 p. 84. 
155 Forestal Mimosa Ltd. v. Oriental Credit Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 631. 
1-'6 Ibid at 632. 
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6.2. The Seller's Right of Recourse When he Cannot Obtain Payment From 
the Bank and the Issue of Whether Payment by Letter of Credit is 
Conditional or Absolute. Possible Conflict With the Independency Principle 
If the seller is unable to obtain payment from the issuing bank in the case of a 
confirmed credit or either the confirming or issuing banks for non-confirmed credit, 
the crucial question faced by the seller is whether he has a right of recourse against 
the buyer. 
The answer to the above question depends on the following conditions: 
"(i) the reason for which the seller is unable to obtain payment; 
(ii) the drafting of the `payment' clause in the main contract between buyer and 
seller". '" 
6.2.1. Whether the Seller has a Right of Recourse? 
6.2.1.1. The Reason for Which the Seller is Unable to Obtain Payment 
If the seller is unable to tender the required documents or is late in presenting them, 
then he has no right of recourse against the applicant for the credit. The seller has 
no real grounds for complaint since he has himself breached the contract, in which 
he is obliged to tender the very documents prescribed by the "credit". '58 In fact, 
"he will be no worse off than he would have been under the rules of the common 
law had he sold c. i. f. or f. o. b. on the basis of payment by the seller by telegraphic 
transfer on reception of the relevant documents". 1s9 Then, does this mean that a 
seller (beneficiary under a credit arrangement) should be better treated than he 
would be if there were no credit, when there is a question of tendering the correct 
documents? If the seller proves that he has tendered exactly the required 
documents, but the bank, being unreasonable, rejected them, the bank should be 
regarded as in breach of its obligations. In such instances, it is open to the seller to 
'57 Ventris, F. M., Bankers' Documentary Credits, 3rd ed (Lloyd's of London Press Ltd, 1990) pp. 85-86. 
138 Soproma S. p. A v Marine and Animal By Products Corporation [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 367,385, per 
McNair J. 
159 Ventris, Bankers' Documentary Credits p. 86. 
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dispose of the goods at the best price he can, in order to mitigate his loss, and then 
an action against the bank for its breach of contract may be followed. "' 
This is, however, a lengthy, expensive and unreliable process. The seller can 
therefore, in practice, appeal to the buyer (the applicant of the credit). "' "This is of 
course an extra-contractual action". 162 However, if the buyer requires the materials 
or goods urgently, he may nonetheless be prepared to waive the non-conformity in 
the documents and instruct the bank to accept the documents. Nowadays, for 
commercial efficacy, the practice is usually that the confirming bank, upon finding 
trivial discrepancies, would consult the issuing bank as to whether it should accept 
such documents. The issuing bank will then naturally repeat such messages to the 
buyer. 163 
An example of a trivial irregularity is where the seller's commercial invoice was 
made out to "ABC" instead of "ABC Ltd. ", and the issuing bank refused to pay. 
The case would be considered worse if the seller had already lost physical control 
of the cargo, where it had been discharged into the buyer's storage without 
production of the bill of lading. What the seller can do is either start an action for 
breach of contract against the bank, but that would be quite time consuming and 
difficult; alternatively, he can appeal to the buyer for the payment. The buyer in this 
kind of case, can often delay the payment for a few months and thus take the 
advantage of the most trivial of irregularities. 164 
6.2.1.2. The Drafting of the `Payment' Clause in the Main Contract Between 
Buyer and Seller 
Another circumstance when the seller would like to have recourse is where the bank 
is unable to pay, i. e., they have stopped payment. The possibility of the seller's 
recovery of payment on the banker's default depends upon the interpretation of the 




164 Ventris, Bankers'Documentary Credits p. 87. 
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payment clause in the sales contract: whether the buyer's procurement of the letter 
of credit is "absolute payment" or "conditional payment" of the purchase price. l6s 
Normally, the contract is silent on that specific issue, and therefore it will be a 
matter of deduction for a court or arbitrator, to determine what the intentions of the 
parties should be taken to be in all circumstances. 166 
It is a principle of letter of credit law that the letter of credit is completely 
independent of the underlying sale of goods contract, which supports the view that 
payment by credit is absolute. Where a credit is absolute payment and is correctly 
established or is accepted by the seller, the seller would normally have no rights 
against the buyer if the seller presents conforming documents but nonetheless 
remains unpaid. His only remedy is against the bank or banks. There may be two 
exceptions to this. Firstly, if the buyer induces the banks not to pay, the buyer may 
be liable for inducing breach of contract, depending on his appreciation that a 
breach was involved. Secondly, if the buyer has received the goods, this may give 
rise to remedies against him. So far no case has touched on the problem of what 
should happen if the bank fails before the documents could be tendered. The 
analysis presented here does not read terms from the sale of goods contract into the 
letter of credit, but asks how the letter of credit should be interpreted, to give a 
certain result under the sale of goods contract. 
Where the effect of the payment clause is that the buyer has taken the contractual 
obligation that he will have a credit issued which will permit the seller to obtain 
payment, if he tenders the prescribed documents in time, then this is a double 
engagement that: 
(i) he will have the "credit" issued; and 
(ii) if the seller fulfils his own contractual obligations, i. e. to tender the specified 
165 W JAlan & Co v E! Nasr Export and Import Co [1972] 2 Q. B. 189. 
'66 Re Charge Card Services Ltd. [1987] Ch 150 at 165 et seq (Millett J) and [1989] Ch 497 at 511-512. 
(CA). 
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documents, then he will definitely get his money. "' 
Which sounds exactly like payment by credit is conditional, i. e. if the seller does 
fulfill the obligations and nonetheless fails to obtain payment from the banks, then 
the buyer is in breach of his contractual undertaking. In fact, it is well established 
that the opening of credit does not discharge the buyer's obligation to pay. 16S In the 
leading case of Newman Industries Ltd v. Indo-British Industries169, where the 
plaintiffs were to supply a generator through an intermediary (Indo-British, the 
defendant) to Govindram Brothers Ltd., in India, the Queen's Bench held that the 
defendant's procurement of a letter of credit was merely a conditional payment, and 
implied that the absence of any express terms to the contrary in the sale of goods 
contract, indicated the parties' intent not to vary the prevalent trade custom. 
Furthermore, the court stated that very clear contractual provisions would be 
necessary for the letter of credit to constitute absolute payment. 170 
It was suggested by the High Court of Australia, that this was specific to situations 
involving credits which were revocable and `irrevocable but unconfirmed', but that 
confirmed credits were excluded. This distinction is pretty hard to appreciate, since 
the only difference between a `confirmed' and an `irrevocable but unconfirmed' 
credit is that, in the first instance, the seller is assured payment by both banks, 
unlike in the other, where the seller can only be assured of payment by the issuing 
bank. 
Lord Denningl" M R. endeavoured to address this issue, with specific reference to 
167 Ventris, Bankers' Documentary Credits p. 88. 
168 Gutteridge and Megrah, The Law of Bankers' Commercial Credits, (Europa Publications Ltd., 1984, ) 
p. 35 et seq. 
169 Newman Industries Ltd v Indo-British Industries [1956] 2 Lloyd's Rep 219; [1957] 1 Lloyd's Rep 211; 
See also Soproma S. p. A. v Marine and Animal By-Products Corporation, supra. In the U. S. A. see: 
Lamborn vAllen Kirkpatrick, 135 A 541 (1927); Greenough vMunroe, 53 F. 2d 362 (1931). 
170 Newman Industries Ltd v Indo-British Industries [1956] 2 Lloyd's Rep 219,236. 
171 WJAIan & Co v EI Nasr Export and Import Co [ 1972] 2 Q. B. 189. 
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normal circumstances, where there was agreement by both parties, by stating that; 
"when the contract of sale stipulates for payment to be made by confirmed 
irrevocable letter of credit, then when the letter of credit is issued and accepted by 
the seller, it operates as a conditional payment of the price. It does not operate as 
absolute payment". 172 He went on to say that "if the letter of credit is honoured by 
the bank when documents are presented to it, the debtor is discharged. If it is not 
honoured the debt is not discharged". 173 
It is evident when examining certain documentary credits, that the banker prefers to 
accept a draft payable within a specified period of time, after sight, instead of 
assuring cash payment or honouring a sight draft174 It can be illustrated, from 
reviewing specific cases, that the buyer is not relieved, irrespective of whether the 
bank actually accepts such a draft, and the seller remains entitled to request 
payment from the buyer in cases where the draft is dishonoured by the banker. In 
this case the buyer may find that he has to pay twice, to both the seller and then to 
the issuing bank 15. Although such practice appears to be unusual, in reality it is 
more common than actually perceived 176 
17 Ibid at 212. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Benjamin's Sale of Goods, at § 23-080 p. 1691. 
175 The court may, however, release the buyer from any obligation assumed by him towards the defaulting 
issuing banker. See Sale Continuation Ltd v Austin Taylor & Co. Ltd. [1968] 2 Q. B. 849; see also 
the American case, Vivacqua Irmaos, SA v Nickerson 193 La. 195,190 So. 657 (1939), where the 
court held that "to hold defendant (buyer) liable to plaintiff (seller) under these circumstances 
(insolvency of the bank) would force defendant to pay a second time for coffee which defendant has 
already paid for in accordance with the custom of trade and as contemplated by the parties under 
the terms of their contract. " (at 503,190 Sp. At 659). 
176 In the case of Donne v Cornewall back in 1485, the defendant had signed a bond for money he owed to 
the plaintiff. Having paid his debt and having the bond back, the defendant forgot to destroy the 
bond, which came again into the hands of the plaintiff by some devious means. The plaintiff sued 
on the bond and the court held that the defendant had to pay again. A verbal statement that he had 
already repaid the money, even if it were truthful, cannot strike down the existence of the bond. 
See Ventris, Bankers' Documentary Credits p. 89. 
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In W. J. Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El Nasr Export and Import Co., '77 a non-conforming 
letter of credit was opened. One of the discrepancies of it was that it provided for 
payment in U. K. sterling rather than Kenyan currency. Since the bank failed to meet 
its obligations, the Court of Appeal held that the seller could claim payment from 
the buyer directly, unless express provision to the contrary was made in the contract 
of sale. Regarding this case, it was said to be a conditional, rather than an absolute 
payment of the price. '78 Lord Denning M. R. said: 
"In my opinion a letter of credit is not to be regarded as absolute payment, unless the 
seller stipulates, expressly or impliedly, that it should be so. He may do it impliedly if he 
stipulates for the credit to be issued by a particular bank in such circumstances that it is to 
be inferred that the seller looks to that particular banker to the exclusion of the buyer... 
If the letter of credit is conditional payment of the price, the consequences are these: The 
seller looks in the first instance to the banker for payment: but if the banker does not meet 
his obligations when the time comes for him to do so, the seller can have recourse to the 
buyer. The seller must present the documents to the banker. One of the two things may 
then happen: (1) the banker may fail or refuse to pay or accept drafts in exchange for the 
documents. The seller then, of course, does not hand over the documents. He retains 
dominion over the goods. He can resell them and claim damages from the buyer. He can 
also sue the banker for not honouring the credit: see Urquhart Lindsay & Co. Ltd. v 
Eastern Bank Ltd. 179 But he cannot, of course, get damages twice over. (2) The bank may 
accept time drafts in exchange for the documents, but may fail to honour the drafts when 
the time comes. In that case the banker will have the documents and will usually have 
passed them on to the buyer, who will have paid the bank for them. The seller can then 
sue the banker on the drafts: or if the banker fails or is insolvent, the seller can sue the 
buyer, The banker's drafts are like any ordinary payment for goods by a bill of exchange. 
They are conditional payment, but not absolute payment. It may mean that the buyer (if 
he has already paid the bank) will have to pay twice over. So be it. He ought to have made 
sure that he employed a `reliable and solvent paymaster'. "' 80 
Similarly, the Queen's Bench adopted the same view in Maran Road Saw Mill v. 
Austin Taylor Ltd'81. Here, upon failure by the issuing bank, the seller succeeded in 
an action against its agent, whose position was of a buyer under the commercial 
credit. Ackner J. said: 
"Can it then be said that [the defendants] have discharged their contractual obligation, 
when, although they have established a letter of credit, payment has not been made under 
it? To my mind, the answer is a simple one and is in the negative. I respectfully adopt 
In W. J. Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El NasrExport and Import Co [1972] 2 Q. B. 189 at p. 220. 
Similarly, see the case of Greenough v Munroe (53 F. 2d 362 (2nd Cir. 1931), cert. Denied, 284 US 672 
(1931)). 
179 Urquhart Lindsay & Co. Ltd. v Eastern Bank Ltd [1922] 1 K. B. 318. 
180 W. J. Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El NasrExport and Import Co [1972] 2 Q. B. 189 at p. 210. 
181 Maran Road Saw Mill v. Austin Taylor Ltd [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 156. 
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and slightly adapt the language used by Stephenson L. J. in W. J. Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El 
Nasr Exhort and Import CO. 182 The agents promised to pay by letter of credit not to 
provide by a letter of credit a source of payment which did not pay. i183 
Todd has submitted that the principles set out in the above mentioned cases of El- 
Nasr and Maran Road create only a "rebuttable presumption". 184 Thus, it is open to 
the courts to decide, according to the surrounding circumstances, whether the 
credit is to be regarded as absolute rather than conditional payment. 
However, some authorities have taken the view that the seller could be regarded to 
have implidley stipulated that the credit payment is to be absolute. This is so if the 
seller "stipulates for the credit to be issued by a particular bank, in such 
circumstances that it is to be inferred that the seller looks to that particular banker 
to the exclusion of the buyer". '" McNair J. in the case of Soproma S. p. A v. Marine 
and Animal By-Products Corporation 186, was of the view that, only in the event of 
the issuing bank's insolvency, may the seller be able to tender documents to the 
buyer directly. Normally, the choice of issuing bank is left to the buyer, and 
therefore the seller should not be required to take the consequences of its failure. "' 
Also, in the case of E. D. & F. Man Ltd. v. Nigerian Sweets & Confectionery Co. 
Ltd., 188 the buyer argued that the opening of the credit should be treated as absolute 
payment because the sellers had agreed on the identity of the issuing bank. In this 
case, the issuing bank went into liquidation after being reimbursed and before 
payment had been made to the seller under 90-day drafts drawn on it. The seller 
sued the buyers directly instead. Ackner J. was of the opinion that the buyers were 
182 W. J. Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El Nasr Export and Import Co [1972] 2 Q. B. 189 at p. 220. 
183Maran Road Saw Mill v. Austin Taylor Ltd [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 156,159 (col. 1). 
184 Todd, P., Bills of Lading & Bankers'Documentary Credits p. 75. 
185 [1972] 2 Q. B. 189, at p. 220 (per Lord Denning, M. R. ). See also Soproma S. p. A v Marine and Animal 
By-Products Corporation [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep 367, where the banker was chosen by the seller. 
186 Soproma S. p. A v Marine and Animal By Products Corporation [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep 367. 
187 Ibid at 386. 
188 E. D. &F. Man Ltd v. Nigerian Sweets & Confectionery Co. Ltd [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 50. 
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liable. He relied on Alan v. El Nasr1S9, when he decided that the seller's agreement, 
as to choice of bank was merely one factor and not in any way conclusive: 
"Mr Evans [for the buyers] sought to submit as a proposition of law, that where the 
identity of the bank is agreed between the parties, and not left to the choice of the buyers, 
it must follow that the sellers impliedly agree that the liability of the issuing bank has 
been accepted by them in place of that of the buyers. I do not think that this is correct. 
The fact that the sellers have agreed on the identity of the issuing bank is but one of the 
factors to be taken into account when considering whether there are circumstances from 
which it can be properly inferred that the sellers look to that particular bank to the 
exclusion of the buyer. It is in no way conclusive. In this case..., there were other 
circumstances which clearly supported the presumption that the letters of credit were not 
given as absolute payment but as conditional payment... 
The sellers remedy in such circumstances is to claim from the buyers either the price 
agreed in the contract of sale or damages for breach of their contractual promise to pay by 
letter of credit. "1 90 
In considering a situation where the seller, in selecting a specific bank, has made 
such a choice against the initial wishes of buyer, reference should be made to the 
American case of Vivacqua Irmaos SA v. Hickerson. 19' In this case, with regards to 
the scenario mentioned above, it was acceptable, as long as the buyer had been 
perceived to have done all he could, by utilising the selected bank's services 192 . 
Moreover, it is a case whereby the selection of the issuing bank was effected by the 
seller, therefore, the presumption that a documentary credit constitutes conditional 
rather than absolute payment is rightly rebuttable in this case. 193 Such a conclusion 
is commercially sound as a buyer who is specifically required to utilise a bank, other 
than his usual bankers, may have to remit to that bank the required funds in advance 
or at least to provide a security, such as a back-to-back credit, of his own bank. 194 
This view is against the prevailing line of the English authorities, however, it can be 
applied in relevant cases'95 
189 W. J. Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El Nasr Export and Import Co [1972] 2 Q. B. 189, he relied on the obiter dicta 
of Lord Denning M. R., at 210. 
190 E. D. & F. Man Ltd. v. Nigerian Sweets & Confectionery Co. Ltd [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 50,56. 
191 Vivacqua Irmaos SA v Nickerson 190 So. 657 (1939). 
192 Ibid at 659. 
193 It should be noted that the choice of bank is merely one factor, and is in no way conclusive. E. D. & F. 
Man Ltd. v. Nigerian Sweets & Confectionery Co. Ltd [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 50, at 56. 
194 Benjamin's Sale of Goods, at § 23-088 p. 1696. 
195 Ibid at § 23-085 p. 1694. 
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The English decisions are based on attributing to the parties to the underlying sale 
of goods transaction, an intention to treat the furnishing of the documentary credit, 
and thus the subsequent acceptance of drafts, as conditional rather than absolute 
payment. But is this presumption rebuttable ? As we have seen, the answer is that it 
is possible in some circumstances according to the judgment of Lord Denning M. R. 
in El Nasr case'96. 
Conversely, the situation is clearer in cases concerning credit cards or charge cards. 
It has always been held that payment by credit cards constitutes absolute rather than 
conditional payment. The case of Re Charge Card Services Ltd. 197, illustrates this 
scenario. In this case, a company engaged in the issuing of credit cards went into 
liquidation. One of the issues was whether dealers, who had supplied goods or 
services to card-holders upon their executing a sales docket on which the details of 
their respective card were imprinted by the use of the dealer's machine, had the 
right to fall back on such holders when the company suspended payment. 
Millett J. said, "the word `pay', like the word `payment', is ambiguous - it may refer 
to conditional or absolute payment - and its meaning in any given case cannot be 
determined merely by its use. "198 His Honour went on to talk about the distinction 
between a transaction involving the furnishing of a documentary credit and a credit 
card transaction. He said: 
"the sole purpose of the letter of credit is to provide security to the seller to replace that 
represented by the shipping documents which he gives up in exchange of the credit ... By 
contrast, credit and charge cards are used mainly to facilitate payment of small consumer 
debts arising out of transactions between parties who may well not be known to each 
196 see W. J. Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El NasrExport and Import Co. [1972] 2 Q. B. 189,210A. per Lord Denning. 
However, it should be noted that the choice of bank is merely one factor, and is in no way 
conclusive. E. D. & F. Man Ltd. v. Nigerian Sweets & Confectionery Co. Ltd [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 
50, at 56. 
197 Re Charge Card Services Ltd [1987] Ch 150, affd. [1989] Ch 497. See generally, Bridge, M. G., The 
Sale of Goods (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1997) p. 34; Benjamin's Sale of Goods, at § 23-085 p. 
1694. 
198 [1987] Ch 150 at p. 168. 
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other, and the terms of which are not usually the subject of negotiation. "' 99 
In his Honour's view, the special type of credit card transaction was sufficient "not 
only to displace any presumption that, payment by such means [was] conditional 
payment only, but to support a presumption to the contrary. s200 
When this case went to the Court of Appeal, as well as it being confirmed that 
payment by credit cards constituted absolute rather than conditional payment, a 
distinction was also made between payment by credit cards and letters of credit201. 
Browne-Wilkinson V-C, referring to the above mentioned judgment of Lord 
Denning M. R. in El Nasr case, additionally emphasised, in the course of his 
judgment, that the presumption that payment by letter of credit was conditional may 
be rebutted. His Lordship commented that where the selection of the issuing bank 
was effected by the seller, the presumption that a documentary credit constitutes 
conditional rather than absolute payment is rebuttable. According to Sir Nicholas 
Browne-WilkinsonV-C : 
"It is normally the buyer, not the seller, who selects the bank issuing the letter of credit: 
if, unusually, the seller does select the bank, this factor may rebut the presumption of 
conditional payment by letter of credit". 202 
This is a good reason for holding the presumption that conditional payment may be 
rebutted. Nonetheless, the comparison of letter of credit as a conditional or absolute 
payment is, in fact, mainly of academic interest. The court has never been so rigid as 
to conclude that payment by letter of credit is an absolute payment. 
6.3. Position on Banker's Bankruptcy203 
Real difficulties arise in cases of the banker's bankruptcy, where the buyer has not 
yet paid the banker before its bankruptcy. However, according to Berger, if 
199 Ibid. 
200 Ibid at 169. 
201 [1989] Ch, 497 at 516-517. 
202 [1989] Ch, 497 at 516. 
203 See Jack, R, Documentary Credits, at § 3-43 et seq p. 54; Todd, P., Bills of Lading & Bankers' 
Documentary Credits p. 69. For Canadian position on this issue, see Sarna, `Letters of credit: 
Bankruptcy, Fraud and Identity of Parties' 65-66 Canadian Bar Review (1986-87) 303 at 307; see 
also, Sarna, "Letters of Credit: The Law and Current Practice, 31a ed., (Carswell, Canada, 1989), at 
§2p. (6-2). 
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payment by letters of credit is absolute, the result is; 
"a loss to the seller equal to the difference between the sales price and the liquidating 
dividend. The general creditors of the bank would reap a benefit to the extent that the 
buyer's payment of funds to the bank prior to the bank's insolvency exceeds the pro rata 
liquidating dividend received by the seller as one general creditor". 204 
However, where payment by letter of credit is conditional, neither the seller nor the 
buyer lose or gain anything and the seller can sue the buyer for breach of contract if 
he does not pay. 
Sometimes the buyer places the issuing banker in funds before the seller is paid the 
amount of credit or honours a draft drawn under it. In this situation, if payment by 
letter of credit is absolute, the seller, as a general creditor, gets only the pro rata 
liquidating dividend. Whereas the buyer here, neither gains or loses anything, and 
the seller gets less than the contracted price. If however, payment by letter of credit 
is conditional, the seller does not gain or lose anything because he receives (partly 
from the bank and partly from the buyer), the entire purchase price for the goods 
shipped. The buyer has already pre-paid the purchase price to the bank, and now he 
will also have to pay almost the entire amount to the seller. See Chart 1, at the end 
of the Chapter, for detail. 
It seems to be proper, because the buyer himself chose the bank to issue the letter 
of credit, and he should be in a better position to evaluate its financial soundness 
than the seller. 205 
6.4. Technical Defects in the Documents 
Where technical defects are discovered within the documents, and the bank 
subsequently refuses to honour the credit, the issue which needs to be addressed is 
whether this permits the seller to have a direct recourse against the buyer. 
In order to answer this question, we have to initially take into consideration the 
following two points. Firstly, what standard of compliance is to govern? Secondly, 
is payment by a letter of credit conditional or absolute? Upon the payment by a 
204 Berger, S. R., `The Effects of Issuing Bank Insolvency on Letters of Credit' 21 Harvard International 
Law Journal (1980)161, at. 175. 
205 See ED. And FMan Ltd. v Nigerian Sweets and Confectionery Co. Ltd. [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep 50. 
Chapter Seven: Disputes on the Underlying Contract 392 
letter of credit being determined as absolute, the seller would then have no direct 
right of claim against the buyer, in cases where the bank legitimately refuses 
payment. The bank is regarded as having legitimately refused payment if it has 
complied with the applicable compliance test. The matter between the seller and 
buyer is thus closed. But if the bank's reason for refusing payment was considered 
as unreasonable, i. e. rejection was contrary to the compliance standard test in place, 
then the seller may claim recourse against the bank. 
Unlike the former situation, if payment by a letter of credit is conditional, then, 
there are two situations that need to be tackled. First, if the bank legitimately 
refused to pay, it would be absurd if the seller had recourse against the buyer. For 
example, supposing that the strict compliance standard was the adopted test, the 
bank's rejection of the documents on the grounds of technical defects would be in 
line with the requirements of such test. Secondly, if the bank wrongfully refuses to 
honour the credit, for example where the qualified strict compliance test is in place, 
under which trivial defects in the documents are tolerated, then the question which 
arises is whether the seller has a direct recourse against the buyer. Now, under 
conditional payment, the seller has a right to have recourse against the buyer if he, 
the seller, has exhausted all possible routes in order to recover his money from the 
bank. If the seller then fails, he would have a direct claim against the buyer. 
7. Suggestions for Buyers and Sellers to Safeguard Their Interests 
7.1. Seller's Protections 
The commentaries206 suggest that the seller should protect himself by preparing a 
checklist that stipulates the conditions that the buyer should include in the letter of 
credit. Firstly, the port of export should be specified, 207 and a precise description of 
the goods, preferably in the words of the seller, should be provided so that there 
206 Samuel, H. A., `Letter of Credit Can Protect Both Sellers and Purchasers' 401 The Journal of Commerce 
and Commercial, (Friday, Aug. 19, No. 28) (1994), 293 at 293; See also, Cooke, J. A., `What You 
Should Know About Letters of Credit' 29 Traffic Management (1990) (No. 9 Sept) 44, at pp. 47-52; 
Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit. Commercial and Standby Credits pp (1-47), (1-48). 
207 Samuel, H. A., `Letter of Credit Can Protect Both Sellers and Purchasers' 401. 
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will be no confusion to the buyer. This enables the seller's normal invoice procedure 
to be followed. Further, it is also important to agree to the shipment date and 45-60 
days period can be added to this. This flexibility in the shipment time should give 
the exporter an adequate time for the production and the shipment of the goods so 
that an extension will not be needed. It is important to agree on who will cover the 
insurance arrangement and costs. A simple sale term c. i. f., does not always make it 
clear. A seller is also advised to check the conformity between the full amount of 
the letter of credit and the other conditions. It happens sometimes in practice that a 
letter of credit includes only the merchandise value stated in it, but some other 
charges such as freight are ignored. It is noteworthy to specify in the credit itself, by 
whom the freight is to be paid and to agree on the consignment's destination. In 
addition, specification of the method of shipment, whether by air or surface from 
point of origin or port of export, is also important. 208 Also, the seller is advised to 
request the letter of credit to be advised through his own bank, so that his account 
will be credited immediately and without delay. It is important for the seller to have 
the letter of credit reviewed by his banker to ensure its accuracy before shipping. It 
is also worth having it reviewed by the seller's freight forwarder, in order to 
confirm whether the terms of the credit are easy to meet. 
For further protection, the seller must demand that the letter of credit be irrevocable 
so that the buyer cannot cancel the credit if the seller made the shipment, no later 
than the date as agreed in the sales contract. 209 When dealing with a buyer from a 
foreign country, a wise seller should request the buyer to have the letter of credit 
confirmed by a bank in which the seller has confidence. 
7.2. Buyer's Protections 
Given the two functions that a letter of credit serves (the forum-shifting function21o 
and the litigation cost-shifting function211, examined under section 4.1.1.2. ), the 
208 This must conform with the value of the letter of credit. 
209 Ortmann, H. J., `The Pitfalls of Letters of Credit' 92 Business Credit, Nov/Dec (1990) 24 at 24. 
210 Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit. Commercial and Standby Credits p. ( 3-34). 
211 See Note, `The Trade Embargo and the Irrevocable Letter of Credit' 1 Ariz J Intl & Comp. L (1982) 213 
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buyer is advised to follow certain safety measures to safeguard his interests. The 
buyer himself is advised to ask for a sale contract, which demands a letter of credit 
payable against an inspection certificate, to be carried out by an independent 
inspector. 212 Further, the buyer is recommended to require the seller to procure the 
opening of a standby letter of credit, in order to be secured against the seller's 
defaults. 213 Moreover, a reduction in the purchase price to take account of the 
forum cost should be negotiated. It is also important that the buyer tries to agree to 
avoid funding the sale contract by a letter of credit. To safeguard his interests 
against seller's fraud, a buyer is required to insert detailed and complex conditions 
and documentary requirements in the credit itself. 214 In addition, the buyer is 
advised to use non-negotiable drafts (Bills of Exchange). In case of forgery of 
shipping documents, holders in due course can still recover from the issuer or 
confirming bank in spite of the fact that the documents were forged. By using such 
non-negotiable Bills of Exchange, the alleged holder in due course may fail to prove 
his status, and therefore, the fraudulent transaction may be frustrated. 215 The buyer 
should insist on the use of time drafts rather than sight drafts. The rationale behind 
this is to allow some time before payment of the credit until the arrival and 
inspection of the goods. Thus, fraud can be detected before payment. 216 He should 
also put a condition which provides for sale "on approval". The root of this 
condition is found in the English Sale of Goods Act 1979, which provides for sales 
on approval in which the property in the goods does not pass to the buyer until he 
approves the goods. In case of payment by letters of credit, payment will not be 
(1982). 
212 Samuel, supra note 206 at 293. See also, Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit. Commercial and Standby 
Credits p. (3-33). 
213 This practice of insisting on standby credits to secure the sellers compliance with the underlying 
contract is evident in the American case of City of Philadelphia v American Coastal Indus., Inc., 
704 F. Supp. 578 (ED. Pa. 1988). 
214 McLaughlin, G. T., `Structuring Commercial Letter-of-Credit Transaction to Safeguard the Interests of 
the Buyer' 21 Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal (1989) 318 at 318-332. 
215 Murray, D. E., `Letters of Credit and Forged and Altered Documents: Some Deterrent Suggestions' 98 
Commercial Law Journal (1993) 504 at 508. 
2161bid at 509. 
Chapter Seven: Disputes on the Underlying Contract 395 
effected till the buyer approves the quality of goods. 217 
Since transmission of shipping documents between the seller and issuing bank is 
direct, buyers are advised to require carriers to send facsimile copies of bills of 
lading immediately to the issuing banks. Issuing banks, therefore, would state that 
the letter of credit would not be honoured without the bill of lading facsimile having 
been received. This decreases the chance of forged shipping documents by 
unscrupulous carriers and sellers. 218 
217 Ibid at 5 10. 
2181bid at 511. 
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Section Two: Evaluation of the Conditional-Absolute Payment Issue in Light 
of the Basic Principles of Commercial Law 
1. "Conditional" Payment vs. "Absolute" Payment 
Parties to the underlying contract are free to expressly or impliedly agree on 
whether payment by letter of credit is absolute or conditional. Since the underlying 
contract is usually silent on the issue of whether payment by letter of credit is 
absolute or conditional, it will be a matter of deduction for a court to decide what 
the intentions of the parties should be taken to be in all circumstances. However, in 
English law if the contract is silent as to this issue, there is a rebuttable presumption 
that it is conditional rather than absolute. 
Despite its theoretical "independence", the buyer's procurement of the letter of 
credit is treated by the courts, more often than not, as conditional payment. 219 
Although considering a letter of credit as a conditional payment goes against the 
principle of independency, the resulting fairness, certainty and flexibility which it 
brings about is judged to outweigh non-conformity with the independency principle. 
Other than the seller's default or being late in tendering the correct documents, 
there are two situations whereby the seller might not get paid while he is entitled to: 
one is when the bank rejects the seller's documents due to technical discrepancies, 
another is on the banker's bankruptcy. These two situations will be dealt with 
separately below. 
2. What Position Does the Law Take in Relation to Absolute-Conditional 
Payment Issue? 
What is the position in the three legal regimes with which we are concerned 
(English law, the UCP and the UCC) with regard to the absolute-conditional 
219 See generally, Newman Industries Ltd v Indo-British Industries [1956] 2 Lloyd's Rep 219; [1957] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 211 and Maran Road Saw Mill v. Austin Taylor Ltd [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 156; WJ. 
Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El Nasr Export and Import Co. [1972] 2 Q. B. 189 at 220; Newman Industries 
Ltd v Indo-British Industries [1957] 1 Lloyd's Rep 211, at 236. 
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issue? 
Under English Law, if the contract is silent as to the payment clause, there is a 
strong presumption that payment by letters of credit is a conditional 
payment. 220 Both the UCP and the UCC are silent upon the issue. 
3. Technical Defects in the Documents 
In determining whether a seller is allowed to have a direct recourse against the 
buyer upon the bank finding technical defects in the documents, it is important 
primarily to establish whether payment is conditional or absolute and the standard 
of compliance in place. The impact of the applicable compliance standard on 
whether payment by a letter of credit is conditional or absolute, upon finding 
technical defects in the documents will be examined below under section 3.1.2. 
3.1. Evaluation of Absolute-Conditional Payment Issue With Reference to the 
Five Criteria 
3.1.1. Party Autonomy in Relation to Absolute-Conditional Payment 
Parties should be free to explicitly agree that payment by letter of credit is 
either absolute or conditional. Where the parties so agree, the principle of party 
autonomy dictates that such terms should be held sacred. Hence, the law may 
adopt either of the two doctrinal options, conditional payment or absolute 
payment, as default positions. Either way, party autonomy is respected because 
the contracting parties can alter the default position by express agreement. This 
conclusion can be inferred only from Common Law cases. The UCP is silent 
upon the issue but since the UCP rules are default rules, there is no reason why 
parties cannot agree to whether payment is absolute or conditional. The UCC 
rules are silent upon the issue too but since Article 5 allows variation of its 
sections if the contracting parties so agree, then the principle of party 
autonomy is also preserved. 
3.1.2. Fairness in Relation to Absolute-Conditional Payment 
Treating the payment by letter of credit as absolute, may, according to the 
220 See, Section One, (1.7. ). 
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distributive theory, produce unfairness, since the seller has no rights against the 
buyer for payment in case of the banker's default even if the tender was rejected 
due to minor or immaterial defects. Under these circumstances, although the seller 
is, no doubt, entitled to appeal to the buyer, if he (seller) has lost control over 
goods, the buyer can often delay the payment for a few months and thus take 
advantage of the most trivial irregularities. Now where the applicable compliance 
rule is the "strict compliance" rule, the bank is right to reject the seller's documents, 
even if the discrepancies are trivial. The problem then lies with the absolute 
payment rule in conjunction with a strict compliance rule. In contrast, treating a 
letter of credit as conditional payment is fair (more in line with the distributive 
theory), since in most cases the seller will have recourse to the buyer should he fail 
to obtain payment from the bank, provided that he has performed and there is no 
fault on his part. 
3.1.3. Good Faith in Relation to Absolute-Conditional Payment 
By treating a letter of credit as a conditional payment, good faith, in its objective 
sense, is promoted because the law then reflects the reasonable expectations of 
commercial people. It is important, at this point, to justify why the `objective sense' 
has been used here. In the underlying contract, since it is not governed by the law of 
letter of credit, i. e. the UCC Article 5, but governed by applicable law whereby the 
concept of fair dealing is incorporated. By contrast, treating a letter of credit as an 
absolute payment overlooks good faith. The buyer can take advantage of the most 
trivial irregularities in the goods to delay payment if goods are delivered. A case 
which is even worse is when the goods have not yet been shipped to the buyer and 
the price of goods in the market has fallen, the buyer simply rejects the goods. The 
only thing the seller can do is to sell the goods in the market at the best price he can 
in an effort to mitigate his loss, and then sue the banker for damages for breach of 
contract, which is a lengthy, expensive and unreliable process221. 
221 See, Section Two, (1.1. ), 
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3.1.4. Certainty in Relation to Absolute-Conditional Payment 
If the law holds that where the contract is silent as to the payment clause, there 
is a strong presumption that payment by letters of credit is conditional, then, 
commercial people know where they stand. Likewise, if a letter of credit 
payment is to be regarded as absolute, unless otherwise expressly or impliedly 
agreed to, the law is also certain. 222 
Certainty is apparent from the clear statement of law which was put by Lord 
Denning MR. where he stated that; "a letter of credit is not to be regarded as 
absolute payment, unless the seller stipulates, expressly or impliedly, that it should 
be so. 9s223 
In fact, it is well established that the opening of a credit does not discharge the 
buyer's obligation to pay. As Ackner J. put it clearly in Maran Road Saw Mill v. 
Austin Taylor & Co. Ltd. 224, providing a `source of payment' by letter of credit is 
different from the promised `paying by letter of credit', and what the bank promised 
was to pay by letter of credit, not to provide by a letter of credit a source of 
payment which did not pay225. In the leading case of Newman Industries Ltd v. 
Indo-British Industries226, payment was merely conditional. The same line of 
judgments was also followed in El Nasr227 and Maran Road Saw Mill v. Austin 
Taylor Ltd228. 
In other words, the law governing letters of credit (English law) is certain as to 
payment because commercial people would be certain that payment by a letter of 
credit is, without doubt, not absolute at all unless otherwise expressly or impliedly 
222 See, Ibid. 
223 WJ. Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El Nasr Export and Import Co. [1972] 2 Q. B. 189 at 220; See also Newman 
Industries Ltd v Indo-British Industries [1957] 1 Lloyd's Rep 211, at 236. 
224Maran Road Saw Mill v. Austin Taylor Ltd [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 156 at 159. 
225 Gutteridge, li. C., and Megrah, M., The Law of Bankers' Commercial Credits p. 35. 
226 Newman Industries Ltd v Indo-British Industries [1956] 2 Lloyd's Rep 219; [1957] 1 Lloyd's Rep 211; 
See also Soproma S. p. A. v Marine and Animal By-Products Corporation, supra. In the U. S. A. See: 
Lamborn vAllen Kirkpatrick, 135 A 541 (1927); Greenough vMunroe, 53 F. 2d 362 (1931). 
227 WJAlan & Co v EI NasrExport and Import Co [1972] 2 Q. B. 189. 
118Maran Road Saw Mill v. Austin Taylor Ltd [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 156. 
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agreed to. So, if the beneficiary agreed that payment by a credit was to be 
absolute, he would know beforehand that in case of the issuing bank being unable 
to pay, he could not claim payment from the applicant. 
As has been discussed above, the position of English law is certain on this issue, 
whereas it appears that the UCP is silent. This feature of silence may be construed 
as uncertainty. Although the UCP takes an international approach, it is evident that 
individual practices vary and therefore such individualised practices play a part in 
determining the way in which it is interpreted. As far as the UCC is concerned, it is 
also silent upon the issue. This also may be construed as uncertainty. 
3.1.5. Flexibility in Relation to Absolute-Conditional Payment 
The common law is flexible as to the nature of payment under letters of credit 
(whether absolute or conditional). There is more than one position that the law may 
take. Under common law parties are free to explicitly agree that payment by letter 
of credit is either absolute or conditional payment. In other words, the law here can 
be perceived as flexible. Thus, in between the expanded reliance upon the existing 
common law rule in relation to the nature of the payment clause as a default rule 
and the ordinary ability of the parties to vary that rule, the common law grants 
commercial people the maximum flexibility to tailor their relationships under letters 
of credit. Likewise, since almost the entirety of Article 5 of the UCC in its revised 
or original form is variable by agreement, and the provisions of the UCP are default 
rules, parties may agree to whether payment by letters of credit be absolute or 
conditional. 
4. What Position Should the Law Take With Regard to the Nature of 
Payment Clause Issue? 
As a matter of general principle, what position should the law take with regard to 
the nature of payment clause whether absolute or conditional? In other words, 
what option should be adopted? 
Having examined the position of absolute-conditional payment clause under the 
laws governing letters of credit, and having illustrated how each option interacts 
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with the five basic principles, the answer will be reserved to the Concluding 
Chapter in which a proposal for reform will be made. 
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Table 1: Comparison between Letter of Credit as Conditional and Absolute 
Payment in light of the basic principles of commercial law 
Conditional payment Absolute payment 
Party Parties are free to explicitly agree Parties are also free to explicitly agree 
Autonomy that payment by letter of credit is that payment by letter of credit is 
conditional payment. Where the absolute payment. However, if the 
parties so agree, the principle of contract is silent as to this issue, there 
party autonomy dictates that is a strong presumption that it is 
such terms should be held sacred. conditional rather than absolute. Thus, 
That is to say, the law might if the default position is absolute 
adopt the two doctrinal options: payment, then absolute payment applies 
conditional payment or absolute unless the contracting parties explicitly 
payment as default positions. provide for conditional payment. Either 
Thus if the default position is way, party autonomy is respected 
conditional payment, then because the contracting parties can 
conditional payment applies alter the default position by express 
unless the contracting parties agreement. 
explicitly provide for absolute 
payment. 
Fairness Fairer, since in most cases, the Unfair, since seller has no rights 
seller does have recourse to the against the buyer for payment in case 
buyer should he fail to obtain of banker's default. 
payment from the bank, provided 
that he has performed and there 
is no fault on his art. 
Good Faith Good faith is promoted because Buyer can take advantage of the most 
conditional payment reflects the trivial irregularities to delay payment if 
reasonable expectations of goods are delivered. If goods are not yet 
commercial people. delivered, buyer can reject goods and 
leave seller to sue the banker for 
damages for breach of contract. 
Certainty The law regulating letters of Certainty is promoted because 
credit is certain on the issue that, commercial people would be certain 
if the contract is silent to that payment by a letter of credit is, 
payment clause, there is a strong without doubt, absolute unless 
presumption that payment by otherwise expressly or impliedly 
letters of credit is conditional. agreed. So, unless the beneficiary 
Therefore, commercial people agreed that payment by a credit is to be 
would know where they stand. conditional, he would know beforehand 
As Ackner ) has put it clearly in that in case of the issuing bank being 
Maran Road Saw Mill v. Austin unable to pay, he cannot claim payment 
Taylor & Co. Ltd. 219 that, from the applicant. 
rovidin a `source of payment' 
229 Tbid at 159, 
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by letter of credit is different 
from the promised `paying by 
letter of credit', and that the bank 
promised to pay by letter of 
credit, not to provide by a letter 
of credit a source of payment 
which did not pay. 
Flexibility Under common law, the parties Under common law, the parties are free 
are free to explicitly agree that to explicitly agree that payment by 
payment by letter of credit is letter of credit is either absolute or 
either absolute or conditional conditional payment. Thus, the 
payment. Thus, the common law common law grants commercial people 
grants commercial people the the maximum flexibility to tailor their 
maximum flexibility to tailor relationships under letters of credit. 
their relationships under letters of 
credit. Since almost the entirety of Article 5 of 
the UCC in its revised or original form 
Since almost the entirety of is variable by agreement, and the 
Article 5 of the UCC in its provisions of the UCP are default rules, 
revised or original form is parties may agree to whether payment 
variable by agreement, and the by letters of credit be absolute or 
provisions of the UCP are default conditional. 
rules, parties may agree to 
whether payment by letters of 
credit be absolute or conditional. 
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5. Banker's insolvency 
In section one, the way in which the court treats the parties where the seller has not 
been paid before the banker's insolvency has been outlined. Here, two situations 
have to be distinguished: the first situation is whereby the bank has become 
insolvent before the buyer pays the bank, and the second is where the buyer places 
the bank in funds before its insolvency. 
In the first situation, according to the distributive theory, gross unfairness is 
apparent if the payment by letter of credit is treated as absolute, since the buyer can 
then escape payment, leaving the seller to claim his liquidating dividend as a general 
creditor of the bank which would not make up the purchase price. By treating the 
letter of credit as a conditional payment, however, in accordance with the 
distributive theory, the result will be fair; and both the buyer and seller will neither 
lose nor gain anything. 
The second situation is where the court is forced to do an injustice as shown clearly 
from Chart 1. The dilemma is that, where the payment by letter of credit is 
conditional rather than absolute and the seller is usually held to be a general 
creditor, that is to impose the loss due to the bank's insolvency on the buyer rather 
than on the seller. This makes the buyer pay twice: once to the banker and once to 
the seller, which is, according to the distributive theory, grossly unfair to the buyer. 
By treating the payment by letter of credit as absolute, the seller will be left with 
getting less than the contracted price, as being a general creditor, he gets only the 
pro rata liquidating dividend, which is unfair to the seller. 
McNair J. 230 was of the view that, only in the event of the issuing bank's insolvency 
may the seller be able to tender documents to the buyer directly. However, that 
would make the buyer who has already paid the bank pay twice. There is a sound 
argument supporting this position if the bank is chosen by the buyer, which is what 
happens in the majority of the cases because he should be in a better position to 
210 Soproma S. p. A v Marine andAnimal By-Products Corporation [196611 Lloyd's Rep 367,386. 
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know the financial soundness of the banker than the seller. 231 
A better solution is by considering the seller a preferred creditor of the bank to the 
extent of the buyer's payment, as suggested by Berger. 232 In doing so, it becomes 
easier to determine which party is to suffer the loss which resulted from the 
insolvency on the part of the issuer. 233 Neither of the parties will incur any loss in 
that case since the buyer has already settled the amount due upon receiving the 
merchandise and the seller has been paid in full, for the draft "which measured his 
claim against the bank or the buyer". 234 Consequently, this would ensure that the 
documentary credit provides guarantee of the payment to the seller, as well as 
ensuring that the documentary character of the transaction continues to clearly 
define the duty of the buyer in terms of its meaning and specificity. 
In the US, the issuing bank's insolvency problem is dealt with under Section 5-117 
of the UCC. s It is well-established that once the bank opens the credit it acts as a 
principal, not as agent. Thus, when the bank becomes insolvent before the credit 
transaction is completed, the outstanding liabilities, the security held by the bank 
and funds provided to indemnify against those liabilities are regarded as separate 
from deposit liabilities and general assets. Nonetheless, the beneficiary is not to 
receive a preferred treatment unless the applicant has earmarked a deposit to pay 
the credit or has pledged collateral to secure payment. The beneficiary is given a 
231 See ED. AndFMan Ltd. v Nigerian Sweets and Confectionery Co. Ltd. [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep 50. 
232 Berger, S. R., supra note 204 pp 174-80. 
233 It should be noted that Article 5-117 of the Uniform Commercial Code deals specifically with the 
circumstance of an issuer, and advising or confirming bank becoming insolvent before the final 
payment of the credit. The drafts or demands are entitled to payment in preference over depositors 
or other general creditors of the issuer or confirming bank to the extent of any funds turned over 
after or before the insolvency as indemnity against drafts or demands for payment drawn under the 
designated credit. These provisions would be applicable where the Code does not have the force in 
law. See Sarna, L., supra note 203 at 307; see also, Gutteridge and Megrah, The Law of Bankers' 
Commercial Credits p. 36. 
234 Berger, S. R., supra note 204 at 180. 
235 It is to be noted here that this insolvency Section (5-117) of the (pre-1995 version) has not been added 
to the (1995) version of the UCC. See Appendix D, for update, Section (15). 
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preferred treatment by virtue of (pre-1995) UCC and the common law. 236 
236 Sce Section 5-117 UCC, cmt Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit. Commercial and Standby Credits P. 
(12-12) et seq. 
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Chart 1: The Positions of Buyer and Seller on Banker's Insolvency 
Buyer has not yet paid banker 
before its bankruptcy. 
ie N 
If payment by If payment by 
letter of credit is letter of credit is 
absolute. conditional. 
Seller is left to 
claim the 
liquidating 
dividend as a 
general creditor. 
Buyer need not 
pay at all. 
Seller gets less 
than the 
contracted price. * 
Seller can sue 
buyer for breach 
of contract if he 
does not pay. 
Buyer and seller 
neither lose nor 
gain anything. 
407 
Buyer places banker in funds 
before it goes bankrupt. 
40 
If payment by If payment by 
letter of credit is letter of credit 
absolute. is conditional. 
+ 40 
Seller, as a 
general creditor, 
gets only the pro 
rata liquidating 
dividend. 
Buyer does not 
gain or lose 
anything. 
Seller gets less 
than the 
contracted p rice. 
Seller has the 




has to pay seller 
Buyer has to 
pay twice. 
Seller does not 
lose anything. 
0 The loss to the seller is equal to the difference between the sales price and the liquidating dividend. 
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Conclusion 
Where parties to the underlying sales contract agree that payment is to be made by 
a letter of credit, then it should only be effected by furnishing of that credit by the 
buyer. Given the mutual nature of the credit, it is not open to the seller to short- 
circuit the credit by tendering the documents directly to the buyer and demand 
payment directly from him. The type of credit which the buyer opens in favour of 
the seller must be the exact type of credit agreed upon. In other words, if the buyer 
fails to open a credit, or if he opens a different credit from that contracted (unless 
waived by the seller), he is in breach of the sales contract. If the breach has 
occurred, the damages should not be limited to the payment of the price, but will be 
anything that is recoverable under ordinary principles applicable to contractual 
damages. 237 
If the seller is unable to obtain payment from the bank, the crucial question faced by 
the seller is whether he has a right of recourse against the buyer. The reason for 
which the seller is unable to obtain payment, and the drafting of the `payment' 
clause in the main contract between buyer and seller are important considerations. 
If the seller is unable to tender the required documents or is late in presenting them, 
then he has no real grounds for complaint since he has himself breached the 
contract in which he is obliged to tender the very documents prescribed by the 
credit. 
The possibility of the seller's recovery of payment on the banker's default is the key 
issue examined in this chapter. Other than the seller's failure or late presentation of 
the correct documents, the reason why the seller cannot get the payment is usually 
either because the banker refuses to accept documents due to trivial or technical 
discrepancies238 or the banker's bankruptcy. The seller's right of recourse depends 
upon whether the letter of credit is "absolute payment" or "conditional payment" of 
the purchase price which depends upon the interpretation of the payment clause in 
2" Todd, P., Bills of Lading & Bankers' Documentary Credits p. 72. 
23! See Chapter Five for the issue of what is considered as trivial and technical discrepancies. 
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the sales contract. It is usually a matter for the court to decide, under circumstances 
of individual cases, what the intentions of the parties should be. 
It is a principle of letter of credit law that the letter of credit is completely 
independent of the underlying sale of goods contract. Nonetheless, as examined in 
section one, according to the line of well-established case law, in the absence of an 
express stipulation to the contrary, there appears to be a strong presumption in 
favour of construing letters of credit as conditional payment. So, in most cases, the 
seller does have recourse to the buyer should he fail to obtain payment from the 
banks, provided that he has performed and there is no fault on his part. So, it is 
presumed that the intention of the parties to a sales contract is to treat the 
furnishing of the documentary credit, and thus the subsequent acceptance of drafts, 
as conditional rather than absolute payment. 
In most cases, the transaction comes to an end when the bank discharges the credit. 
However, following the principle of independency29, the payment effected by the 
bank does not necessarily discharge the mutual rights and duties of the parties to 
the contract of sale. Therefore, there remains a right of an action in deceit240 or a 
breach of contract against the seller if it is later discovered that the documents the 
seller has tendered are not genuine. 
239 Benjamin's Sale of Goods, at § 23-120 p. 1712 et seq. 
240 See, cg Famourl v Dialcord Ltd (1983) 133 NLJ 153. 
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Introduction 
In this concluding chapter, it is appropriate to start by emphasising the distinctive 
nature of the certainty versus fairness problem in the context of letters of credit 
which can be expressed as follows: 
(1) It is generally agreed that the two cornerstone principles of the law governing 
letters of credit are (i) the independency (autonomy) principle and (ii) the doctrine 
of strict compliance. 
(2) The function of the independency (autonomy) principle is to protect the 
interests of the seller. It means that the buyer cannot raise issues arising from the 
underlying transaction to interfere with payment to the seller under the letter of 
credit arrangement. 
(3) The function of the doctrine of strict compliance is to protect the interests of 
the buyer. It means that the seller does not get paid without strictly meeting the 
buyer's conditions for payment. 
(4) Both these principles are designed for certainty. The seller knows that 
compliance with the terms of the credit should produce payment and that problems 
relating to the underlying transaction cannot give the bank an excuse for non- 
payment. The only good reason for non-payment is if the documents do not 
comply. 
(5) In both cases, however, the protection given by these two principles can be 
abused. The fraudulent seller can hide behind the independency principle; and the 
bad faith buyer can insist upon strict compliance. 
(6) So, looking at the two cornerstone principles from the perspective of fairness, 
two exceptions or qualifications to the principles invite consideration. One 
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exception (to the independency principle) is for fraud by the seller; and the other 
exception (to the principle of strict compliance) is for bad faith by the buyer (or by 
the bank). 
(7) The central problematic in this area of law, therefore, is how far (if at all) the 
two cornerstone principles (representing the interests of certainty) should be 
qualified (in the interests of fairness) by exceptions for fraud by the seller and bad 
faith by the buyer. 
Whereas under current English law, the strict compliance test is potentially unfair 
to the seller, the narrow interpretation of the fraud exception is potentially unfair 
to the buyer. In light of this, one may argue that unfairness to the buyer (narrow 
fraud) is balanced by unfairness to the seller (strict compliance). Although it is true 
that both parties (buyer and seller) are exposed to unfairness under English law, 
this however, does not mean that two wrongs make a right. The position taken 
under English law is completely in favour of certainty. What we propose is that the 
law should be adjusted marginally, to make corrections in favour of some fairness 
to both sides, but in doing so without jeopardising certainty. Having argued for 
such marginal adjustment to legal doctrine in favour of fairness, it is to be noted 
that both parties would still be at risk but not as much as under the present regime. 
In sum, under the present regime, there is a high risk of unfairness with complete 
certainty. Thus, in the proposals which will be advanced below, it is felt that there 
is less risk of unfairness without jeopardising certainty. 
In this study, we have examined the tension between certainty and fairness not only 
in relation to the independency principle (and its fraud exception) and strict 
compliance but also in relation to a number of other doctrinal issues. They are (i) 
the prevailing standard of compliance in the reimbursement contract (whether 
Chapter Eight: Conclusion 412 
"strict compliance" or "bifurcated compliance"); (ii) the nature of payment clause 
(whether absolute or conditional); and finally (iii) punitive damages. ' 
Generally speaking, relative to the tension between certainty and fairness, there are 
three options that the law can take in relation to each issue discussed under the law 
governing letters of credit. Option one is to maximise doctrinal certainty. In other 
words, certainty is the main and only concern of doctrine. Conversely, option two 
attempts to gear the law towards fairness. Thus, fairness can be perceived as the 
primary and fundamental concern of legal doctrine. Option three seeks a balance 
between certainty and fairness. In principle, this balance could be struck anywhere 
between certainty and fairness. However, in what follows, this third option will be 
concerned only with marginal adjustments to doctrine that is primarily geared for 
certainty. 
As we have seen in each chapter, the problematic issues which have been subjected 
to evaluation, have been more concerned with certainty than with the principle of 
fairness. In all these matters, as will be demonstrated later in the recommendations, 
the general position taken will be to respect certainty but, in doing so, to ensure 
that fairness is not neglected. Therefore, it is apparent that there is a call for 
marginal adjustment to the classical doctrine of letters of credit, the main aim of 
which adjustment is to inject some fairness - fairness which would not affect 
certainty of legal doctrine. 
In these concluding remarks an attempt is made to formulate a number of 
proposals (recommendations) which are designed to make the law more sensitive 
to questions of fairness but without sacrificing the certainty that is essential for 
1 In light of the discussion, examined earlier in Chapter Six, Section Two (3), concerning the impact of fraud 
(bad faith actions) committed by the seller (beneficiary) on both innocent bank and buyer in relation to 
the reimbursement contract, it is felt that the balance between the considerations of certainty and 
fairness is rightly struck, in the current law governing letters of credit. Thus, there will be no proposal 
for reform in this Concluding Chapter. 
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commercial dealing. The improvements concern particularly (i) the compliance 
standard (in the letter of credit context); (ii) the compliance standard in the 
reimbursement agreement context; (iii) the fraud exception; (iv) punitive damages; 
and (v) the nature of the payment clause (whether absolute or conditional). 
1. The Compliance Test 
So far as the question of the documentary compliance test is concerned, there are 
three factors to be taken into consideration. First, the test must be sufficiently 
certain to be commercially workable; secondly, it must not operate unfairly (by e. g. 
unfairly depriving the beneficiary of payment where documents have trivial 
discrepancies); thirdly, it must not invite bad faith/abuse of right/a lack of good 
faith by either bankers or buyers. 
In fact, the doctrine of strict compliance, although meeting the test of certainty, 
may give rise to unjust results. The principle of good faith is the only chip the 
court has in hand to let in commercial fair dealing considerations when applying 
the doctrine of strict compliance. Most of those familiar with documentary credits 
have expressed the view that it is wrong and unjust to leave the applicant with no 
remedy due to the inflexibility of the doctrine. If the beneficiary is left with no 
remedy due to a mere technicality, documentary credit will be seen as an 
instrument which hinders rather than helps international trade. There is also the 
risk with strict compliance that trivial non-compliance can be used in bad faith as a 
pretext for non-payment. Thus, the application of the principle of good faith in 
some form or another is vital to fair dealing in documentary credit transactions. 
Accordingly, the author suggests that the law should incorporate a good faith test 
in some form. It could do this directly, by adopting an explicit requirement of good 
faith, which the seller could then plead where he suspected that the bank was using 
the strict compliance standard for bad faith purposes (either to benefit the bank or 
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the buyer). Or, good faith could be introduced indirectly, by dropping the strict 
compliance test in favour of either substantial compliance or qualified strict 
compliance. Theoretically speaking, the direct test of good faith sounds more 
plausible and may seem to tackle the issue of bad faith resulting from misapplying 
the strict compliance test straightforwardly. Nonetheless, the author suggests that 
this test may prove difficult to put into practice. The fact that the law adopts a 
direct test of good faith (along with the strict compliance standard being retained) 
may produce some problems as it would be a matter of evidence to prove bad faith 
actions committed either by buyer or bank. In other words, it is difficult to apply in 
practice, firstly, precisely because it asks difficult questions about motives, reasons, 
states of mind etc. Secondly, as a result, there might be some cases of bad faith 
that a direct test fails to pick up (i. e. many bad faith actions whether by the bank or 
the buyer may not be caught) if there is not sufficient evidence of bad faith. Both 
bank and buyer may, by virtue of the strict compliance test, practise some bad faith 
actions when their sole motive is to escape the consequences of a bad bargain. i. e. 
they may be shielded behind the strict compliance test. Thus, if the direct test is to 
be adopted, there is no guarantee that it will be possible to detect bad faith actions, 
particularly in cases of lack of evidence concerning motives, reasons, states of 
mind etc. -and, what is more, the uncertainty involved in such enquiries into 
alleged bad faith threatens the calculability of letters of credit. 
By contrast, the indirect test of good faith may seem to be preferable to a direct 
test because one of the strong arguments in favour of an indirect test is that it is 
easier to apply in practice than a direct test, precisely because, first of all, it avoids 
asking difficult questions about motives, reasons, states of mind etc. Secondly, as a 
result, an indirect test of good faith might actually succeed in picking up more 
cases of bad faith. 
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Having suggested that both the substantial and qualified strict compliance tests 
represent an indirect test of good faith, and having suggested that an indirect test is 
preferable to a direct test, the author's preference is to adopt the qualified strict 
compliance test. This is supported by the following factors: 
First, any test based on "substantial" compliance raises the question of how the line 
between substantial and non-substantial will be drawn. In other words, in its 
application, this test is likely to prove unpredictable and uncertain. Neither the 
seller nor the buyer will know where they stand. 
Secondly, unlike qualified strict compliance, substantial compliance involves 
looking beyond the documents and asking about the impact on the buyer. But, 
what precisely is the question that substantial compliance asks? Again, the test is 
not as clear as one might wish. If the test is vague, it again leaves the law 
uncertain. 
Thirdly, even if the question that substantial compliance asks is about the 
consequences of the particular documentary non-compliance in relation to the 
impact on the buyer, there is a temptation to start dealing in goods. If this happens, 
the independency principle is broken. Quite apart from raising concerns about 
certainty, this leads to an unexpected twist in the following way. We start looking 
at the doctrine of substantial compliance as a way of protecting the seller against 
abuse by the buyer; however, if substantial compliance invites departure from the 
independency principle, it might end up working against the seller's interests. 
Thus, the preference is for the qualified strict compliance test because, first of all, 
banks are entitled to honour the credit despite trivial discrepancies. Secondly, since 
banks do not have to look beyond the documents to decide the question of 
compliance, the consideration of certainty is not jeopardised. This would respect 
the rule of independency by being more certain than the substantial compliance test 
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as well as maintaining good faith, though not as much as the substantial 
compliance test does. It is to be noted that if the concern here is to move towards 
good faith and fairness only and not to focus on certainty, the substantial 
compliance test would be the answer. Yet, since the objective of the thesis is to 
strike the right balance between considerations of certainty and fairness, it is 
suggested that the right balance in relation to the standard of compliance is the 
qualified strict compliance test. 
2. The Fraud Exception 
Should the law ever allow fraud, both in the underlying sale transaction and fraud by 
a third party, to be a good defence for a bank's refusal to pay the beneficiary? 
The answer to this question lies in accommodating two considerations: first, from a 
certainty point of view, fraud in the underlying sale transaction as well as by a third 
party, should not be allowed as a defence for the bank to reject payment to the 
beneficiary. This is simply because the law should not encourage the bank to look 
for reasons to dishonour the letter of credit arrangement. Secondly, from the good 
faith and fairness perspective, the answer is positive at least where the beneficiary 
has knowledge of fraud and thus, acts in bad faith. 
In order to find the right balance between certainty and fairness, it is important to 
consider three possible approaches to a fraud exception: (i) mere allegation of fraud 
suffices; (ii) actual knowledge of fraud is required; and (iii) reasonable ground for 
suspecting fraud suffices. Starting with the first case, mere allegation of fraud 
suffices, it is too risky to the seller since both the bank and the buyer, acting in bad 
faith, can allege such fraud and thus prevent the beneficiary from drawing on the 
credit thereby affecting fairness and certainty too. So far as actual knowledge by 
the bank of the fraud is concerned, it may be also too risky to both the bank and 
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the buyer's interests because even though they strongly suspect fraud but for some 
reason cannot prove it, the seller is still entitled to payment in which case fairness 
is also jeopardised. This is the position under English law. The suggested 
compromise thus is applying the third approach, refusing payment if there is 
reasonable ground to suspect fraud. By insisting on this approach, both certainty 
and fairness can be well balanced. This means the bank could legitimately not pay 
if there is a reasonable ground of suspecting fraud. Thus, so far as English law is 
concerned, the balance between certainty and fairness may be achieved if the 
confines of the fraud exception are broadened to entitle the bank to reject payment 
on reasonable grounds of suspecting fraud instead of insisting on the bank's actual 
knowledge. 
Following this suggestion, the seller will have no claim against the bank for 
wrongful refusal to pay, if: 
(1) the seller has committed fraud; and 
(2) the bank has reasonable grounds to suspect fraud by the seller. 
So, if the bank refuses to pay on the grounds of fraud, its defence hinges on it 
establishing reasonable grounds for suspicion of fraud. The question which 
emerges now is: how then does the question of actual fraud get settled? Obviously, 
it cannot be that the bank must prove actual fraud; because the suggestion is that 
reasonable suspicion is enough. The effect of this is that it is up to the seller to 
disprove fraud. In other words, the bank makes out its defence on the basis of 
reasonable grounds and that is a good defence unless the seller can then prove an 
absence of fraud. 
Having softened the rigours of the existing English law by letting the bank have the 
right to refuse payment if the bank has reasonable grounds to suspect fraud by the 
seller, the result is fair since if there has actually been fraud by the seller and since 
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actual fraud is part of the test, then whatever the rest of the test the seller can 
hardly complain about unfairness. 
3. Punitive Damages 
In the interests of certainty, the author favours adopting a clear rule within the 
sections of Article 5 of the UCC itself as well as the UCP in relation to punitive 
damages (i. e. as to whether or not they may be allowed). The most difficult 
question is whether punitive damages should be made available to innocent parties 
(whether the beneficiary, bank, or applicant) and if so, in what circumstances penal 
awards should be allowed. 
Should the law ever allow the beneficiary to recover punitive damages against the 
bank where the bank has wrongly failed to pay? First, if the law is concerned with 
considerations of party autonomy (sanctity), then the answer is in the positive 
because the threat of punitive damages should encourage the bank to honour the 
letter of credit arrangement in which case certainty of payment is preserved. 
Moreover, so far as freedom of contract is concerned, the answer is in the positive 
too since this provides that parties should have the power to set their own remedial 
regime. Secondly, if punitive damages are never awarded, it creates an open-ended 
excuse to contract breachers for them not to fulfil their contractual obligations 
thereby jeopardising fairness. 
On the other hand, if punitive damages are always awarded, it is extremely unfair 
because it goes completely against the compensatory policy of contract law. This 
would also encourage unbridled claims for such damages in all cases. 
Having admitted that the award of punitive damages is unfair, as a general rule, 
allowing punitive damages may be justified if the harm done by one of the 
contracting parties is so severe as to fall within one of the exceptional categories 
for allowing them, as suggested by some American authorities. 
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Thus, the compromise would be that punitive damages should be awarded in some 
cases. This option, in order to be applied efficiently, requires a definite and 
categorised list of prohibited conduct upon the occurrence of which such damages 
would be awarded. Regardless of the controversy over the award of punitive 
damages in the US (as to whether such damages are to apply to insurance 
contracts only)2, the author suggests that punitive damages should be awarded in 
some certain cases and to all types of contracts but only upon the occurrence of a 
specified (definite) category of conduct such as (i) where the guilty party acts in 
bad faith (maliciously, fraudulently) and (ii) where the guilty party acts in a grossly 
negligent way. Such an itemised category of prohibited conduct could be laid 
down by either courts or legislatures. Having accomplished such a list of specified 
wrongs, certainty would be preserved. Each party would be aware of such 
prohibited actions before entering into a contractual relationship no matter whether 
this wrong conduct is a contract-based liability or a tort-based liability. This would 
bring fairness to the innocent party and thus the balance between certainty and 
fairness may be best struck. 
The reason why the above two categories of conduct are suggested as possible 
grounds for awarding punitive damages in letters of credit cases can be explained 
as follows. So far as both bad faith acts (fraud and malice) and grossly negligent 
acts are concerned, the reason for taking a hard line here is that a letter of credit 
(as a special commercial device having its own character) makes international trade 
possible regardless of the fact that distant buyers and sellers do not know each 
other. Both distant parties to a letter of credit enter into this relationship in the 
belief that the correct documents are to be presented and the right sum of money 
will be paid. Any compromise to such certainty of letters of credit would 
2 See, Nehf, J., `Bad Faith Breach of Contract in Consumer Transaction' in Good Faith in Contract: Concept 
and Context, edited by Brownsword, R., Hird, N., and Howells, G. (Dartmouth Publishing Company 
Limited, London, 1999) 115,131-136. 
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jeopardise international trade. In other words, if fraud and malice as well as grossly 
negligent acts go unpunished, the credibility of documentary credits is undermined 
and the original problem of lack of trust threatens to re-emerge. 
Although introducing punitive damages may seem to be a radical step, the award 
of such damages can be further justified as follows. Firstly, it is suggested that 
punitive damages are to be awarded only in exceptional cases. i. e. as an exception 
not as a rule. Secondly, it is submitted that punitive damages are to be awarded in 
the letter of credit context in order to protect the whole institution of letters of 
credit and thus provide certainty. Regardless of the unfair nature of such damages, 
the reason for their award is justified in cases where trust is threatened in a letter of 
credit. If there is lack of confidence or even abuse within a letter of credit, the 
whole institution of letters of credit would be jeopardised. Instead of ordinary 
awards of compensation, punitive damages is one way of clamping down on such 
harm. In sum, although it might be argued that such damages are to be awarded to 
attain fairness to the aggrieved party, this would actually result in over- 
compensation: thus, the most important reason for their award is to strengthen 
faith and confidence in the institution of letters of credit in order to attain certainty. 
Thirdly, punitive damages should not be extended to the reimbursement contract 
or the underlying sale contract because such arrangements are considered as 
normal contracts and should therefore be governed by the normal contract law 
rules which are already said to prohibit such damages. Finally, in relation to bad 
faith acts (fraud and malice) and grossly negligent acts as grounds for punitive 
awards, the argument is that banks have a special responsibility in relation to 
letters of credit. If banks act fraudulently or in a grossly negligent way, without a 
penal system being set up to protect innocent parties, certainty of international 
trade would be jeopardised. 
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4. The Standard of Compliance in Relation to the Reimbursement Agreement 
Since the UCP is silent upon the standard of compliance between the bank and the 
applicant, and the UCC is silent upon the issue too (though some US courts have 
applied the bifurcated compliance standard), the author contends that as the 
relationship between the applicant and the issuing bank is governed partially by the 
laws governing letters of credit, and partially by contract law, any standard of 
compliance set by the law is merely a default rule. That is to say, the compliance 
standard for reimbursement purposes (between bank and applicant) should be 
determined by ordinary contractual principles. So, the rule here is a default rule 
(whether it is for strict compliance or a bifurcated standard) which the bank/buyer 
can bargain around if they wish. 
It is hoped that this issue will be dealt with explicitly in the next review of both the 
UCP and UCC rules. An explicit rule regarding this issue would remove any 
uncertainty and make the law more calculable. 
Which rule should be adopted? Should it be a rule for strict compliance or 
bifurcated compliance? 
In the interests of fairness, certainty, flexibility and good faith, they are all 
preserved under the bifurcated standard but not under the strict compliance 
standard as the study revealed (in sections 6.2.1,6.2.2,6.2.3, and 6.2.4. ). So far as 
certainty here is concerned, it is to be noted that this is to do with certainty of the 
legal position. However, in relation to certainty of the bifurcated standard itself 
(which resembles the substantial compliance standard discussed in the letter of 
credit contract) the test is uncertain in its application because each case will be 
judged on its own merits. 
Now, since the aim of this thesis is to preserve certainty, one may argue that it would 
be a mistake to adopt such a bifurcated standard because it would jeopardise certainty 
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and pull too strongly towards fairness. Surely though this is not the case, simply 
because, although the author suggests the adoption of the bifurcated compliance 
standard in the reimbursement agreement context, the suggestion takes into 
consideration two points which ensure certainty. First, the reimbursement agreement 
is not governed fully by the law of letters of credit. The general principles of contract 
law also govern in this regard. Thus, allowing some room for fairness would not 
jeopardise the law of international trade (i. e. the law relative to letters of credit) which 
thrives on certainty. Secondly, this test of compliance, in order to work with a 
sufficient degree of certainty, should only be applied upon the occurrence of some 
specific conditions. This, on the one hand, would preserve certainty. Parties would 
then know where they stand. On the other hand, it would guard against cases of 
unfairness to banks as a result of bad faith actions conducted by their customers. It is 
suggested, therefore, that the better explicit rule is that the bifurcated compliance 
standard (in association with the two common law conditions for its application, in 
order to attain certainty) is the default position. The two common law conditions, it 
will be recalled, are (i) "whether the issuer's misconduct damaged the customer, and 
(ii) whether the issuer acted in good faith". 3 
5. Absolute/Conditional payment 
The author contends that although both the UCP and the UCC are silent upon the 
issue of absolute-conditional payment, since they express the independency 
principle, it could be inferred that absolute payment is to prevail. It is hoped that 
this issue will be dealt with explicitly in the next review of both the UCP and UCC 
rules. An explicit rule regarding this issue would remove any misunderstanding and 
make the law transparent. 
3 Dolan, `Letter-of-Credit Disputes Between the Issuer and its Customer: The Issuer's Rights under the 
Misnamed "Bifurcated Standard"' 105 The Banking Law Journal (1988) 380, pp. 383-4. 
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Which rule should be adopted? Should it be a rule for absolute or conditional 
payment? 
In the interests of good faith and fairness, both good faith and fairness are 
preserved under conditional payment, as the study revealed (in sections 3.1.2. and 
3.1.3. above). It is suggested, therefore, that the better explicit rule is that 
conditional payment is the default position. Having suggested the conditional 
payment option, it is to be emphasised that conditional payment does not in any 
way jeopardise certainty. 
6. Recommendations Summarised 
Bearing in mind the need to maintain certainty in letters of credit arrangements, it 
is proposed that: 
"a test of qualified strict compliance be adopted. 
" the fraud exception should operate where the bank has reasonable grounds to 
suspect fraud and there has actually been fraud. 
" punitive damages are to be awarded in two exceptional cases, bad faith and 
gross negligence. 
" the bifurcated compliance standard is to be adopted in the reimbursement 
agreement context, but only where the issuer has acted in good faith and has 
not harmed the customer. 
" conditional payment is to be adopted in relation to payment under letters of 
credit. 
7. The Purpose and Significance of the Research 
The primary purpose of this study, as set out in the introduction, is to assess the 
adequacy of the law relating to letters of credit in relation to the five basic 
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principles which, arguably, should govern Commercial Law doctrine. These 
principles are (i) party autonomy (freedom and sanctity of contract) (ii) certainty 
(iii) flexibility (iv) fairness and (v) good faith. Although it can be concluded that 
the principles are, all, to some extent, applicable, it seems that the laws of letters of 
credit are more particularly concerned with considerations of certainty than 
fairness. This is explained due to the special character of the letter of credit device 
under which banks deal in documents not in goods. Together with the 
independency and strict compliance principles, this serves to enhance certainty 
more than fairness. 
The potential contribution of this study can be summarised in the following terms: 
it examines the relevant literature in order to explain and develop a better 
understanding of the five basic principles and the way they interact. The theoretical 
contribution of the study comes from the attempt to integrate those five basic 
principles of commercial law into the law governing letters of credit, as part of the 
commercial law doctrine, in relation to specific issues, where the literature says 
little regarding such a relationship between those principles and the law of letters 
of credit. 
8. Suggestions for the Future Researchers 
Owing to the fact that there are many unresolved problems (questions) in the 
Common Law, the UCP rules and the UCC rules in relation to letters of credit, 
each of them can be undertaken as a subject for further study. However, in relation 
to this work as a comparative research, a study with similar features is more 
desirable. This research has identified some gaps and deficiencies in three legal 
regimes governing letters of credit law. Therefore, the discussion and the argument 
of this thesis as well as its conclusion may be implemented for further research on 
striking the balance between the considerations of certainty and fairness in relation 
to other problematic issues which this work has not touched on-for instance, 
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disputes emerging from the lack of a legal relationship between buyer and 
intermediary bank (advising, confirming), or difficulties arising out of the lack of a 
legal relationship between the advising bank and the beneficiary. Further, as this 
work has been conducted in line with the Common Law rules, a comparative study 
of the application of these five basic principles in a civil law system compared with 
either of the UCP or UCC rules, might be more desirable because good faith is 
viewed in a different way in civil legal systems. 
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Appendix A: Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits (1993 Revision) of the International Chamber of 
Commerce' 
GENERAL PROVISIONS AND DEFINITIONS 
ARTICLE 1 
Application of UCP 
The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, 1993 Revision, ICC 
Publication No. 500, shall apply to all Documentary Credits (including to the 
extent to which they may be applicable, Standby Letter(s) of Credit) where they 
are incorporated into the text of the Credit. They are binding on all parties thereto, 
unless otherwise expressly stipulated in the Credit. 
ARTICLE 2 
Meaning of Credit 
For the purposes of these Articles, the expressions "Documentary Credit(s)" and 
"Standby Letter(s) of Credit" (hereinafter referred to as "Credit(s)"), mean any 
arrangement, however named or described, whereby a bank (the "Issuing Bank") 
acting at the request and on the instructions of a customer (the "Applicant") or on 
its own behalf, 
i. is to make a payment to or to the order of a third party (the 'Beneficiary"), or is 
to accept and pay bills of exchange (Draft(s)) drawn by the Beneficiary, or 
ii. authorizes another bank to effect such payment, or to accept and pay such bills 
of exchange (Draft(s)), or 
ICC Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits - 1993 Revision (ICC 
Publication No 500 - ISBN 92.842.1155.7 (E)). Published in its official English version 
by the International Chamber of Commerce. Copyright © 1993 - International Chamber 
of Commerce (ICC), Paris. Available from: ICC Publishing £4., 38 Court Albert ter, 
75008 Paris, France or ICC United Kingdom, 14/15 Belgrave Square, London SW1X 
8PS, United Kingdom. 
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iii. authorizes another bank to negotiate, against stipulated document(s), provided 
that the terms and conditions of the Credit are complied with. 
For the purposes of these Articles, branches of a bank in different countries are 
considered another bank. 
ARTICLE 3 
Credits v. Contracts 
A. Credits, by their nature, are separate transactions from the sales or other 
contract(s) on which they may be based and banks are in no way concerned with 
or bound by such contract(s), even if any reference whatsoever to such contract(s) 
is included in the Credit. Consequently, the undertaking of a bank to pay, accept 
and pay Draft(s) or negotiate and/or to fulfill any other obligation under the 
Credit, is not subject to claims or defenses by the Applicant resulting from his 
relationships with the Issuing Bank or the Beneficiary. 
B. A Beneficiary can in no case avail himself of the contractual relationships 
existing between the banks or between the Applicant and the Issuing Bank. 
ARTICLE 4 
Documents v. Goods/Services/Performances 
In Credit operations all parties concerned deal with documents, and not with 
goods, services and/or other performances to which the documents may relate. 
ARTICLE 5 
Instructions to Issue/Amend Credits 
A. Instructions for the issuance of a Credit, the Credit itself, instructions for an 
amendment thereto, and the amendment itself, must be complete and precise. 
In order to guard against confusion and misunderstanding, banks should 
discourage any attempt: 
i. to include excessive detail in the Credit or in any amendment thereto; 
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ii. to give instructions to issue, advise or confirm a Credit by reference to a Credit 
previously issued (similar Credit) where such previous Credit has been subject to 
accepted amendment(s), and/or unaccepted amendment(s). 
B. All instructions for the issuance of a Credit and the Credit itself and, where 
applicable, all instructions for an amendment thereto and the amendment itself, 
must state precisely the document(s) against which payment, acceptance or 
negotiation is to be made. 
FORM AND NOTIFICATION OF CREDITS 
ARTICLE 6 
Revocable v. Irrevocable Credits 
A. A Credit may be either 
i. revocable, or 
ii. irrevocable. 
B. The Credit, therefore, should clearly indicate whether it is revocable or 
irrevocable. 
C. In the absence of such indication the Credit shall be deemed to be irrevocable. 
ARTICLE 7 
Advising Bank's Liability 
A. A Credit may be advised to a Beneficiary through another bank (the "Advising 
Bank") without engagement on the part of the Advising Bank, but that bank, if it 
elects to advise the Credit, shall take reasonable care to check the apparent 
authenticity of the Credit which it advises. If the bank elects not to advise the 
Credit, it must so inform the Issuing Bank without delay. 
B. If the Advising Bank cannot establish such apparent authenticity it must inform, 
without delay, the bank from which the instructions appear to have been received 
that it has been unable to establish the authenticity of the Credit and if it elects 
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nonetheless to advise the Credit it must inform the Beneficiary that it has not been 
able to establish the authenticity of the Credit. 
ARTICLE 8 
Revocation of a Credit 
A. A revocable Credit may be amended or canceled by the Issuing Bank at any 
moment and without prior notice to the Beneficiary. 
B. However, the Issuing Bank must: 
i. reimburse another bank with which a revocable Credit has been made available 
for sight payment, acceptance or negotiation for any payment, acceptance or 
negotiation made by such bank prior to receipt by it of notice of amendment or 
cancellation, against documents which appear on their face to be in compliance 
with the terms and conditions of the Credit; 
ii. reimburse another bank with which a revocable Credit has been made available 
for deferred payment, if such a bank has, prior to receipt by it of notice of 
amendment or cancellation, taken up documents which appear on their face to be 
in compliance with the terms and conditions of the Credit. 
ARTICLE 9 
Liability of Issuing and Confirming Banks 
A. An irrevocable Credit constitutes a definite undertaking of the Issuing Bank, 
provided that the stipulated documents are presented to the Nominated Bank or to 
the Issuing Bank and that the terms and conditions of the Credit are complied 
with: 
i. if the Credit provides for sight payment to pay at sight; 
ii. if the Credit provides for deferred payment to pay on the maturity date(s) 
determinable in accordance with the stipulations of the Credit; iii. if the Credit 
provides for acceptance; 
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a. by the Issuing Bank to accept Draft(s) drawn by the Beneficiary on the Issuing 
Bank and pay them at maturity, or 
b. by another drawee bank to accept and pay at maturity Draft(s) drawn by the 
Beneficiary on the Issuing Bank in the event the drawee bank stipulated in the 
Credit does not accept Draft(s) drawn on it, or to pay Drafts(s) accepted but not 
paid by such drawee bank at maturity; 
iv. if the Credit provides for negotiation to pay without recourse to drawers 
and/or bona fide holders, Draft(s) drawn by the Beneficiary and/or document(s) 
presented under the Credit. A Credit should not be issued available by Draft(s) on 
the Applicant. If the Credit nevertheless calls for Draft(s) on the Applicant, banks 
will consider such Draft(s) as an additional document(s). 
B. A confirmation of an irrevocable Credit by another bank (the "Confirming 
Bank") upon the authorization or request of the Issuing Bank, constitutes a 
definite undertaking of the Confirming Bank, in addition to that of the issuing 
Bank, provided that the stipulated documents are presented to the Confirming 
Bank or to any other Nominated Bank and that the terms and conditions of the 
Credit are complied with: 
i. If the Credit provides for sight payment to pay at sight; 
ii. if the Credit provides for deferred payment to pay on the maturity date(s) 
determinable in accordance with the stipulations of the Credit; 
iii. if the Credit provides for acceptance: 
a. by the Confirming Bank to accept Draft(s) drawn by the Beneficiary on the 
Confirming Bank and pay them at maturity, or 
b. by another drawee bank to accept and pay at maturity Draft(s) drawn by the 
Beneficiary on the Confirming Bank, in the event the drawee bank stipulated in the 
Credit does not accept Draft(s) drawn on it, or to pay Draft(s) accepted but not 
paid by such drawee bank at maturity; 
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iv. if the Credit provides for negotiation to negotiate without recourse to drawers 
and/or bona fide holders, Draft(s) drawn by the Beneficiary and/or document(s) 
presented under the Credit. A Credit should not be issued available by Draft(s) on 
the Applicant. If the Credit nevertheless calls for Draft(s) on the Applicant, banks 
will consider such Draft(s) as an additional document(s). 
C. i. If another bank is authorized or requested by the Issuing Bank to add its 
confirmation to a Credit but is not prepared to do so, it must so inform the Issuing 
Bank without delay. 
ii. Unless the Issuing Bank specifies otherwise in its authorization or request to 
add confirmation, the Advising Bank may advise the Credit to the Beneficiary 
without adding its confirmation. 
D. i. Except as otherwise provided by Article 48, an irrevocable Credit can neither 
be amended nor canceled without the agreement of the Issuing Bank, the 
Confirming Bank, if any, and the Beneficiary. 
ii. The Issuing Bank shall be irrevocably bound by an amendment(s) issued by it 
from the time of the issuance of such amendment(s). A Confirming Bank may 
extend its confirmation to an amendment and shall be irrevocably bound as of the 
time of its advice of the amendment. A Confirming Bank may, however, choose to 
advise an amendment to the Beneficiary without extending its confirmation and if 
so, must inform the Issuing Bank and the Beneficiary without delay. 
iii. The terms of the original Credit (or a Credit incorporating previously accepted 
amendment(s)) will remain in force for the Beneficiary until the Beneficiary 
communicates his acceptance of the amendment to the bank that advised such 
amendment. The Beneficiary should give notification of acceptance or rejection of 
amendment(s). If the Beneficiary fails to give such notification, the tender of 
documents to the Nominated Bank or Issuing Bank, that conform to the Credit 
and to not yet accepted amendment(s), will be deemed to be notification of 
acceptance by the Beneficiary of such amendment(s) and as of that moment the 
Credit will be amended. 
7 
Appendix A 
iv. Partial acceptance of amendments contained in one and the same advice of 
amendment is not allowed and consequently will not be given any effect. 
ARTICLE 10 
Types of Credit 
A. All Credits must clearly indicate whether they are available by sight payment, 
by deferred payment, by acceptance or by negotiation. 
B. i. Unless the Credit stipulates that it is available only with the Issuing Bank, all 
Credits must nominate the bank (the "Nominated Bank") which is authorized to 
pay, to incur a deferred payment undertaking, to accept Draft(s) or to negotiate. 
In a freely negotiable Credit, any bank is a Nominated Bank. 
Presentation of documents must be made to the Issuing Bank or the Confirming 
Bank, if any, or any other Nominated Bank. 
ii. Negotiation means the giving of value for Draft(s) and/or document(s) by the 
bank authorized to negotiate. Mere examination of the documents without giving 
of value does not constitute a negotiation. 
C. Unless the Nominated Bank is the Confirming Bank, nomination by the Issuing 
Bank does not constitute any undertaking by the Nominated Bank to pay, to incur 
a deferred payment undertaking, to accept Draft(s), or to negotiate. Except where 
expressly agreed to by the Nominated Bank and so communicated to the 
Beneficiary, the Nominated Bank's receipt of and/or examination and/or 
forwarding of the documents does not make that bank liable to pay, to incur a 
deferred payment undertaking, to accept Draft(s), or to negotiate. 
D. By nominating another bank, or by allowing for negotiation by any bank, or by 
authorizing or requesting another bank to add its confirmation, the Issuing Bank 
authorizes such bank to pay, accept Draft(s) or negotiate as the case may be, 
against documents which appear on their face to be in compliance with the terms 
and conditions of the Credit and undertakes to reimburse such bank in accordance 




Teletransmitted and Pre Advised Credit 
A. i. When an Issuing Bank instructs an Advising Bank by an authenticated 
teletransmission to advise a Credit or an amendment to a Credit, the 
teletransmission will be deemed to be the operative Credit instrument or the 
operative amendment, and no mail confirmation should be sent. 
Should a mail confirmation nevertheless be sent, it will have no effect and the 
Advising Bank will have no obligation to check such mail confirmation against the 
operative Credit instrument or the operative amendment received by 
teletransmission. 
ii. If the teletransmission states "full details to follow" (or words of similar effect) 
or states that the mail confirmation is to be the operative Credit instrument or the 
operative amendment, then the teletransmission will not be deemed to be the 
operative Credit instrument or the operative amendment. The Issuing Bank must 
forward the operative Credit instrument or the operative amendment to such 
Advising Bank without delay. 
B. If a bank uses the services of an Advising Bank to have the Credit advised to 
the Beneficiary, it must also use the services of the same bank for advising an 
amendment(s). 
C. A preliminary advice of the issuance or amendment of an irrevocable Credit 
(pre advice), shall only be given by an Issuing Bank if such bank is prepared to 
issue the operative Credit instrument or the operative amendment thereto. Unless 
otherwise stated in such preliminary advice by the Issuing Bank, an Issuing Bank 
having given such pre advice shall be irrevocably committed to issue or amend the 




Incomplete or Unclear Instructions 
If incomplete or unclear instructions are received to advise, confirm or amend a 
Credit, the bank requested to act on such instructions may give preliminary 
notification to the Beneficiary for information only and without responsibility. This 
preliminary notification should state clearly that the notification is provided for 
information only and without the responsibility of the Advising Bank. In any 
event, the Advising Bank must inform the Issuing Bank of the action taken and 
request it to provide the necessary information. 
The Issuing Bank must provide the necessary information without delay. The 
Credit will be advised, confirmed or amended, only when complete and clear 
instructions have been received and if the Advising Bank is then prepared to act 
on the instructions. 
LIABILITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
ARTICLE 13 
Standard for Examination of Documents 
A. Banks must examine all documents stipulated in the Credit with reasonable 
care, to ascertain whether or not they appear, on their face, to be in compliance 
with the terms and conditions of the Credit. Compliance of the stipulated 
documents on their face with the terms and conditions of the Credit, shall be 
determined by international standard banking practice as reflected in these 
Articles. 
Documents which appear on their face to be inconsistent with one another will be 
considered as not appearing on their face to be in compliance with the terms and 
conditions of the Credit. 
Documents not stipulated in the Credit will not be examined by banks. If they 




B. The Issuing Bank, the Confirming Bank, if any, or a Nominated Bank acting on 
their behalf, shall each have a reasonable time, not to exceed seven banking days 
following the day of receipt of the documents, to examine the documents and 
determine whether to take up or refuse the documents and to inform the party 
from which it received the documents accordingly. 
C. If a Credit contains conditions without stating the document(s) to be presented 
in compliance therewith, banks will deem such conditions as not stated and will 
disregard them. 
ARTICLE 14 
Discrepant Documents and Notice 
A. When the Issuing Bank authorizes another bank to pay, incur a deferred 
payment undertaking, accept Draft(s), or negotiate against documents which 
appear on their face to be in compliance with the terms and conditions of the 
Credit, the Issuing Bank and the Confirming Bank, if any, are bound: 
i. to reimburse the Nominated Bank which has paid, incurred a deferred payment 
undertaking, accepted Draft(s), or negotiated, 
ii. to take up the documents. 
B. Upon receipt of the documents the Issuing Bank and /or Confirming Bank, if 
any, or a Nominated Bank acting on their behalf, must determine on the basis of 
the documents alone whether or not they appear on their face to be in compliance 
with the terms and conditions of the Credit. If the documents appear on their face 
not to be in compliance with the terms and conditions of the Credit, such banks 
may refuse to take up the documents. 
C. If the Issuing Bank determines that the documents appear on their face not to 
be in compliance with the terms and conditions of the Credit, it may in its sole 
judgment approach the Applicant for a waiver of the discrepancy(ies). This does 
not, however, extend the period mentioned in sub Article 13 (b). 
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D. i. If the Issuing Bank and/or Confirming Bank, if any, or a Nominated Bank 
acting on their behalf, decides to refuse the documents, it must give notice to that 
effect by telecommunication or, if that is not possible, by other expeditious means, 
without delay but no later than the close of the seventh banking day following the 
day of receipt of the documents. Such notice shall be given to the bank from 
which it received the documents, or to the Beneficiary, if it received the 
documents directly from him. 
ii. Such notice must state all discrepancies in respect of which the bank refuses the 
documents and must also state whether it is holding the documents at the disposal 
of, or is returning them to, the presenter. 
iii. The Issuing Bank and/or Confirming Bank, if any, shall then be entitled to 
claim from the remitting bank refund, with interest, of any reimbursement which 
has been made to that bank. 
E. If the Issuing Bank and/or Confirming Bank, if any, fails to act in accordance 
with the provisions of this Article and/or fails to hold the documents at the 
disposal of, or return them to the presenter, the Issuing Bank and/ or Confirming 
Bank, if any, shall be precluded from claiming that the documents are not in 
compliance with the terms and conditions of the Credit. 
F. If the remitting bank draws the attention of the Issuing Bank and/or Confirming 
Bank, if any, to any discrepancy(ies) in the document(s) or advises such banks that 
it has paid, incurred a deferred payment undertaking, accepted Draft(s) or 
negotiated under reserve or against an indemnity in respect of such 
discrepancy(ies), the Issuing Bank and/or Confirming Bank, if any, shall not be 
thereby relieved from any of their obligations under any provision of this Article. 
Such reserve or indemnity concerns only the relations between the remitting bank 
and the party towards whom the reserve was made, or from whom, or on whose 




Disclaimer on Effectiveness of Documents 
Banks assume no liability or responsibility for the form, sufficiency, accuracy, 
genuineness, falsification or legal effect of any document(s), or for the general 
and/or particular conditions stipulated in the document(s) or superimposed 
thereon; nor do they assume any liability or responsibility for the description, 
quantity, weight, quality, condition, packing, delivery, value or existence of the 
goods represented by any document(s), or for the good faith or acts and/or 
omissions, solvency, performance or standing of the consignors, the carriers, the 
forwarders, the consignees or the insurers of the goods, or any other person 
whomsoever. 
ARTICLE 16 
Disclaimer on the Transmission of Messages 
Banks assume no liability or responsibility for the consequences arising out of 
delay and/or loss in transit of any message(s), letter(s) or document(s), or for 
delay, mutilation or other error(s) arising in the transmission of any 
telecommunication. Banks assume no liability or responsibility for errors in 
translation and/or interpretation of technical terms, and reserve the right to 
transmit Credit terms without translating them. 
ARTICLE 17 
Force Majeure 
Banks assume no liability or responsibility for the consequences arising out of the 
interruption of their business by Acts of God, riots, civil commotions, 
insurrections, wars or any other causes beyond their control, or by any strikes or 
lockouts. Unless specifically authorized, banks will not, upon resumption of their 
business, pay, incur a deferred payment undertaking, accept Draft(s) or negotiate 




Disclaimer for Acts of an Instructed Party 
A. Banks utilizing the services of another bank or other banks for the purpose of 
giving effect to the instructions of the Applicant do so for the account and at the 
risk of such Applicant. 
B. Banks assume no liability or responsibility should the instructions they transmit 
not be carried out, even if they have themselves taken the initiative in the choice of 
such other bank(s). 
C. i. A party instructing another party to perform services is liable for any charges, 
including commissions, fees, costs or expenses incurred by the instructed party in 
connection with its instructions. 
ii. Where a credit stipulates that such charges are for the account of a party other 
than the instructing party, and charges cannot be collected, the instructing party 
remains ultimately liable for the payment thereof. 
D. The Applicant shall be bound by and liable to indemnify the banks against all 
obligations and responsibilities imposed by foreign laws and usages. 
ARTICLE 19 
Bank to Bank Reimbursement Arrangements 
A. If an Issuing Bank intends that the reimbursement to which a paying, accepting 
or negotiating bank is entitled, shall be obtained by such bank (the "Claiming 
Bank"), claiming on another party (the "Reimbursing Bank"), it shall provide such 
Reimbursing Bank in good time with the proper instructions or authorization to 
honor such reimbursement claims. 
B. Issuing Banks shall not require a Claiming Bank to supply a certificate of 
compliance with the terms and conditions of the Credit to the Reimbursing Bank. 
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C. An Issuing Bank shall not be relieved from any of its obligations to provide 
reimbursement if and when reimbursement is not received by the Claiming Bank 
from the Reimbursing Bank. 
D. The Issuing Bank shall be responsible to the Claiming Bank for any loss of 
interest if reimbursement is not provided by the Reimbursing Bank on first 
demand, or as otherwise specified in the Credit, or mutually agreed, as the case 
maybe. 
E. The Reimbursing Bank's charges should be for the account of the Issuing Bank. 
However, in cases where the charges are for the account of another party, it is the 
responsibility of the Issuing Bank to so indicate in the original Credit and in the 
reimbursement authorization. In cases where the Reimbursing Bank's charges are 
for the account of another party they shall be collected from the Claiming Bank 
when the Credit is drawn under. In cases where the Credit is not drawn under, the 
Reimbursing Bank's charges remain the obligation of the Issuing Bank. 
DOCUMENTS 
ARTICLE 20 
Ambiguity as to the Issuers of Documents 
A. Terms such as "first class", "well known", "qualified", "independent", "official", 
"competent", "local", and the like, shall not be used to describe the issuers of any 
document(s) to be presented under a Credit. If such terms are incorporated in the 
Credit, banks will accept the relative document(s) as presented, provided that it 
appears on its face to be in compliance with the other terms and conditions of the 
Credit and not to have been issued by the Beneficiary. 
B. Unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, banks will also accept as an original 
document(s), a document(s) produced or appearing to have been produced: i. by 
reprographic, automated or computerized systems; ii. as carbon copies; provided 
that it is marked as original and, where necessary, appears to be signed. 
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A document may be signed by handwriting, by facsimile signature, by perforated 
signature, by stamp, by symbol, or by any other mechanical or electronic method 
of authentication. 
C. i. Unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, banks will accept as a copy(ies), a 
document(s) either labeled copy or not marked as an original a copy(ies) need not 
be signed. 
ii. Credits that require multiple document(s) such as "duplicate", "two fold", "two 
copies" and the like, will be satisfied by the presentation of one original and the 
remaining number in copies except where the document itself indicates otherwise. 
D. Unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, a condition under a Credit calling for 
a document to be authenticated, validated, legalized, visaed, certified or indicating 
a similar requirement, will be satisfied by any signature, mark, stamp or label on 
such document that on its face appears to satisfy the above condition. 
ARTICLE 21 
Unspecified Issuers or Contents of Documents When documents other than 
transport documents, insurance documents and commercial invoices are called for, 
the Credit should stipulate by whom such documents are to be issued and their 
wording or data content. If the Credit does not so stipulate, banks will accept such 
documents as presented, provided that their data content is not inconsistent with 
any other stipulated document presented. 
ARTICLE 22 
Issuance Date of Documents Vs. Credit Date 
Unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, banks will accept a document bearing a 
date of issuance prior to that of the Credit, subject to such document being 




Marine/Ocean Bill of Lading 
A. If a Credit calls for a bill of lading covering a port to port shipment, banks will, 
unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, accept a document, however named, 
which: 
i. appears on its face to indicate the name of the carrier and to have been signed or 
otherwise authenticated by: 
" the carrier or a named agent for or on behalf of the carrier, or 
" the master or a named agent for or on behalf of the master. 
Any signature or authentication of the carrier or the master must be identified as 
carrier or master, as the case may be. An agent signing or authenticating for the 
carrier or master must also indicate the name and the capacity of the party, i. e. 
carrier or master, on whose behalf that agent is acting, and 
ii. indicates that the goods have been loaded on board, or shipped on a named 
vessel. 
Loading on board or shipment on a named vessel may be indicated by pre printed 
wording on the bill of lading that the goods have been loaded on board a named 
vessel or shipped on a named vessel, in which case the date of issuance of the bill 
of lading will be deemed to be the date of loading on board and the date of 
shipment. 
In all other cases loading on board a named vessel must be evidenced by a 
notation on the bill of lading which gives the date on which the goods have been 
loaded on board, in which case the date of the board notation will be deemed to be 
the date of shipment. If the bill of lading contains the indication "intended vessel", 
or similar qualification in relation to the vessel, loading on board a named vessel 
must be evidenced by an on board notation on the bill of lading which, in addition 
to the date on which the goods have been loaded on board, also includes the name 
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of the vessel on which the goods have been loaded, even if they have been loaded 
on the vessel named as the "intended vessel". 
If the bill of lading indicates a place of receipt or taking in charge different from 
the port of loading, the on board notation must also include the port of loading 
stipulated in the Credit and the name of the vessel on which the goods have been 
loaded, even if they have been loaded on the vessel named in the bill of lading. 
This provision also applies whenever loading on board the vessel is indicated by 
pre printed wording on the bill of lading, and 
iii. indicates the port of loading and the port of discharge stipulated in the Credit, 
notwithstanding that it: 
a. indicates a place of taking in charge different from the port of loading, and/or a 
place of final destination different from the port of discharge, and/or 
b. contains the indication "intended" or similar qualification in relation to the port 
of loading and/or port of discharge, as long as the document also states the ports 
of loading and/or discharge stipulated in the Credit, and 
iv. consists of a sole original bill of lading or, if issued in more than one original, 
the full set as so issued, and 
v. appears to contain all of the terms and conditions of carriage, or some of such 
terms and conditions by reference to a source or document other than the bill of 
lading (short form/blank back bill of lading); banks will not examine the contents 
of such terms and conditions, and 
vi. contains no indication that it is subject to a charter party and/or no indication 
that the carrying vessel is propelled by sail only, and 
vii. in all other respects meets the stipulations of the Credit. 
B. For the purpose of this Article, transshipment means unloading and reloading 
from one vessel to another vessel during the course of ocean carriage from the 
port of loading to the port of discharge stipulated in the Credit. 
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C. Unless transshipment is prohibited by the terms of the Credit, banks will accept 
a bill of lading which indicates that the goods will be transshipped, provided that 
the entire ocean carriage is covered by one and the same bill of lading. 
D. Even if the Credit prohibits transshipment, banks will accept a bill of lading 
which: 
i. indicates that the transshipment will take place as long as the relevant cargo is 
shipped in Container(s), Trailer(s) and/or "LASH" barge(s) as evidenced by the 
bill of lading, provided that the entire ocean carriage is covered by one and the 
same bill of lading, and/or ii. incorporates clauses stating that the carrier reserves 
the right to transship. 
ARTICLE 24 
Non Negotiable Sea Waybill 
A. If a Credit calls for a non negotiable sea waybill covering a port to port 
shipment, banks will, unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, accept a document, 
however named, which: 
i. appears on its face to indicate the name of the carrier and to have been signed or 
otherwise authenticated by: 
" the carrier or a named agent for or on behalf of the carrier, or 
" the master or a named agent for or on behalf of the master, 
Any signature or authentication of the carrier or master must be identified as 
carrier or master, as the case may be. An agent signing or authenticating for the 
carrier or master must also indicate the name and the capacity of the party, i. e. 
carrier or master, on whose behalf that agent is acting, and 
ii. indicates that the goods have been loaded on board, or shipped on a named 
vessel. 
Loading on board or shipment on a named vessel may be indicated by pre printed 
wording on the nonnegotiable sea waybill that the goods have been loaded on 
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board a named vessel or shipped on a named vessel, in which case the date of 
issuance of the non negotiable sea waybill will be deemed to be the date of loading 
on board and the date of shipment. 
In all other cases loading on board a named vessel must be evidenced by a 
notation on the non negotiable sea waybill which gives the date on which the 
goods have been loaded on board, in which case the date of the on board notation 
will be deemed to be the date of shipment. 
If the non negotiable sea waybill contains the indication "intended vessel", or 
similar qualification in relation to the vessel, loading on board a named vessel must 
be evidenced by an on board notation on the non negotiable sea waybill which, in 
addition to the date on which the goods have been loaded on board, includes the 
name of the vessel on which the goods have been loaded, even if they have been 
loaded on the vessel named as the "intended vessel". 
If the non negotiable sea waybill indicates a place of receipt or taking in charge 
different from the port of loading, the on board notation must also include the port 
of loading stipulated in the Credit and the name of the vessel on which the goods 
have been loaded, even if they have been loaded on a vessel named in the 
nonnegotiable sea waybill. This provision also applies whenever loading on board 
the vessel is indicated by pre printed wording on the non negotiable sea waybill, 
and 
iii. indicates the port of loading and the port of discharge stipulated in the Credit, 
notwithstanding that it: 
a. indicates a place of taking in charge different from the port of loading, and/or a 
place of final destination different from the port of discharge, and/or 
b. contains the indication "intended" or similar qualification in relation to the port 
of loading and/or port of discharge, as long as the document also states the ports 
of loading and/or discharge stipulated in the Credit, and 
iv. consists of a sole original non negotiable sea waybill, or if issued in more than 
one original, the full set as so issued, and 
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v. appears to contain all of the terms and conditions of carriage, or some of such 
terms and conditions by reference to a source or document other than the 
nonnegotiable sea waybill (short form/blank back nonnegotiable sea waybill); 
banks will not examine the contents of such terms and conditions, and 
vi. contains no indication that it is subject to a charter party and/or no indication 
that the carrying vessel is propelled by sail only, and 
vii. in all other respects meets the stipulations of the Credit. 
B. For the purpose of this Article, transshipment means unloading and reloading 
from one vessel to another vessel during the course of ocean carriage from the 
port of loading to the port of discharge stipulated in the Credit. 
C. Unless transshipment is prohibited by the terms of the Credit, banks will accept 
a non negotiable sea waybill which indicates that the goods will be transshipped, 
provided that the entire ocean carriage is covered by one and the same non 
negotiable sea waybill. 
D. Even if the Credit prohibits transshipment, banks will accept a non negotiable 
sea waybill which: 
i. indicates that transshipment will take place as long as the relevant cargo is 
shipped in Container(s), Trailer(s) and/or "LASH" barge(s) as evidenced by the 
nonnegotiable sea waybill, provided that the entire ocean carriage is covered by 
one and the same non negotiable sea waybill, and/or ii. incorporates clauses stating 
that the carrier reserves the right to transship. 
ARTICLE 25 
Charter Party Bill of Lading 
A. If a Credit calls for or permits a charter party bill of lading, banks will, unless 
otherwise stipulated in the Credit, accept a document, however named, which: 
i. contains any indication that it is subject to a charter party, and 
ii. appears on its face to have been signed or otherwise authenticated by: 
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" the master or a named agent for or on behalf of the master, or 
" the owner or a named agent for or on behalf of the owner. 
Any signature or authentication of the master or owner must be identified as 
master or owner as the case may be. An agent signing or authenticating for the 
master or owner must also indicate the name and the capacity of the party, i. e. 
master or owner, on whose behalf that agent is acting, and 
iii. does or does not indicate the name of the carrier, and 
iv. indicates that the goods have been loaded on board or shipped on a named 
vessel. 
Loading on board or shipment on a named vessel may be indicated by pre printed 
wording on the bill of lading that the goods have been loaded on board a named 
vessel or shipped on a named vessel, in which case the date of issuance of the bill 
of lading will be deemed to be the date of loading on board and the date of 
shipment. 
In all other cases loading on board a named vessel must be evidenced by a 
notation on the bill of lading which gives the date on which the goods have been 
loaded on board, in which case the date of the on board notation will be deemed 
to be the date of shipment, and 
v. indicates the port of loading and the port of discharge stipulated in the Credit, 
and 
vi. consists of a sole original bill of lading or, if issued in more than one original, 
the full set as so issued, and 
vii. contains no indication that the carrying vessel is propelled by sail only, and 
viii. in all other respects meets the stipulations of the Credit. 
B. Even if the Credit requires the presentation of a charter party contract in 
connection with a charter party bill of lading, banks will not examine such charter 




Multimodal Transport Document 
A. If a Credit calls for a transport document covering at least two different modes 
of transport (multimodal transport), banks will, unless otherwise stipulated in the 
Credit, accept a document, however named, which: 
i. appears on its face to indicate the name of the carrier or multimodal transport 
operator and to have been signed or otherwise authenticated by: 
" the carrier or multimodal transport operator or a named agent for or on behalf of 
the carrier or multimodal transport operator, or 
" the master or a named agent for or on behalf of the master. 
Any signature or authentication of the carrier, multimodal transport operator or 
master must be identified as carrier, multimodal transport operator or master, as 
the case may be. An agent signing or authenticating for the carrier, multimodal 
transport operator or master must also indicate the name and the capacity of the 
party, i. e. carrier, multimodal transport operator or master, on whose behalf that 
the agent is acting, and 
ii. indicates that the goods have been dispatched, taken in charge or loaded on 
board. Dispatch, taking in charge or loading on board may be indicated by 
wording to that effect on the multimodal transport document and the date of 
issuance will be deemed to be the date of dispatch, taking in charge or loading on 
board and the date of shipment. However, if the document indicates, by stamp or 
otherwise, a date of dispatch, taking in charge or loading on board, such date will 
be deemed to be the date of shipment, and 
iii. a. indicates the place of taking in charge stipulated in the Credit which may be 
different from the port, airport or place of loading, and the place of final 
destination stipulated in the Credit which may be different from the port, airport or 
place of discharge, and/or 
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b. contains the indication "intended" or similar qualification in relation to the 
vessel and/or port of loading and/or port of discharge, and 
iv. consists of a sole original multimodal transport document or, if issued in more 
than one original, the full set as so issued, and 
v. appears to contain all of the terms and conditions of carriage, or some of such 
terms and conditions by reference to a source or document other than the 
multimodal transport document (short formblank back multimodal transport 
document); banks will not examine the contents of such terms and conditions, and 
vi, contains no indication that it is subject to a charter party and/or no indication 
that the carrying vessel is propelled by sail only, and 
vii. in all other respects meets the stipulations of the Credit. 
B. Even if the Credit prohibits transshipment, banks will accept a multimodal 
transport document which indicates that transshipment will or may take place, 
provided that the entire carriage is covered by one and the same multimodal 
transport document. 
ARTICLE 27 
Air Transport Document 
A. If a Credit calls for an air transport document, banks will, unless otherwise 
stipulated in the Credit, accept a document, however named, which: 
i. appears on its face to indicate the name of the carrier and to have been signed or 
otherwise authenticated by: 
" the carrier, or 
"a named agent for or on behalf of the carrier. 
Any signature or authentication of the carrier must be identified as carrier. An 
agent signing or authenticating for the carrier must also indicate the name and the 
capacity of the party, i. e. carrier, on whose behalf that agent is acting, and 
ii. indicates that the goods have been accepted for carriage, and 
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iii. where the Credit calls for an actual date of dispatch, indicates a specific 
notation of such date, the date of dispatch so indicated on the air transport 
document will be deemed to be the date of shipment. 
For the purpose of this Article, the information appearing in the box on the air 
transport document (marked "For Carrier Use Only" or similar expression) relative 
to the flight number and date will not be considered as a specific notation of such 
date of dispatch. 
In all other cases, the date of issuance of the air transport document will be 
deemed to be the date of shipment, and 
iv. indicates the airport of departure and the airport of destination stipulated in the 
Credit, and 
v. appears to be the original for consignor/shipper even if the Credit stipulates a 
full set of originals, or similar expressions, and 
vi. appears to contain all of the terms and conditions of carriage, or some of such 
terms and conditions, by reference to a source or document other than the air 
transport document; banks will not examine the contents of such terms and 
conditions, and 
vii. in all other respects meets the stipulations of the Credit. 
B. For the purpose of this Article, transshipment means unloading and reloading 
from one aircraft to another aircraft during the course of carriage from the airport 
of departure to the airport of destination stipulated in the Credit. 
C. Even if the Credit prohibits transshipment, banks will accept an air transport 
document which indicates that transshipment will or may take place, provided that 




Road, Rail or inland Waterway 1-port Documents 
A. If a Credit calls for a road, rail, or inland waterway transport document, banks 
will, unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, accept a document of the type 
called for, however named, which: 
i. appears on its face to indicate the name of the carrier and to have been signed or 
otherwise authenticated by the carrier or a named agent for or on behalf of the 
carrier and/or to bear a reception stamp or other indication of receipt by the 
carrier or a named agent for or on behalf of the carrier. 
Any signature, authentication, reception stamp or other indication of receipt of the 
carrier, must be identified on its face as that of the carrier. An agent signing or 
authenticating for the carrier must also indicate the name and the capacity of the 
party, i. e. carrier, on whose behalf that agent is acting, and 
ii. indicates that the goods have been received for shipment, dispatch or carriage 
or wording to this effect. The date of issuance will be deemed to be the date of 
shipment unless the transport document contains a reception stamp, in which case 
the date of the reception stamp will be deemed to be the date of shipment, and 
iii. indicates the place of shipment and the place of destination stipulated in the 
Credit, and 
iv. in all other respects meets the stipulations of the Credit. 
B. In the absence of any indication on the transport document as to the numbers 
issued, banks will accept the transport document(s) presented as constituting a full 
set. Banks will accept as original(s) the transport document(s) whether marked as 
original(s) or not. 
C. For the purpose of this Article, transshipment means unloading and reloading 
from one means of conveyance to another means of conveyance, in different 
modes of transport, during the course of carriage from the place of shipment to 
the place of destination stipulated in the Credit. 
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D. Even if the Credit prohibits transshipment, banks will accept a road, rail, or 
inland waterway transport document which indicates that transshipment will or 
may take place, provided that the entire carriage is covered by one and the same 
transport document and within the same mode of transport. 
ARTICLE 29 
Courier and Post Receipts 
A. If a Credit calls for a post receipt or certificate of posting, banks will, unless 
otherwise stipulated in the Credit, accept a post receipt or certificate of posting 
which: 
i. appears on its face to have been stamped or otherwise authenticated and dated 
in the place from which the Credit stipulates the goods are to be shipped or 
dispatched and such date will be deemed to be the date of shipment or dispatch, 
and 
ii. in all other respects meets the stipulations of the Credit. 
B. If a Credit calls for a document issued by a courier or expedited delivery 
service evidencing receipt of the goods for delivery, banks will, unless otherwise 
stipulated in the Credit, accept a document, however named, which: 
i. appears on its face to indicate the name of the courier/ service, and to have been 
stamped, signed or otherwise authenticated by such named courier/service (unless 
the Credit specifically calls for a document issued by a named Courier/Service, 
banks will accept a document issued by any Courier/Service), and 
ii. indicates a date of pick up or of receipt or wording to this effect, such date 
being deemed to be the date of shipment or dispatch, and 




Transport Documents issued by Freight Forwarders 
Unless otherwise authorized in the Credit, banks will only accept a transport 
document issued by a freight forwarder if it appears on its face to indicate: 
i. the name of the freight forwarder as a carrier or multimodal transport operator 
and to have been signed or otherwise authenticated by the freight forwarder as 
carrier or multimodal transport operator, or 
ii. the name of the carrier or multimodal transport operator and to have been 
signed or otherwise authenticated by the freight forwarder as a named agent for or 
on behalf of the carrier or multimodal transport operator. 
ARTICLE 31 
"On Deck", "Shipper's Load and Count", Name of Consignor 
Unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, banks will accept a transport document 
which: 
i. does not indicate, in the case of carriage by sea or by more than one means of 
conveyance including carriage by sea, that the goods are or will be loaded on 
deck. Nevertheless, banks will accept a transport document which contains a 
provision that the goods may be carried on deck, provided that it does not 
specifically state that they are or will be loaded on deck, and/or 
ii. bears a clause on the face thereof such as "shipper's load and count" or "said by 
shipper to contain" or words of similar effect, and/or 
iii. indicates as the consignor of the goods a party other than the Beneficiary of the 
Credit. 
ARTICLE 32 
Clean Transport Documents A. A clean transport document is one which bears no 
clause or notation which expressly declares a defective condition of the goods 
and/or the packaging. 
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B. Banks will not accept transport documents bearing such clauses or notations 
unless the Credit expressly stipulates the clauses or notations which may be 
accepted. 
C. Banks will regard a requirement in a Credit for a transport document to bear 
the clause "clean on board" as complied with if such transport document meets the 
requirements of this Article and of Articles 23,24,25,26,27,28 or 30. 
ARTICLE 33 
Freight Payable/Prepaid Transport Documents 
A. Unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, or inconsistent with any of the 
documents presented under the Credit, banks will accept transport documents 
stating that freight or transportation charges (hereafter referred to as "freight") 
have still to be paid. 
B. If a Credit stipulates that the transport document has to indicate that freight has 
been paid or prepaid, banks will accept a transport document on which words 
clearly indicating payment or prepayment of freight appear by stamp or otherwise, 
or on which payment or prepayment of freight is indicated by other means. If the 
Credit requires courier charges to be paid or prepaid banks will also accept a 
transport document issued by a courier or expedited delivery service evidencing 
that the courier charges are for the account of a party other than the consignee. 
C. The words "freight prepayable" or "freight to be prepaid" or words of similar 
effect, if appearing on transport documents, will not be accepted as constituting 
evidence of the payment of freight. 
D. Banks will accept transport documents bearing reference by stamp or otherwise 
to costs additional to the freight, such as costs of, or disbursements incurred in 
connection with, loading, unloading or similar operations, unless the conditions of 





A. Insurance documents must appear on their face to be issued and signed by 
insurance companies or underwriters or their agents. 
B. If the insurance document indicates that it has been issued in more than one 
original, all the originals must be presented unless otherwise authorized in the 
Credit. 
C. Cover notes issued by brokers will not be accepted, unless specifically 
authorized in the Credit. 
D. Unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, banks will accept an insurance 
certificate or a declaration under an open cover pre signed by insurance companies 
or underwriters or their agents. 
If a Credit specifically calls for an insurance certificate or a declaration under an 
open cover, banks will accept, in lieu thereof, an insurance policy. 
E. Unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, or unless it appears from the 
insurance document that the cover is effective at the latest from the date of 
loading on board or dispatch or taking in charge of the goods, banks will not 
accept an insurance document which bears a date of issuance later than the date of 
loading on board or dispatch or taking in charge as indicated in such transport 
document. 
F. i. Unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, the insurance document must be 
expressed in the same currency as the Credit. 
ii. Unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, the minimum amount for which the 
insurance document must indicate the insurance cover to have been effected is the 
CIF (cost, insurance and freight (... "named port of destination")) or CIP (carriage 
and insurance paid to (... "named place of destination")) value of the goods, as the 
case may be, plus 10%, but only when the CIF or CIP value can be determined 
from the documents on their face. Otherwise, banks will accept as such minimum 
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amount 110% of the amount for which payment, acceptance or negotiation is 
requested under the Credit, or 110% of the gross amount of the invoice, 
whichever is the greater. 
ARTICLE 35 
Type of Insurance Cover 
A. Credits should stipulate the type of insurance required and, if any, the 
additional risks which are to be covered. Imprecise terms such as "usual risks" or 
"customary risks" shall not be used; if they are used, banks will accept insurance 
documents as presented, without responsibility for any risks not being covered. 
B. Failing specific stipulations in the Credit, banks will accept insurance 
documents as presented, without responsibility for any risks not being covered. 
C. Unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, banks will accept an insurance 
document which indicates that the cover is subject to a franchise or an excess 
(deductible). 
ARTICLE 36 
All Risks Insurance Cover 
Where a Credit stipulates "insurance against all risks", banks will accept an 
insurance document which contains any "all risks" notation or clause, whether or 
not bearing the heading "all risks", even if the insurance document indicates that 
certain risks are excluded, without responsibility for any risk(s) not being covered. 
ARTICLE 37 
Commercial Invoices 
A. Unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, commercial invoices; 
i. must appear on their face to be issued by the Beneficiary named in the Credit 
(except as provided in Article 48), and 
u. must be made out in the name of the Applicant (except as provided in sub 
Article 48 (H)), and 
31 
Appendix A 
iii. need not be signed. 
B. Unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, banks may refuse commercial 
invoices issued for amounts in excess of the amount permitted by the Credit. 
Nevertheless, if a bank authorized to pay, incur a deferred payment undertaking, 
accept Draft(s), or negotiate under a Credit accepts such invoices, its decision will 
be binding upon all parties, provided that such bank has not paid, incurred a 
deferred payment undertaking, accepted Draft(s) or negotiated for an amount in 
excess of that permitted by the Credit. 
C. The description of the goods in the commercial invoice must correspond with 
the description in the Credit. In all other documents, the goods may be described 
in general terms not inconsistent with the description of the goods in the Credit. 
ARTICLE 38 
Other Documents 
If a Credit calls for an attestation or certification of weight in the case of transport 
other than by sea, banks will accept a weight stamp or declaration of weight which 
appears to have been superimposed on the transport document by the carrier or 
his agent unless the Credit specifically stipulates that the attestation or certification 
of weight must be by means of a separate document. 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
ARTICLE 39 
Allowances in Credit Amount, Quantity and Unit Price. 
A. The words "about", "approximately", "circa" or similar expressions used in 
connection with the amount of the Credit or the quantity or the unit price stated in 
the Credit are to be construed as allowing a difference not to exceed 10% more or 
10% less than the amount or the quantity or the unit price to which they refer. 
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B. Unless a Credit stipulates that the quantity of the goods specified must not be 
exceeded or reduced, a tolerance of 5% more or 5% less will be permissible, 
always provided that the amount of the drawings does not exceed the amount of 
the Credit. This tolerance does not apply when the Credit stipulates the quantity in 
terms of a stated number of packing units or individual items. 
C. Unless a Credit which prohibits partial shipments stipulates otherwise, or unless 
sub Article (B) above is applicable, a tolerance of 5% less in the amount of the 
drawing will be permissible, provided that if the Credit stipulates the quantity of 
the goods, such quantity of goods is shipped in full, and if the Credit stipulates a 
unit price, such price is not reduced. This provision does not apply when 
expressions referred to in sub Article (A) above are used in the Credit. 
ARTICLE 40 
Partial Shipments/Drawings 
A. Partial drawings and/or shipments are allowed, unless the Credit stipulates 
otherwise. 
B. Transport documents which appear on their face to indicate that shipment has 
been made on the same means of conveyance and for the same journey, provided 
they indicate the same destination, will not be regarded as covering partial 
shipments, even if the transport documents indicate different dates of shipment 
and/or different ports of loading, places of taking in charge, or dispatch. 
C. Shipments made by post or by courier will not be regarded as partial shipments 
if the post receipts or certificates of posting or courier's receipts or dispatch notes 
appear to have been stamped, signed or otherwise authenticated in the place from 
which the Credit stipulates the goods are to be dispatched, and on the same date. 
ARTICLE 41 
Installment Shipments/Drawings 
If drawings and/or shipments by installments within given periods are stipulated in 
the Credit and any installment is not drawn and/or shipped within the period 
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allowed for that installment, the Credit ceases to be available for that and any 
subsequent installments, unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit. 
ARTICLE 42 
Expiry Date and Place for Presentation of Documents 
A. All Credits must stipulate an expiry date and a place for presentation of 
documents for payment, acceptance, or with the exception of freely negotiable 
Credits, a place for presentation of documents for negotiation. An expiry date 
stipulated for payment, acceptance or negotiation will be construed to express an 
expiry date for presentation of documents. 
B. Except as provided in sub Article 44(A), documents must be presented on or 
before such expiry date. 
C. If an Issuing Bank states that the Credit is to be available "for one month", "for 
six months", or the like, but does not specify the date from which the time is to 
run, the date of issuance of the Credit by the Issuing Bank will be deemed to be 
the first day from which such time is to run. Banks should discourage indication of 
the expiry date of the Credit in this manner. 
ARTICLE 43 
Limitation on the Expiry Date 
A. In addition to stipulating an expiry date for presentation of documents, every 
Credit which calls for a transport document(s) should also stipulate a specified 
period of time after the date of shipment during which presentation must be made 
in compliance with the terms and conditions of the Credit. If no such period of 
time is stipulated, banks will not accept documents presented to them later than 21 
days after the date of shipment. In any event, documents must be presented not 
later than the expiry date of the Credit. 
B. In cases in which sub Article 40(B) applies, the date of shipment will be 





Extension of Expiry Date 
A. If the expiry date of the Credit and/or the last day of the period of time for 
presentation of documents stipulated by the Credit or applicable by virtue of 
Article 43 falls on a day on which the bank to which presentation has to be made 
is closed for reasons other than those referred to in Article 17, the stipulated 
expiry date and/or the last day of the period of time after the date of shipment for 
presentation of documents, as the case may be, shall be extended to the first 
following day on which such bank is open. 
B. The latest date for shipment shall not be extended by reason of the extension of 
the expiry date and/or the period of time after the date of shipment for 
presentation of documents in accordance with sub Article (A) above. If no such 
latest date for shipment is stipulated in the Credit or amendments thereto, banks 
will not accept transport documents indicating a date of shipment later than the 
expiry date stipulated in the Credit or amendments thereto. 
C. The bank to which presentation is made on such first following business day 
must provide a statement that the documents were presented within the time limits 
extended in accordance with sub Article 44(A) of the Uniform Customs and 
Practice for Documentary Credits, 1993 Revision, ICC Publication No. 500. 
ARTICLE 45 
Hours of Presentation 
Banks are under no obligation to accept presentation of documents outside their 
banking hours. 
ARTICLE 46 
General Expressions as to Dates for Shipment 
A. Unless otherwise stipulated in the Credit, the expression "shipment" used in 
stipulating an earliest and/or a latest date for shipment will be understood to 
include expressions such as, "loading on board", "dispatch", "accepted for 
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carriage", "date of post receipt", "date of pick up", and the like, and the case of a 
Credit calling for a multimodal transport document the expression "taking in 
charge". 
B. Expressions such as "prompt", "immediately", "as soon as possible", and the 
like should not be used. If they are used banks will disregard them. 
C. If the expression "on or about" or similar expressions are used, banks will 
interpret them as a stipulation that the shipment is to be made during the period 
from five days before to five days after the specified date, both end days included. 
ARTICLE 47 
Date Terminology for Periods of Shipment 
A. The words "to", "until", "till", "from" and words of similar import applying to 
any date or period in the Credit referring to shipment will be understood to include 
the date mentioned. 
B. The word "after" will be understood to exclude the date mentioned. 
C. The terms "first half, "second half of a month shall be construed respectively as 
the 1st to the 15th, and the 16th to the last day of such month, all dates inclusive. 
D. The terms "beginning", "middle", or "end" of a month shall be construed 
respectively as the Ist to the 10th, the 11th to the 20th, and the 21st to the last 




A. A transferable Credit is a Credit under which the Beneficiary (First Beneficiary) 
may request the bank authorized to pay, incur a deferred payment undertaking, 
accept or negotiate (the "Transferring Bank"), or in the case of a freely negotiable 
Credit, the bank specifically authorized in the Credit as a Transferring Bank, to 
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make the Credit available in whole or in part to one or more other Beneficiary(ies) 
(Second Beneficiary(ies)). 
B. A Credit can be transferred only if it is expressly designated as "transferable" by 
the Issuing Bank. Terms such as "divisible", "fractionable", "assignable", and 
"transmissible" do not render the Credit transferable. If such terms are used they 
shall be disregarded. 
C. The Transferring Bank shall be under no obligation to effect such transfer 
except to the extent and in the manner expressly consented to by such bank. 
D. At the time of making a request for transfer and prior to transfer of the Credit, 
the First Beneficiary must irrevocably instruct the Transferring Bank whether or 
not he retains the right to refuse to allow the Transferring Bank to advise 
amendments to the Second Beneficiary(ies). If the Transferring Bank consents to 
the transfer under these conditions, it must, at the time of transfer, advise the 
Second Beneficiary(ies) of the First Beneficiary's instructions regarding 
amendments. 
E. If a Credit is transferred to more than one Second Beneficiary(ies), refusal of an 
amendment by one or more Second Beneficiary(ies) does not invalidate the 
acceptance(s) by the other Second Beneficiary(ies) with respect to whom the 
Credit will be amended accordingly. With respect to the Second Beneficiary(ies) 
who rejected the amendment, the Credit will remain unammended. 
F. Transferring Bank charges in respect of transfers including commissions, fees, 
costs or expenses are payable by the First Beneficiary, unless otherwise agreed. If 
the Transferring Bank agrees to transfer the Credit it shall be under no obligation 
to effect the transfer until such charges are paid. 
G. Unless otherwise stated in the Credit, a transferable Credit can be transferred 
once only. Consequently, the Credit cannot be transferred at the request of the 
Second Beneficiary to any subsequent Third Beneficiary. For the purpose of this 
Article, a retransfer to the First Beneficiary does not constitute a prohibited 
transfer. Fractions of a transferable Credit (not exceeding in the aggregate the 
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amount of the Credit) can be transferred separately, provided partial 
shipment/drawings are not prohibited, and the aggregate of such transfers will be 
considered as constituting only one transfer of the Credit. 
H. The Credit can be transferred only on the terms and conditions specified in the 
original Credit, with the exception of. 
" the amount of the Credit, 
" any unit price stated therein, 
" the expiry date, 
" the last date for presentation of documents in accordance with Article 43 
" the period for shipment, any or all of which may be reduced or curtailed. 
The percentage for which insurance cover must be effected may be increased in 
such a way as to provide the amount of cover stipulated in the original Credit, or 
these Articles. 
In addition, the name of the First Beneficiary can be substituted for that of the 
Applicant, but if the name of the Applicant is specifically required by the original 
Credit to appear in any document(s) other than the invoice, such requirement must 
be fulfilled. 
I. The First Beneficiary has the right to substitute his own invoice(s) (and Draft(s)) 
for those of the Second Beneficiary(ies), for amounts not in excess of the original 
amount stipulated in the Credit and for the original unit prices if stipulated in the 
Credit, and upon such substitution of invoice(s) (and Draft(s)) the First 
Beneficiary can draw under the Credit for the difference, if any, between his 
invoice(s) and the Second Beneficiaries(ies') invoice(s). 
When a Credit has been transferred and the First Beneficiary is to supply his own 
invoice(s) (and Draft(s)) in exchange for the Second Beneficiary's(ies') invoices(s) 
(and Draft(s)) but fails to do so on first demand, the Transferring Bank has the 
right to deliver to the Issuing Bank the documents received under the transferred 
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Credit, including the Second Beneficiary's(ies') invoice(s) (and Draft(s)) without 
further responsibility to the First Beneficiary. 
J. The First Beneficiary may request that payment or negotiation be effected to the 
Second Beneficiary(ies) at the place to which the Credit has been transferred up to 
and including the expiry date of the Credit, unless the original Credit expressly 
states that it may not be made available for payment or negotiation at a place other 
than that stipulated in the Credit. This is without prejudice to the First 
Beneficiary's right to substitute subsequently his own invoice(s) (and Draft(s)) for 
those of the Second Beneficiary(ies) and to claim any difference due to him. 
ASSIGNMENT OF PROCEEDS 
ARTICLE 49 
Assignment of Proceeds 
The fact that a Credit is not stated to be transferable shall not affect the 
Beneficiary's right to assign any proceeds to which he may be, or may become, 
entitled under such Credit, in accordance with the provisions of the applicable law. 
This Article relates only to the assignment of proceeds and not to the assignment 
of the right to perform under the Credit itself. 
Appendix: B 
Appendix B: U. C. C. - Article 5- Letters of Credit 
(Original Version)' 
§ 5-101. Short Title. 
§ 5-102. Scope. 
§ 5-103. Definitions. 
§ 5-104. Formal Requirements; Signing. 
§ 5-105. Consideration. 
§ 5-106. Time and Effect of Establishment of Credit. 
§ 5-107. Advice of Credit; Confirmation; Error in Statement of Terms. 
§ 5-108. "Notation Credit"; Exhaustion of Credit. 
§ 5-109. Issuer's Obligation to Its Customer. 
§ 5-110. Availability of Credit in Portions; Presenter's Reservation of Lien or 
Claim. 
§ 5-111. Warranties on Transfer and Presentment. 
§ 5-112. Time Allowed for Honor or Rejection; Withholding Honor or Rejection 
by Consent; "Presenter". 
§ 5-113. Indemnities. 
§ 5-114. Issuer's Duty and Privilege to Honor; Right to Reimbursement. 
§ 5-115. Remedy for Improper Dishonor or Anticipatory Repudiation. 
§ 5-116. Transfer and Assignment. 
§ 5-117. Insolvency of Bank Holding Funds for Documentary Credit. 
§ 5-101. Short Title. 
This Article shall be known and may be cited as Uniform Commercial Code- 
Letters of Credit. 
"Uniform Commercial Code. Copyright. The American Law Institute and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. " 
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§ 5-102. Scope. 
(1) This Article applies 
(a) to a credit issued by a bank if the credit requires a documentary draft or a 
documentary demand for payment; and 
(b) to a credit issued by a person other than a bank if the credit requires that the 
draft or demand for payment be accompanied by a document of title; and 
(c) to a credit issued by a bank or other person if the credit is not within 
subparagraphs (a) or (b) but conspicuously states that it is a letter of credit or is 
conspicuously so entitled. 
(2) Unless the engagement meets the requirements of subsection (1), this Article 
does not apply to engagements to make advances or to honor drafts or demands 
for payment, to authorities to pay or purchase, to guarantees or to general 
agreements. 
(3) This Article deals with some but not all of the rules and concepts of letters of 
credit as such rules or concepts have developed prior to this act or may hereafter 
develop. The fact that this Article states a rule does not by itself require, imply or 
negate application of the same or a converse rule to a situation not provided for or 
to a person not specified by this Article. 
§ 5-103. Definitions. 
(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires 
(a) "Credit" or "letter of credit" means an engagement by a bank or other 
person made at the request of a customer and of a kind within the scope of this 
Article (Section 5-102) that the issuer will honor drafts or other demands for 
payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the credit. A credit may 
be either revocable or irrevocable. The engagement may be either an agreement to 
honor or a statement that the bank or other person is authorized to honor. 
(b) A "documentary draft" or a "documentary demand for payment" is one 
honor of which is conditioned upon the presentation of a document or documents. 
"Document" means any paper including document of title, security, invoice, 
certificate, notice of default and the like. 
(c) An "issuer" is a bank or other person issuing a credit. 
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(d) A "beneficiary" of a credit is a person who is entitled under its terms to 
draw or demand payment. 
(e) An "advising bank" is a bank which gives notification of the issuance of a 
credit by another bank. 
(f) A "confirming bank" is a bank which engages either that it will itself honor a 
credit already issued by another bank or that such a credit will be honored by the 
issuer or a third bank. 
(g) A "customer" is a buyer or other person who causes an issuer to issue a 
credit. The term also includes a bank which procures issuance or confirmation on 
behalf of that bank's customer. 
(2) Other definitions applying to this Article and the sections in which they appear 
are: 
"Notation Credit". Section 5-108. 
"Presenter". Section 5-112(3). 
(3) Definitions in other Articles applying to this Article and the sections in which 
they appear are: 
"Accept" or "Acceptance". Section 3-409. 
"Contract for sale". Section 2-106. 
"Draft". Section 3-104. 
"Holder in due course". Section 3-302. 
"Midnight deadline". Section 4-104. 
"Security". Section 8-102. 
(4) In addition, Article 1 contains general definitions and principles of construction 
and interpretation 
applicable throughout this Article. 
§ 5-104. Formal Requirements; Signing. 
(1) Except as otherwise required in subsection (1)(c) of Section 5-102 on scope, 
no particular form of phrasing is required for a credit. A credit must be in writing 
and signed by the issuer and a confirmation must be in writing and signed by the 
confirming bank. A modification of the terms of a credit or confirmation must be 
signed by the issuer or confirming bank. 
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(2) A telegram may be a sufficient signed writing if it identifies its sender by an 
authorized authentication. The authentication may be in code and the authorized 
naming of the issuer in an advice of credit is a sufficient signing. 
§ 5-105. Consideration. 
No consideration is necessary to establish a credit or to enlarge or otherwise 
modify its terms. 
§ 5-106. Time and Effect of Establishment of Credit. 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed a credit is established 
(a) as regards the customer as soon as a letter of credit is sent to him or the 
letter of credit or an authorized written advice of its issuance is sent to the 
beneficiary; and 
(b) as regards the beneficiary when he receives a letter of credit or an 
authorized written advice of its issuance. 
(2) Unless otherwise agreed once an irrevocable credit is established as regards the 
customer it can be modified or revoked only with the consent of the customer and 
once it is established as regards the beneficiary it can be modified or revoked only 
with his consent. 
(3) Unless otherwise agreed after a revocable credit is established it may be 
modified or revoked by the issuer without notice to or consent from the customer 
or beneficiary. 
(4) Notwithstanding any modification or revocation of a revocable credit any 
person authorized to honor or negotiate under the terms of the original credit is 
entitled to reimbursement for or honor of any draft or demand for payment duly 
honored or negotiated before receipt of notice of the modification or revocation 
and the issuer in turn is entitled to reimbursement from its customer. 
§ 5-107. Advice of Credit; Confirmation; Error in Statement of Terms. 
(1) Unless otherwise specified an advising bank by advising a credit issued by 
another bank does not assume any obligation to honor drafts drawn or demands 
for payment made under the credit but it does assume obligation for the accuracy 
of its own statement. 
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(2) A confirming bank by confirming a credit becomes directly obligated on the 
credit to the extent of its confirmation as though it were its issuer and acquires the 
rights of an issuer. 
(3) Even though an advising bank incorrectly advises the terms of a credit it has 
been authorized to advise the credit is established as against the issuer to the extent 
of its original terms. 
(4) Unless otherwise specified the customer bears as against the issuer all risks of 
transmission and reasonable translation or interpretation of any message relating to 
a credit. 
§ 5-108. "Notation Credit"; Exhaustion of Credit. 
(1) A credit which specifies that any person purchasing or paying drafts drawn or 
demands for payment made under it must note the amount of the draft or demand 
on the letter or advice of credit is a "notation credit". 
(2) Under a notation credit 
(a) a person paying the beneficiary or purchasing a draft or demand for payment 
from him acquires a right to honor only if the appropriate notation is made and by 
transferring or forwarding for honor the documents under the credit such a person 
warrants to the issuer that the notation has been made; and 
(b) unless the credit or a signed statement that an appropriate notation has been 
made accompanies the draft or demand for payment the issuer may delay honor 
until evidence of notation has been procured which is satisfactory to it but its 
obligation and that of its customer continue for a reasonable time not exceeding 
thirty days to obtain such evidence. 
(3) If the credit is not a notation credit 
(a) the issuer may honor complying drafts or demands for payment presented to 
it in the order in which they are presented and is discharged pro tanto by honor of 
any such draft or demand; 
(b) as between competing good faith purchasers of complying drafts or 
demands the person first purchasing has priority over a subsequent purchaser even 
though the later purchased draft or demand has been first honored. 
App endrx B 
6 
§ 5-109. Issuer's Obligation to Its Customer. 
(1) An issuer's obligation to its customer includes good faith and observance of any 
general banking usage but unless otherwise agreed does not include liability or 
responsibility 
(a) for performance of the underlying contract for sale or other transaction 
between the customer and the beneficiary; or 
(b) for any act or omission of any person other than itself or its own branch or 
for loss or destruction of a draft, demand or document in transit or in the 
possession of others; or 
(c) based on knowledge or lack of knowledge of any usage of any particular 
trade. 
(2) An issuer must examine documents with care so as to ascertain that on their 
face they appear to comply with the terms of the credit but unless otherwise agreed 
assumes no liability or responsibility for the genuineness, falsification or effect of 
any document which appears on such examination to be regular on its face. 
(3) A non-bank issuer is not bound by any banking usage of which it has no 
knowledge. 
§ 5-110. Availability of Credit in Portions; Presenter's Reservation of Lien or 
Claim. 
(1) Unless otherwise specified a credit may be used in portions in the discretion of 
the beneficiary. 
(2) Unless otherwise specified a person by presenting a documentary draft or 
demand for payment under a credit relinquishes upon its honor all claims to the 
documents and a person by transferring such draft or demand or causing such 
presentment authorizes such relinquishment. An explicit reservation of claim makes 
the draft or demand non-complying. 
§ 5-111. Warranties on Transfer and Presentment. 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed the beneficiary by transferring or presenting a 
documentary draft or demand for payment warrants to all interested parties that 
the necessary conditions of the credit have been complied with. This is in addition 
to any warranties arising under Articles 3,4,7 and 8. 
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(2) Unless otherwise agreed a negotiating, advising, confirming, collecting or 
issuing bank presenting or transferring a draft or demand for payment under a 
credit warrants only the matters warranted by a collecting bank under Article 4 and 
any such bank transferring a document warrants only the matters warranted by an 
intermediary under Articles 7 and 8. 
§ 5-112. Time Allowed for Honor or Rejection; Withholding Honor or 
Rejection by 
Consent; "Presenter". 
(1) A bank to which a documentary draft or demand for payment is presented 
under a credit may without dishonor of the draft, demand or credit 
(a) defer honor until the close of the third banking day following receipt of the 
documents; and 
(b) further defer honor if the presenter has expressly or impliedly consented 
thereto. 
Failure to honor within the time here specified constitutes dishonor of the draft or 
demand and of the credit [except as otherwise provided in subsection (4) of 
Section 5-114 on conditional payment]. 
Note: The bracketed language in the last sentence of subsection (1) should be 
included only if the optional provisions of Section 5-114(4) and (5) are included. 
(2) Upon dishonor the bank may unless otherwise instructed fulfill its duty to 
return the draft or demand and the documents by holding them at the disposal of 
the presenter and sending him an advice to that effect. 
(3) "Presenter" means any person presenting a draft or demand for payment for 
honor under a credit even though that person is a confirming bank or other 
correspondent which is acting under an issuer's authorization. 
§ 5-113. Indemnities. 
(1) A bank seeking to obtain (whether for itself or another) honor, negotiation or 
reimbursement under a credit may give an indemnity to induce such honor, 
negotiation or reimbursement. 
(2) An indemnity agreement inducing honor, negotiation or reimbursement 
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(a) unless otherwise explicitly agreed applies to defects in the documents but 
not in the goods; and 
(b) unless a longer time is explicitly agreed expires at the end of ten business 
days following receipt of the documents by the ultimate customer unless notice of 
objection is sent before such expiration date. The ultimate customer may send 
notice of objection to the person from whom he received the documents and any 
bank receiving such notice is under a duty to send notice to its transferor before its 
midnight deadline. 
§ 5-114. Issuer's Duty and Privilege to Honor; Right to Reimbursement. 
(1) An issuer must honor a draft or demand for payment which complies with the 
terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether the goods or documents conform 
to the underlying contract for sale or other contract between the customer and the 
beneficiary. The issuer is not excused from honor of such a draft or demand by 
reason of an additional general term that all documents must be satisfactory to the 
issuer, but an issuer may require that specified documents must be satisfactory to 
it. 
(2) Unless otherwise agreed when documents appear on their face to comply with 
the terms of a credit but a required document does not in fact conform to the 
warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a document of title (Section 7-507) 
or of a certificated security (Section 8-306) or is forged or fraudulent or there is 
fraud in the transaction: 
(a) the issuer must honor the draft or demand for payment if honor is demanded 
by a negotiating bank or other holder of the draft or demand which has taken the 
draft or demand under the credit and under circumstances which would make it a 
holder in due course. (Section 3-302) and in an appropriate case would make it a 
person to whom a document of title has been duly negotiated (Section 7-502) or a 
bona fide purchaser of a certificated security (Section 8-302); and 
(b) in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer acting in good faith may 
honor the draft or demand for payment despite notification from the customer of 
fraud, forgery or other defect not apparent on the face of the documents but a 
court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such honor. 
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(3) Unless otherwise agreed an issuer which has duly honored a draft or demand 
for payment is entitled to immediate reimbursement of any payment made under 
the credit and to be put in effectively available funds not later than the day before 
maturity of any acceptance made under the credit. 
[(4) When a credit provides for payment by the issuer on receipt of notice that the 
required documents are in the possession of a correspondent or other agent of the 
issuer 
(a) any payment made on receipt of such notice is conditional; and 
(b) the issuer may reject documents which do not comply with the credit if it 
does so within three banking days following its receipt of the documents; and 
(c) in the event of such rejection, the issuer is entitled by charge back or 
otherwise to return of the payment made. ] 
[(5) In the case covered by subsection (4) failure to reject documents within the 
time specified in sub-paragraph (b) constitutes acceptance of the documents and 
makes the payment final in favor of the beneficiary. ] 
Note: Subsections (4) and (5) are bracketed as optional. If they are included the 
bracketed 
language in the last sentence of Section 5-112(1) should also be included. 
[As amended in 1977. ] 
§ 5-115. Remedy for Improper Dishonor or Anticipatory Repudiation. 
(1) When an issuer wrongfully dishonors a draft or demand for payment presented 
under a credit the person entitled to honor has with respect to any documents the 
rights of a person in the position of a seller (Section 2-707) and may recover from 
the issuer the face amount of the draft or demand together with incidental damages 
under Section 2-7 10 on seller's incidental damages and interest but less any amount 
realized by resale or other use or disposition of the subject matter of the 
transaction. 
In the event no resale or other utilization is made the documents, goods or other 
subject matter involved in the transaction must be turned over to the issuer on 
payment of judgment. 
Appendix B 
10 
(2) When an issuer wrongfully cancels or otherwise repudiates a credit before 
presentment of a draft or demand for payment drawn under it the beneficiary has 
the rights of a seller after anticipatory repudiation by the buyer under Section 2- 
610 if he learns of the repudiation in time reasonably to avoid procurement of the 
required documents. Otherwise the beneficiary has an immediate right of action for 
wrongful dishonor. 
§ 5-116. Transfer and Assignment. 
(1) The right to draw under a credit can be transferred or assigned only when the 
credit is expressly designated as transferable or assignable. 
(2) Even though the credit specifically states that it is nontransferable or 
nonassignable the beneficiary may before performance of the conditions of the 
credit assign his right to proceeds. Such an assignment is an assignment of an 
account under Article 9 on Second Transactions and is governed by that Article 
except that 
(a) the assignment is ineffective until the letter of credit or advice of credit is 
delivered to the assignee which delivery constitutes perfection of the security 
interest under Article 9; and 
(b) the issuer may honor drafts or demands for payment drawn under the credit 
until it receives a notification of the assignment signed by the beneficiary which 
reasonably identifies the credit involved in the assignment and contains a request to 
pay the assignee; and 
(c) after what reasonably appears to be such a notification has been received the 
issuer may without dishonor refuse to accept or pay even to a person otherwise 
entitled to honor until the letter of credit or advice of credit is exhibited to the 
issuer. 
(3) Except where the beneficiary has effectively assigned his right to draw or his 
right to proceeds, nothing in this section limits his right to transfer or negotiate 
drafts or demands drawn under the credit. 
[As amended in 1972. 
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§ 5-117. Insolvency of Bank Holding Funds for Documentary Credit. 
(1) Where an issuer or an advising or confirming bank or a bank which has for a 
customer procured issuance of a credit by another bank becomes insolvent before 
final payment under the credit and the credit is one to which this Article is made 
applicable by paragraphs (a) or (b) of Section 5-102(1) on scope, the receipt or 
allocation of funds or collateral to secure or meet obligations under the credit shall 
have the following results: 
(a) to the extent of any funds or collateral turned over after or before the 
insolvency as indemnity against or specifically for the purpose of payment of drafts 
or demands for payment drawn under the designated credit, the drafts or demands 
are entitled to payment in preference over depositors or other general creditors of 
the issuer or bank; and 
(b) on expiration of the credit or surrender of the beneficiary's rights under it 
unused any person who has given such funds or collateral is similarly entitled to 
return thereof, and 
(c) a charge to a general or current account with a bank if specifically 
consented to for the purpose of indemnity against or payment of drafts or demands 
for payment drawn under the designated credit falls under the same rules as if the 
funds had been drawn out in cash and then turned over with specific instructions. 
(2) After honor or reimbursement under this section the customer or other person 
for whose account the insolvent bank has acted is entitled to receive the 
documents involved. 
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§ 5-101. Short Title. 
This Article shall be known and may be cited as Uniform Commercial Code- 
Letters of Credit. 
§ 5-102. Definitions. 
(a) In this article: 
(1) "Adviser" means a person who, at the request of the issuer, a confirmer, or 
another adviser, notifies or requests another adviser to notify the beneficiary that a 
letter of credit has been issued, confirmed, or amended. 
1 "Uniform Commercial Code. Copyright. The American Law Institute and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. " 
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(2) "Applicant" means a person at whose request or for whose account a letter of 
credit is issued. The term includes a person who requests an issuer to issue a letter 
of credit on behalf of another if the person making the request undertakes an 
obligation to reimburse the issuer. 
(3) "Beneficiary" means a person who under the terms of a letter of credit is 
entitled to have its complying presentation honored. The term includes a person to 
whom drawing rights have been transferred under a transferable letter of credit . 
(4) "Confirmer" means a nominated person who undertakes, at the request or with 
the consent of the issuer, to honor a presentation under a letter of credit issued by 
another. 
(5) "Dishonor" of a letter of credit means failure timely to honor or to take an 
interim action, such as acceptance of a draft, that may be required by the letter of 
credit. 
(6) "Document" means a draft or other demand, document of title, investment 
security, certificate, invoice, or other record, statement, or representation of fact, 
law, right, or opinion (i) which is presented in a written or other medium 
permitted by the letter of credit or, unless prohibited by the letter of credit, by the 
standard practice referred to in Section 5-108(e) and (ii) which is capable of being 
examined for compliance with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit. A 
document may not be oral. 
(7) "Good faith" means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. 
(8) "Honor" of a letter of credit means performance of the issuer's undertaking in 
the letter of credit to pay or deliver an item of value. Unless the letter of credit 
otherwise provides, "honor" occurs 
(i) upon payment, 
(ii) if the letter of credit provides for acceptance, upon acceptance of a draft and, 
at maturity, its payment, or 
(iii) if the letter of credit provides for incurring a deferred obligation, upon 
incurring the obligation and, at maturity, its performance. 
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(9) "Issuer" means a bank or other person that issues a letter of credit, but does 
not include an individual who makes an engagement for personal, family, or 
household purposes. 
(10) "Letter of credit" means a definite undertaking that satisfies the requirements 
of Section 5-104 by an issuer to a beneficiary at the request or for the account of 
an applicant or, in the case of a financial institution, to itself or for its own 
account, to honor a documentary presentation by payment or delivery of an item 
of value. 
(11) "Nominated person" means a person whom the issuer (i) designates or 
authorizes to pay, accept, negotiate, or otherwise give value under a letter of 
credit and (ii) undertakes by agreement or custom and practice to reimburse. 
(12) "Presentation" means delivery of a document to an issuer or nominated 
person for honor or giving of value under a letter of credit . 
(13) "Presenter" means a person making a presentation as or on behalf of a 
beneficiary or nominated person. 
(14) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium, or that is 
stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. 
(15) "Successor of a beneficiary" means a person who succeeds to substantially all 
of the rights of a beneficiary by operation of law, including a corporation with or 
into which the beneficiary has been merged or consolidated, an administrator, 
executor, personal representative, trustee in bankruptcy, debtor in possession, 
liquidator, and receiver. 
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(b) Definitions in other Articles applying to this article and the sections in which 
they appear are: 
"Accept" or "Acceptance" Section 3-409 
"Value" Sections 3-303,4-211 
(c) Article 1 contains certain additional general definitions and principles of 
construction and interpretation applicable throughout this article. 
§ 5-103. Scope. 
(a) This article applies to letters of credit and to certain rights and obligations 
arising out of transactions involving letters of credit. 
(b) The statement of a rule in this article does not by itself require, imply, or 
negate application of the same or a different rule to a situation not provided for, or 
to a person not specified, in this article. 
(c) With the exception of this subsection, subsections (a) and (d), Sections 5- 
102(a) (9) and (10), 5-106(d), and 5-114(d), and except to the extent prohibited in 
Sections 1-102(3) and 5-117(d), the effect of this article may be varied by 
agreement or by a provision stated or incorporated by reference in an undertaking. 
A term in an agreement or undertaking generally excusing liability or generally 
limiting remedies for failure to perform obligations is not sufficient to vary 
obligations prescribed by this article. 
(d) Rights and obligations of an issuer to a beneficiary or a nominated person 
under a letter of credit are independent of the existence, performance, or 
nonperformance of a contract or arrangement out of which the letter of credit 
arises or which underlies it, including contracts or arrangements between the 
issuer and the applicant and between the applicant and the beneficiary. 
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§ 5-104. Formal Requirements. 
A letter of credit, confirmation, advice, transfer, amendment, or cancellation may 
be issued in any form that is a record and is authenticated (i) by a signature or (ii) 
in accordance with the agreement of the parties or the standard practice referred 
to in Section 5-108(e). 
§ 5-105. Consideration. 
Consideration is not required to issue, amend, transfer, or cancel a letter of credit, 
advice, or confirmation. 
§ 5-106. Issuance, Amendment, Cancellation, and Duration. 
(a) A letter of credit is issued and becomes enforceable according to its terms 
against the issuer when the issuer sends or otherwise transmits it to the person 
requested to advise or to the beneficiary. A letter of credit is revocable only if it so 
provides. 
(b) After a letter of credit is issued, rights and obligations of a beneficiary, 
applicant, confirmer, and issuer are not affected by an amendment or cancellation 
to which that person has not consented except to the extent the letter of credit 
provides that it is revocable or that the issuer may amend or cancel the letter of 
credit without that consent. 
(c) If there is no stated expiration date or other provision that determines its 
duration, a letter of credit expires one year after its stated date of issuance or, if 
none is stated, after the date on which it is issued. 
(d) A letter of credit that states that it is perpetual expires five years after its stated 
date of issuance, or if none is stated, after the date on which it is issued. 
§ 5-107. Confirmer, Nominated Person, and Adviser. 
(a) A confirmer is directly obligated on a letter of credit and has the rights and 
obligations of an issuer to the extent of its confirmation. The confirmer also has 
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rights against and obligations to the issuer as if the issuer were an applicant and 
the confirmer had issued the letter of credit at the request and for the account of 
the issuer. 
(b) A nominated person who is not a confirmer is not obligated to honor or 
otherwise give value for a presentation. 
(c) A person requested to advise may decline to act as an adviser. An adviser that 
is not a confirmer is not obligated to honor or give value for a presentation. An 
adviser undertakes to the issuer and to the beneficiary accurately to advise the 
terms of the letter of credit, confirmation, amendment, or advice received by that 
person and undertakes to the beneficiary to check the apparent authenticity of the 
request to advise. Even if the advice is inaccurate, the letter of credit, 
confirmation, or amendment is enforceable as issued. 
(d) A person who notifies a transferee beneficiary of the terms of a letter of credit, 
confirmation, amendment, or advice has the rights and obligations of an adviser 
under subsection (c). The terms in the notice to the transferee beneficiary may 
differ from the terms in any notice to the transferor beneficiary to the extent 
permitted by the letter of credit, confirmation, amendment, or advice received by 
the person who so notifies. 
§ 5-108. Issuer's Rights and Obligations 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 5-109, an issuer shall honor a 
presentation that, as determined by the standard practice referred to in subsection 
(e), appears on its face strictly to comply with the terms and conditions of the 
letter of credit. Except as otherwise provided in Section 5-113 and unless 
otherwise agreed with the applicant, an issuer shall dishonor a presentation that 
does not appear so to comply. 
(b) An issuer has a reasonable time after presentation , 
but not beyond the end of 
the seventh business day of the issuer after the day of its receipt of documents: 
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(1) to honor, 
(2) if the letter of credit provides for honor to be completed more than seven 
business days after presentation, to accept a draft or incur a deferred obligation, or 
(3) to give notice to the presenter of discrepancies in the presentation. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), an issuer is precluded from 
asserting as a basis for dishonor any discrepancy if timely notice is not given, or 
any discrepancy not stated in the notice if timely notice is given. 
(d) Failure to give the notice specified in subsection (b) or to mention fraud, 
forgery, or expiration in the notice does not preclude the issuer from asserting as a 
basis for dishonor fraud or forgery as described in Section 5-109(a) or expiration 
of the letter of credit before presentation. 
(e) An issuer shall observe standard practice of financial institutions that regularly 
issue letters of credit. Determination of the issuer's observance of the standard 
practice is a matter of interpretation for the court. The court shall offer the parties 
a reasonable opportunity to present evidence of the standard practice. 
(0 An issuer is not responsible for: 
(1) the performance or nonperformance of the underlying contract, arrangement, 
or transaction, 
(2) an act or omission of others, or 
(3) observance or knowledge of the usage of a particular trade other than the 
standard practice referred to in subsection (e). 
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(g) If an undertaking constituting a letter of credit under Section 5-102(a) (10) 
contains nondocumentary conditions, an issuer shall disregard the 
nondocumentary conditions and treat them as if they were not stated. 
(h) An issuer that has dishonored a presentation shall return the documents or hold 
them at the disposal of, and send advice to that effect to, the presenter. 
(i) An issuer that has honored a presentation as permitted or required by this 
article: 
(1) is entitled to be reimbursed by the applicant in immediately available funds not 
later than the date of its payment of funds; 
(2) takes the documents free of claims of the beneficiary or presenter; 
(3) is precluded from asserting a right of recourse on a draft under Sections 3-414 
and 3-415; 
(4) except as otherwise provided in Sections 5-110 and 5-117, is precluded from 
restitution of money paid or other value given by mistake to the extent the mistake 
concerns discrepancies in the documents or tender which are apparent on the face 
of the presentation; and 
(5) is discharged to the extent of its performance under the letter of credit unless 
the issuer honored a presentation in which a required signature of a beneficiary 
was forged. 
§ 5-109. Fraud and Forgery. 
(a) If a presentation is made that appears on its face strictly to comply with the 
terms and conditions of the letter of credit, but a required document is forged or 
Appendix C 
9 
materially fraudulent, or honor of the presentation would facilitate a material fraud 
by the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant : 
(1) the issuer shall honor the presentation, if honor is demanded by (i) a nominated 
person who has given value in good faith and without notice of forgery or material 
fraud, (ii) a confirmer who has honored its confirmation in good faith, (iii) a holder 
in due course of a draft drawn under the letter of credit which was taken after 
acceptance by the issuer or nominated person, or (iv) an assignee of the issuer's or 
nominated person's deferred obligation that was taken for value and without 
notice of forgery or material fraud after the obligation was incurred by the issuer 
or nominated person; and 
(2) the issuer, acting in good faith, may honor or dishonor the presentation in any 
other case. 
(b) If an applicant claims that a required document is forged or materially 
fraudulent or that honor of the presentation would facilitate a material fraud by the 
beneficiary on the issuer or applicant, a court of competent jurisdiction may 
temporarily or permanently enjoin the issuer from honoring a presentation or grant 
similar relief against the issuer or other persons only if the court finds that: 
(1) the relief is not prohibited under the law applicable to an accepted draft or 
deferred obligation incurred by the issuer; 
(2) a beneficiary, issuer, or nominated person who may be adversely affected is 
adequately protected against loss that it may suffer because the relief is granted; 
(3) all of the conditions to entitle a person to the relief under the law of this State 
have been met; and 
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(4) on the basis of the information submitted to the court, the applicant is more 
likely than not to succeed under its claim of forgery or material fraud and the 
person demanding honor does not qualify for protection under subsection (a)(1). 
§ 5-110. Warranties. 
(a) If its presentation is honored, the beneficiary warrants: 
(1) to the issuer, any other person to whom presentation is made, and the 
applicant that there is no fraud or forgery of the kind described in Section 5- 
109(a); and 
(2) to the applicant that the drawing does not violate any agreement between the 
applicant and beneficiary or any other agreement intended by them to be 
augmented by the letter of credit. 
(b) The warranties in subsection (a) are in addition to warranties arising under 
Article 3,4,7, and 8 because of the presentation or transfer of documents covered 
by any of those articles. 
§ 5-111. Remedies. 
(a) If an issuer wrongfully dishonors or repudiates its obligation to pay money 
under a letter of credit before presentation, the beneficiary, successor, or 
nominated person presenting on its own behalf may recover from the issuer the 
amount that is the subject of the dishonor or repudiation. If the issuer's obligation 
under the letter of credit is not for the payment of money, the claimant may obtain 
specific performance or, at the claimant's election, recover an amount equal to the 
value of performance from the issuer. In either case, the claimant may also recover 
incidental but not consequential damages. The claimant is not obligated to take 
action to avoid damages that might be due from the issuer under this subsection. 
If, although not obligated to do so, the claimant avoids damages, the claimant's 
recovery from the issuer must be reduced by the amount of damages avoided. The 
issuer has the burden of proving the amount of damages avoided. In the case of 
repudiation the claimant need not present any document. 
Appendix C 
11 
(b) If an issuer wrongfully dishonors a draft or demand presented under a letter of 
credit or honors a draft or demand in breach of its obligation to the applicant , the 
applicant may recover damages resulting from the breach, including incidental but 
not consequential damages, less any amount saved as a result of the breach. 
(c) If an adviser or nominated person other than a confirmer breaches an 
obligation under this article or an issuer breaches an obligation not covered in 
subsection (a) or (b), a person to whom the obligation is owed may recover 
damages resulting from the breach, including incidental but not consequential 
damages, less any amount saved as a result of the breach. To the extent of the 
confirmation, a confirmer has the liability of an issuer specified in this subsection 
and subsections (a) and (b). 
(d) An issuer, nominated person, or adviser who is found liable under subsection 
(a), (b), or (c) shall pay interest on the amount owed thereunder from the date of 
wrongful dishonor or other appropriate date. 
(e) Reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation must be awarded to 
the prevailing party in an action in which a remedy is sought under this article. 
(0 Damages that would otherwise be payable by a party for breach of an 
obligation under this article may be liquidated by agreement or undertaking, but 
only in an amount or by a formula that is reasonable in light of the harm 
anticipated. 
§ 5-112. Transfer of Letter of Credit. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 5-113, unless a letter of credit 
provides that it is transferable, the right of a beneficiary to draw or otherwise 
demand performance under a letter of credit may not be transferred. 
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(b) Even if a letter of credit provides that it is transferable, the issuer may refuse to 
recognize or carry out a transfer if. 
(1) the transfer would violate applicable law; or 
(2) the transferor or transferee has failed to comply with any requirement stated in 
the letter of credit or any other requirement relating to transfer imposed by the 
issuer which is within the standard practice referred to in Section 5-108(e) or is 
otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. 
§ 5-113. Transfer by Operation of Law. 
(a) A successor of a beneficiary may consent to amendments, sign and present 
documents, and receive payment or other items of value in the name of the 
beneficiary without disclosing its status as a successor. 
(b) A successor of a beneficiary may consent to amendments, sign and present 
documents, and receive payment or other items of value in its own name as the 
disclosed successor of the beneficiary. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 
(e), an issuer shall recognize a disclosed successor of a beneficiary as beneficiary 
in full substitution for its predecessor upon compliance with the requirements for 
recognition by the issuer of a transfer of drawing rights by operation of law under 
the standard practice referred to in Section 5-108(e) or, in the absence of such a 
practice, compliance with other reasonable procedures sufficient to protect the 
issuer. 
(c) An issuer is not obliged to determine whether a purported successor is a 
successor of a beneficiary or whether the signature of a purported successor is 
genuine or authorized. 
(d) Honor of a purported successor's apparently complying presentation under 
subsection (a) or (b) has the consequences specified in Section 5-108(i) even if the 
purported successor is not the successor of a beneficiary. Documents signed in the 
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name of the beneficiary or of a disclosed successor by a person who is neither the 
beneficiary nor the successor of the beneficiary are forged documents for the 
purposes of Section 5-109. 
(e) An issuer whose rights of reimbursement are not covered by subsection (d) or 
substantially similar law and any confirmer or nominated person may decline to 
recognize a presentation under subsection (b). 
(f) A beneficiary whose name is changed after the issuance of a letter of credit has 
the same rights and obligations as a successor of a beneficiary under this section. 
§ 5-114. Assignment of Proceeds. 
(a) In this section, "proceeds of a letter of credit" means the cash, check, accepted 
draft, or other item of value paid or delivered upon honor or giving of value by the 
issuer or any nominated person under the letter of credit. The term does not 
include a beneficiary's drawing rights or documents presented by the beneficiary. 
(b) A beneficiary may assign its right to part or all of the proceeds of a letter of 
credit. The beneficiary may do so before presentation as a present assignment of 
its right to receive proceeds contingent upon its compliance with the terms and 
conditions of the letter of credit. 
(c) An issuer or nominated person need not recognize an assignment of proceeds 
of a letter of credit until it consents to the assignment. 
(d) An issuer or nominated person has no obligation to give or withhold its 
consent to an assignment of proceeds of a letter of credit, but consent may not be 
unreasonably withheld if the assignee possesses and exhibits the letter of credit and 
presentation of the letter of credit is a condition to honor. 
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(e) Rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person are independent of the 
beneficiary's assignment of the proceeds of a letter of credit and are superior to the 
assignee's right to the proceeds. 
(f) Neither the rights recognized by this section between an assignee and an issuer, 
transferee beneficiary, or nominated person nor the issuer's or nominated person's 
payment of proceeds to an assignee or a third person affect the rights between the 
assignee and any person other than the issuer, transferee beneficiary, or nominated 
person. The mode of creating and perfecting a security interest in or granting an 
assignment of a beneficiary's rights to proceeds is governed by Article 9 or other 
law. Against persons other than the issuer, transferee beneficiary, or nominated 
person, the rights and obligations arising upon the creation of a security interest or 
other assignment of a beneficiary's right to proceeds and its perfection are 
governed by Article 9 or other law. 
§ 5-115. Statute of Limitations. 
An action to enforce a right or obligation arising under this article must be 
commenced within one year after the expiration date of the relevant letter of credit 
or one year after the [claim for relief] [cause of action] accrues, whichever occurs 
later. A [claim for relief] [cause of action] accrues when the breach occurs, 
regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. 
§ 5-116. Choice of Law and Forum. 
(a) The liability of an issuer, nominated person, or adviser for action or omission is 
governed by the law of the jurisdiction chosen by an agreement in the form of a 
record signed or otherwise authenticated by the affected parties in the manner 
provided in Section 5-104 or by a provision in the person's letter of credit, 
confirmation, or other undertaking. The jurisdiction whose law is chosen need not 
bear any relation to the transaction. 
(b) Unless subsection (a) applies, the liability of an issuer, nominated person, or 
adviser for action or omission is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which 
the person is located. The person is considered to be located at the address 
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indicated in the person's undertaking. If more than one address is indicated, the 
person is considered to be located at the address from which the person's 
undertaking was issued. For the purpose of jurisdiction, choice of law, and 
recognition of interbranch letters of credit, but not enforcement of a judgment, all 
branches of a bank are considered separate juridical entities and a bank is 
considered to be located at the place where its relevant branch is considered to be 
located under this subsection. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the liability of an issuer, 
nominated person, or adviser is governed by any rules of custom or practice, such 
as the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, to which the letter 
of credit, confirmation, or other undertaking is expressly made subject. If (i) this 
article would govern the liability of an issuer, nominated person, or adviser under 
subsection (a) or (b), (ii) the relevant undertaking incorporates rules of custom or 
practice, and (iii) there is conflict between this article and those rules as applied to 
that undertaking, those rules govern except to the extent of any conflict with the 
nonvariable provisions specified in Section 5-103(c). 
(d) If there is conflict between this article and Article 3,4,4A, or 9, this article 
governs. 
(e) The forum for settling disputes arising out of an undertaking within this article 
may be chosen in the manner and with the binding effect that governing law may 
be chosen in accordance with subsection (a). 
§ 5-117. Subrogation of Issuer, Applicant, and Nominated Person. 
(a) An issuer that honors a beneficiary's presentation is subrogated to the rights of 
the beneficiary to the same extent as if the issuer were a secondary obligor of the 
underlying obligation owed to the beneficiary and of the applicant to the same 
extent as if the issuer were the secondary obligor of the underlying obligation 
owed to the applicant. 
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(b) An applicant that reimburses an issuer is subrogated to the rights of the issuer 
against any beneficiary, presenter, or nominated person to the same extent as if the 
applicant were the secondary obligor of the obligations owed to the issuer and has 
the rights of subrogation of the issuer to the rights of the beneficiary stated in 
subsection (a). 
(c) A nominated person who pays or gives value against a draft or demand 
presented under a letter of credit is subrogated to the rights of. 
(1) the issuer against the applicant to the same extent as if the nominated person 
were a secondary obligor of the obligation owed to the issuer by the applicant; 
(2) the beneficiary to the same extent as if the nominated person were a secondary 
obligor of the underlying obligation owed to the beneficiary; and 
(3) the applicant to same extent as if the nominated person were a secondary 
obligor of the underlying obligation owed to the applicant. 
(d) Notwithstanding any agreement or term to the contrary, the rights of 
subrogation stated in subsections (a) and (b) do not arise until the issuer honors 
the letter of credit or otherwise pays and the rights in subsection (c) do not arise 
until the nominated person pays or otherwise gives value. Until then, the issuer, 
nominated person, and the applicant do not derive under this section present or 
prospective rights forming the basis of a claim, defense, or excuse. 
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Appendix D: Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 5 (1995) 
Compared With the Original Version-Letters of Credit 
Introduction 
The original intention behind Article 5 was to provide a framework within which 
business practice could be allowed to evolve in a number of different directions. In 
doing this it defined the letter of credit and some other key terms, set rules for 
establishing a letter of credit, provided some very basic rules which prescribed the 
obligations of the parties to a letter of credit, described the obligations of 
confirmers and advisors, and established some basic remedies for breach of these 
obligations. ' 
Under the (1995) revision the essential objectives and format of Article 5 remain 
the same, however, the revised Article leaves more room for the evolution of new 
business practices so allowing it to respond to modern commercial needs and 
technology. 2 It achieves this mainly by considerably simplifying the rules that apply 
to letters of credit. However, it has been argued that the reason why the revised 
UCC continues to provide non-comprehensive rules, is to enable the parties to a 
letter of credit to incorporate into the letter of credit other rules e. g. the UCP. 3 
The original Article 5 (pre-1995) made clear that it dealt with "some but not all of the rules and 
concepts" of letter of credit law. See in this regard UCC - 5-102(3) (pre-1995), and UCC - 5. 
102, (pre-1995) cmt. See web site httpl/www. nccusl. org/summary/ucc5. html. 
z UCC - 5-103(CX1995). cmt, UCC - 5-103 (2). UCC - 5-10(3) (pre-1995 version). See generally, Barnes, 
J. G., and Byrne, J. E., `Revision of UCC Article 5' 50 The Business Lawyer (August) (1995) 1449 
at 1451. 
3 UCC - 5-116(c). See UCC - 5-101, cmt. Article 5 does not exclusively govern all aspects of letters of 
credit and other laws do apply to letters of credit in certain situations. For example, in addition to 
the UCP and the international convention, the following bodies of law also apply on some 
occasions to letters of credit: 
(1) the federal bankruptcy law which applies to letters of credit with respect to applicants and 
beneficiaries that are in bankruptcy, 
(2) regulations of the Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller of the Currency lay out requirements 
for banks that issue letters of credit. They also describe how letters of credit are to be treated for 
calculating asset risk and for the purpose of loan limitations; 
(3) an array of anti-boycott and other similar laws that may affect the issuance and performance of 
letters of credit. 
Therefore, although the commentators on Section 5-101 state that all of these laws are beyond the scope of 
Article 5, in certain circumstances they will override Article 5. In addition, other Articles of the 
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They may do this by expressly making the letter of credit subject to those rules. 
However, it should be noted that at the same time as simplifying the law, the new 
revision has introduced some new concepts and modifications. The following are 
the most apparent modifications and new concepts which have been introduced 
into the revised UCC Article 5, in relation to the sections that this research has 
consulted: 
1. Formal Requirements 
Under the revised Article 5 of the UCC, it is no longer a requirement that a letter 
of credit has to be expressly labeled as such. 4 This contrasts significantly with its 
predecessor which described in detail the form of document which had to be stated 
as a letter of credits. As a sign of flexibility, a letter of credit may now be issued in 
any form that is a "record" provided that the record is authenticated'. 
Authentication could be achieved either through a signature', via any other method 
of authentication which the parties agree to, or through any form which is 
permitted according to the "standard practice". 8 
In simple terms, the way to interpret this language is to say that a written 
document is no longer absolutely necessary to establish the existence of a valid 
letter of credit or of any other associated obligation. Under the new legal regime, 
all that is required is an authenticated "record", in fact a properly preserved 
computer record will suffice. 9 This new definition of a letter of credit means that 
UCC may apply to letters of credit. For instance, if the transaction involves the use of an 
instrument, such as a draft, that is a negotiable instrument under Article 3 and is collected and 
presented for payment through the banking system where the rules of Article 4 apply. Article 4 can 
also apply to the collection of documentary drafts [UCC - 4-501 to 4-504]. The terms of the letter 
of credit may require presentation of a document of title, such as a bill of lading, or a warehouse 
receipt to which Article 7 applies and one or more parties may have a security interest in property 
involved in the transaction, which is governed by Article 9. Finally, the issuer may pay the 
beneficiary using a cheque that is a negotiable instrument under Article 3 or a funds transfer. This 
would be is subject to Article 4A. However, it should be mentioned here that if there is a tension 
(conflict) between Article 5 and Article 3,4,4A, or 9, Article 5 has overriding authority. [UCC -5- 
116(d). Pre-revision Article 5 was silent on the relationship it had to those other articles. See UCC 
-5-102 (pre-1995 version). 
° UCC - 5-102(a) (10) & cmt. 6. (1995). 
s UCC - 5-102(1) (c). (Pre-1995 version). 
6 UCC - 5-104. 
7 UCC - 5-102(c) and S 1-201(39). 
8 UCC - 5-104. 
9 See web site http: //www. nccusl. org/summary/ucc5. html. 
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the electronic transmission methods can now be utilised to issue a credit or present 
documents for honour. 1° Under the original Article 5, a "document" that was 
called for in a "documentary draft" or a "documentary demand for payment" had 
to be a "paper". " This modification makes Article 5 fit for the age of electronic 
communications. 
2. Revocable and Irrevocable Credits 
With regard to the irrevocability of a credit, the revised Article 5 takes the same 
line as the UCP12. Thus the UCP and the UCC provide that a letter of credit is 
deemed irrevocable in the absence of any indication in the credit as to whether it is 
revocable or irrevocable 13. By comparison, under the original Section although it 
was recognised that a letter of credit could be either revocable or irrevocable, it 
was not specified how to treat a letter of credit that failed to describe its status. 
Consequently, it deliberately left the question for courts to resolve. 
3. Time of Enforceability 
According to the revised Article 5-106(a), a letter of credit becomes enforceable 
from the time it is "issued". In turn, the time of issuance is defined as the moment 
when the issuer "sends" the letter of credit or "otherwise transmits it", to the 
person who is the beneficiary or the person requested to advise the letter of 
credit 14. This differs from the original UCC in that previously the right of the 
beneficiary did not become established until either the beneficiary received the 
letter of credit, or was in possession of an authorised piece of written advice that 
the letter of credit had been issued. '5 
4. Strict Compliance 
With regard to the issuing bank's obligations, the revised Article 5 has introduced 
the standard of strict compliance. This standard means that it is the duty of the 
Schroeder, M R., `The 1995 Revisions to UCC Article 5, Letters of Credit", 29, No 4, Spring (1997), 
Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal 331 at 333. 
11 UCC - 5-103(b) (pre-1995 version). 
'2 Article 6(c) of the UCP. 
13 UCC - 5-106(a) (1995). 
la Ibid. 
Is UCC - 5-106(lxb) (pre-1995 version). 
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issuer to determine whether a presentation "appears on its face strictly to comply" 
with the terms of the letter of credit16. Thus in contrast to its predecessor, the 
revised version clearly adopts the "strict compliance" standard over the so-called 
"substantial compliance standard" 17 which was examined in Chapter Five. 
However, the phrase "strictly to comply" used in this section, is to be construed in 
line with the "standard practice of financial institutions that regularly issue letters 
of credit". " Accordingly, commentators on this Article have suggested that "strict 
compliance" does not mean "slavish conformity to the terms of the credit". 19 It is 
also worth noting that under the revised UCC, the doctrine of strict compliance is 
softened by the requirement on the issuer to give timely notice to the presenter of 
"discrepancies in the presentation". 20 With the exception of cases of fraud or 
forgery, failure to do so will result in the issuer being precluded from using such 
discrepancies as a basis for rejection. 21 
5. Warranties 
Under a letter of credit the presenter owes the issuer and the applicant a warranty 
duty of fraud and forgery. According to the revised Article, this cannot be effective 
until the issuer honours the presentation. This new approach makes it impossible 
for the issuer to justify a failure to honour a presentation just because there is a 
breach of this warranty. Moreover, the warranty to the applicant now extends to 
cover the underlying contract as well. "It is a warranty that the beneficiary has 
performed all the acts expressly and implicitly necessary under the underlying 
agreement to entitle the beneficiary to honour". 22 That is to say, this warranty 
gives the applicant rights against the beneficiary where he fails to meet those terms 
16 UCC - 5-108(a). See generally, Barnes, J. G., and Byrne, J. E, supra note 2 at 1453-5. 
17 Schroeder maintains that the revisers point to Banco Espanol de Creditor v. State Street Bank & Trust 
Co., 385 F2d 230 (1 st Cir. 1967), and Flagship Cruises Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l 
Bank, 569 F2d 699 (1 st Cir. 1978), as cases that "arguably" applied a substantial compliance 
standard. UCC - 5-108, cmt. l. See the same author, supra note 10, fn 136 p. 356. 
ý$ UCC - 5-108(a), - UCC - 5-108(e). For more on UCC - 5-108(e), see Byrne, J. E., 'Revised UCC 
Section 5-108(e): A Constitutional Nudge to Courts' 29 Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal 
(1997) 419,419-427. 
19 UCC - 5-108, cmt. 1. 
20 UCC - 5-108(b)(3). 
21 UCC - 5-108, cmt. 3. Similarly, see Articles 14(d) and 14(e) of the UCP. 
22 UCC - 5-110, cmt. 2. 
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in the underlying contract that specify the conditions under which the beneficiary 
can draw on the letter of credit. 23 Warranties also may arise as the result of the 
application of Articles 3,4,7, and 8 to the transaction. However, the new Article 5 
limits the warranties arising under those other articles to ones which relate to "the 
presentation or transfer of documents covered by any of those articles". 24 
6. Reasonable Time for Examination 
The revised UCC has introduced a section that deals with the time within which 
the issuing bank is to either honour or dishonour the credit. This should occur in "a 
reasonable time after presentation, but not beyond the end of the seventh business 
day" after receipt of documents. 2' Again this section has been drafted in line with 
the UCP, Article (13)(b) under which a period of seven-days is required for the 
issuer to act. 
7. Expiry Date 
The revised UCC has introduced a new approach regarding expiration of the 
credit. As a result, if the credit does not state its expiration date; it is considered to 
expire one year after the date of issue stated in the letter26. Moreover, if the letter 
of credit fails to state the date when it was issued, it expires one year after the date 
on which it was issued in practice. If a letter of credit states that it is perpetual, it 
will expire five years after the date states as its date of issue. The original UCC 
was silent on those issues. 27 
8. Bifurcated Standard 
The revised UCC does not adopt the so-called "bifurcated standard" which was 
discussed in Chapter Six. However, the issuer and the applicant may create such a 
28 relationship by agreement. 
Ibid. See for more on the point, Schroeder, supra note 10. at 369. 
24 UCC - 5-110(b). UCC - 5-111 (pre-1995 version). 
25 UCC - 5-108(b) & cmt. 2. 
26 UCC - 5-106 (c). 
27 UCC - 5-106 (d). 
" UCC - 1-08, cmt. 1. 
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9. The Standard of Practice Provision 
6 
The standard of practice provision in the new Article is undoubtedly the most 
significant part of these revisions. In the revised version there is an explicit 
recognition of standards of practice. 29 This entails that standards such as the 
Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits can govern many of the 
particulars of letters of credit. The primary reason for such simplifications is the 
specific inclusion of standards of practice in the revised Article 5. It provides that 
"An issuer shall observe standard practice of financial institutions that regularly 
issue letters of credit. Determination of the issuer's observance of that standard 
practice is a matter of interpretation for the court" . 
3' This means that the standards 
will apply unless the contract states otherwise. This differs from the original Article 
which only assumed that standards of practice would be adopted as a matter of 
contract between the parties to a letter of credit. Hence the standards were 
ineffective where the contract was silent. 
Standards of practice for letters of credit are very well documented. First and 
foremost are the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits (UCP), 
I. C. C. Publication No. 500, which have been set out by the International Chamber 
of Commerce. The UCP is updated on a decadal basis, and is much relied upon in 
international trade as a common language of letter of credit transactions. Thus the 
adoption of common standards of practice can be said once again to suggest a 
clear recognition by the drafters of the UCC, of the UCP as the source for many of 
the formal requirements and details of letters of credit. This permits business 
practices to govern the evolution of letters of credit within the aforementioned 
basic framework that Article 5 intends to provide. 31 
This new stance also removes an issuer's obligations to its customer including 
"observance of any general banking usage", 32 and consequently relieves an issuer 
29 See web site http: //www. nccusl. org/summary/ucc5. html. 
30 UCC - 5-108(e). 
31 Schroeder, supra note 10 at 346. 
32 UCC - 5-108(e). UCC - 5-109(1) (pre-1995 version). 
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of responsibility for "observance or knowledge of the usage of a particular trade 
other than the standard practice referred to in [revised Article 5]. s33 
10. Fraud and Forgery 
Another improvement is that with the revised version, the opportunity has been 
taken to clarify certain ambiguities surrounding the concept of fraud. One of these 
changes concerns fraud and forgery in presentation for payment. Basically, a letter 
of credit requires the presentation of a document, commonly a draft, for payment. 
According to the original Article, if the draft was fraudulent in some aspect or 
forged, the issuer's reaction varied according to the circumstances. Nor was the 
issuer required to police the process by which payment was obtained34. However, 
in those situations in which the issuer had the discretion to honour the draft, the 
customer could petition the appropriate court to enjoin honouring the draft. 
The original Article 5 adopted the terminology of fraud in the transaction, and 
provided no guidelines with respect to which a court could determine the level of 
fraud that triggered the issuance of an injunction. This is why in the Revised 
Article the terminology of fraud in the transaction has been eliminated. 35 A fraud 
that justifies an injunction must be a "material" fraud. 36 Further, standards have 
now been established that the court must apply in determining whether to enjoin 
the issuer from honouring the draft. Included in these are factors of prohibition of 
injunction by other law, adverse effect upon the beneficiary, and availability of a 
remedy for fraud or forgery against the responsible individual or institution. 37 
11. Remedies 
Damages for a dishonoured or repudiated letter of credit are limited to the amount 
of the document plus incidental damages. 38 Consequential damages are not 
33 UCC - 5-108(0(3). See generally on the standard practice, Moses, M. L., 'The Uniform Commercial 
Code Meets the Seventh Amendment: The Demise of Jury Trials Under Article 5' 72 Indiana Law 
Review (1997) 681 at 690-709. 
34 Schroeder, supra note 10 at 370; see web site http: //www. nccusl. org/summary/ucc5. html. 
35 See generally on fraud, Greenleaf, C. J., 'The Holder-In-Due-Course Exception to the Fraud Exception to 
Compelled Honour Under Revised Article 5' Banking Law Journal (1998) January 29-36. 
36 UCC - 5-109(a). 
37 UCC - 5-109, cmt. 1. See web site http: //www. nccusl. org/summary/ucc5. html. 
38 UCC - 5-111(a). generally, Barnes, J. G., and Byrne, J. E., supra note 2 at 1459. 
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permitted for two reasons. First, it is believed that the beneficiary and the applicant 
are in the best position to avoid such damages; second, it is feared that the 
imposition of consequential damages would raise the cost of letters of credit to the 
extent that they would be viewed as uneconomical. Thus "[h]aving excluded 
consequential damages, punitive damages `a fortiori' are excluded"39 and overall 
the remedies against an issuer for wrongful repudiation or dishonour of a letter of 
credit will become more consistent for letter of credit transactions. 
In short, the current situation is that an issuer is bound to honour a proper 
documentary presentation. Accordingly, repudiation occurs when the issuer 
communicates that a presentation will not be honoured and a dishonour occurs 
when the issuer does not pay when the appropriate document is presented. Finally, 
like any other legal obligation, the issuer is liable for all wrongful repudiation or 
dishonour. 
In the original Article 5, the injured party could obtain the amount of the 
dishonoured document plus incidental damages less the amount realized on the 
underlying transaction. 4° This meant that if goods or documents of value produced 
as a result of the transaction were not sold to cover the losses, the issuer was 
entitled to them upon payment of judgment. 
The position now is that the beneficiary or appropriate nominee is entitled to "the 
amount that is the subject of the dishonor or repudiation". 41 If the obligation is not 
for payment of money, the injured party may have specific performance in lieu of 
damages, at the option of the injured person. Significantly, incidental damages are 
allowed but not consequential damages nor is there an obligation to cover losses. 
If there is cover, the savings must be deducted from the recovered damages. 
39 Schroeder, supra note 10 at 389. See also UCC S 5-111, cmt. 4. The official comment on this Section, 
however, states that Article 5" does not bar recovery or consequential or even punitive damages for 
breach of statutory or common law duties arising outside of [Article 5]. " 
40 UCC - 5-115 (1) (pre-1995 version). 
41 UCC - 5-111(a). 
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As for the applicant, he has a remedy for damages "resulting from breach", again 
including incidental but not consequential damages. A breach by a confirmer or 
advisor gives rise to actual damages plus incidentals . 
`2 
Interest is due for any damages from the date of breach or dishonour and the 
prevailing party has a right to attorney's fees. 43 There is also a specific authority for 
prior agreement to liquidate damages. It can be concluded that these provisions 
vastly improve and clarify the remedies available under Article 5. 
12. Subrogation 
One area which was not specifically addressed in the original version was the 
possibility of the subrogation of one party to another party to a letter of credit, 
upon payment of the other party's obligations. Subrogation rights are available by 
contract under the original Article. 44 However, in the absence of provision within 
the contract, the courts have not agreed upon their availability. This has given rise 
to some confusion in the law. 
The new rules provide specific rules to cover such eventualities. For example, if 
the issuer pays the beneficiary, the issuer is subrogated to the rights of the 
beneficiary and the applicant to the same extent as if the issuer were a secondary 
obligor of the underlying obligation. 45 However, subrogation rights do not arise 
until there has been an actual payment to the party whose rights are subrogated. 46 
Subrogation puts the person with the subrogation right in the shoes of the person 
who benefited from the payment that triggered the subrogation right. Subrogation 
rights balance equities between parties in complex transactions like letters of 
credit. As a result, the revised Article 5 has cleared up the judicial doubt as to 
whether automatic rights of subrogation exist. 47 
42 UCC - 5-111(b). 
43 UCC - 5-111(e). 
44 See web site http: //www. nccusl. org/sunimary/ucc5. html. Pre-revision Article 5 did not address the 
subrogation rights of parties to letters of credit. See Schroeder, supra note 10, fn 185 at p. 365. 
45 UCC - 5-117(a). 
46 See Schroeder, supra note 10 pp. 365-68. 
47 See web site http: //www. nccusl. org/summary/ucc5. html. 
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13. Variation of Article 5 Rules by Agreement of the Parties 
Article 5 continues to provide rules that can be waived or modified by agreement 
between the parties. Since almost the entirety of Article 5 in its revised or original 
form is variable by agreement, the specific provisions of the UCP may also become 
part of the agreement between the parties, or its provisions may be waived by 
agreement. Thus in between the expanded reliance upon existing standards of 
business practice as a default rule and the ordinary ability of the parties to vary the 
default rules, the revised Article 5 grants commercial people the maximum 
flexibility to tailor their relationships under letters of credit. As a result, there is 
considerable freedom to vary by agreement the framework of rights and duties 
established in Article 5. In addition the courts are encouraged to be sensitive to the 
commercial expectations created by custom and usage that "are not inconsistent 
with the essential definitions and substantive mandates of the statute". 48 
13.1. Limitations to Variation of Article 5 Rules by Agreement of the Parties 
Although under the revised Article 5, the parties to a letter of credit may, by 
agreement, vary most of the terms in the agreement and thereby alter the 
obligations that would otherwise be imposed by Article 549, there are seven 
exceptions to this rule. These exceptions serve to foster certainty. 
1. An overriding clause which attempts to disclaim liability or limit remedies, is 
not effective. Thus issuers cannot limit their liability to only those 
circumstances where there has been an act of bad faith or gross negligence. 
2. It is not possible to disclaim liability for breach of "the obligations of good 
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care". 
3. The legal scope of Article 5 cannot be altered, nor can a definition of letters of 
credit be given to a contract which is outside Article 5. 
"s UCC - 5-101, cmt. See generally, Stem, S., `Varying Article 5 of the UCC by Agreement' 114 Banking 
Law Journal (1997) 516. 
49 This may be done either "by agreement" or by a provision stated or incorporated by reference in an 
undertaking" (UCC - 5-108). 
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4. The independence principle may not be varied. This means that any concurrent 
rights and obligations under any underlying contract cannot undermine the 
rights and obligations of the issuer under a letter of credit. 
5. The restrictions imposed by Article 5 on who can be an issuer of a letter of 
credit, cannot be altered. Thus ordinary consumers cannot issue letters of 
credit. 
6. Letter of credit cannot be made in perpetuity and any attempt to do so will be 
null and void. 
7. Subrogation rights can be claimed by an issuer, applicant or a nominated 
person, however, those rights cannot be used to avoid honouring, reimbursing 
or paying an essential term of the letter of credit. 5° 
14. Enjoining an Issuer from Honouring a Presentation Under a Letter of 
Credit 
Under the former Article 5, there was much debate as to whether the court could 
be justified in enjoining an issuer from honouring a letter of credit because of 
fraud. 5' These rules have been modified by the revised version in two major 
respects. 
14.1. The Issuer's Ability to Dishonour for Fraud 
According to the new Article, three specifically defined conditions must be met 
before the issuer can dishonour a contract where, on the face of it, presentation 
appears to meet the terms and the conditions of the letter of credit. 
(i) The required document must be forged, or presentation involves material 
fraud. 52 In addition the material fraud, even if it involves a breach of the 
underlying contract, must do so in a way that means the beneficiary is 
acting fraudulently against the issuer or applicant. 53 
50 Schroeder, supra note 10 at pp. 344-5. 
s' UCC 5-114 (pre -1995 version). 
52 UCC 5-109(a). 
53 UCC 5-109, cmt. 1. 
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(ii) Where a person has given value in good faith because of the letter of credit, 
then a contract cannot be dishonoured against him because of fraud. The 
Article lists the type of parties that it is referring to here. " 
(iii) Provided the other two exceptions are met, then provided he acts in good 
faith, the issuer has the discretion to dishonour or honour the presentation, 
regardless of the viewpoint of the applicant. " It is worth noting though 
that the applicant will only have an action against the issuer if he can prove 
bad faith. S6 Therefore, where the issue is in doubt, it is safer for the issuer 
to accept presentation than it is to dishonour the contract. This is because 
the issuer will be liable if he cannot prove conditions (i) and (ii). 
Consequently, in practice it is likely that it will be for the applicant to 
obtain an injunction to force the issuer to dishonour the contract. 57 
14.2. The Applicant's Rights to an Injunction Against Honour 
For such an application, a special set of conditions must be satisfied, and these 
conditions apply to temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and 
permanent injunctions. The conditions will also apply if the applicant attempts to 
use alternative legal means to arrive at the same conclusion because the 
"[e]xpanded use of any of these devices could threaten the independence principle 
just as much as an injunction against honor". 58 
For the conditions to be met, there must be a claim by an applicant of forgery or 
material fraud59 and in doing this condition (i) of the preceding section must be 
met. Thereafter, provided that the court is a competent one, four further conditions 
must be met60 
S4 UCC 5-109(axl). 
ss UCC 5-109(aX2). 
s6 UCC 5-102(aX7). 
57 Schroeder, supra note 10 at p. 370. 
51 UCC 5-109, cmt. 5. 
S9 UCC 5-109(b). 
60 Summarised by Schroeder, supra note 10 at 374. 
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First, "the relief is not prohibited under the law applicable to an accepted draft or deferred 
obligation incurred by the issuer; ""' 
second, "a beneficiary, issuer, or nominated person who may be adversely affected is 
adequately protected against loss that it may suffer because the relief is granted; "62 
third, "all of the conditions to entitle a person to the relief under the law of this State have 
been met; and"63 
fourth, "on the basis of the information submitted to the court, the applicant is more likely 
than not to succeed under its claim of forgery or material fraud and the person 
demanding honour does not qualify for protection under subsection (a)(1 ). i64 
With letters of credit the term honour means "performance of the issuer's 
undertaking in the letter of credit to pay or deliver an item of value. "65 Thus 
"[u]nless the letter of credit otherwise provides", there is honour: "upon payment 
...; 
if the letter of credit provides for acceptance, upon acceptance of a draft and, 
at maturity, its payment; or if the letter of credit provides for incurring a deferred 
obligation, upon incurring the obligation and, at maturity, its performance. "66 
Obviously, this definition has implications for proceedings for an injunction by the 
applicant against the issuer. A particular example is where a letter of credit is 
honoured by a time draft. The question here is whether an injunction can be made 
out preventing the issuer from paying the draft when it matures, even when the 
issuer has already accepted the draft. It would appear that here the present case 
law applies67, but also that the revised Article 5 outlines two ways in which such an 
injunction can be prevented. Thus either the letter of credit should specify that 
honour occurs when the draft is accepted, or declare that injunctions cannot be 
brought post acceptance. 68 It should also be noted, that the section that provides 
for the applicant's right to enjoin the issuer from honouring a letter of credit can be 
varied. 69 
61 UCC 5-109(bxl). 
62 UCC 5-109(bX2). 
63 UCC 5-109(bX3). 
64 UCC 5-109(bX4). 
65 UCC 5-102(a)(8). 
66 Ibid. There are many similarities in approach to the former version of Article 5. 
67 UCC 4-303(1). 
68 UCC 5-109, cmt. 4. 
69 UCC 5-103(c). 
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15. Insolvency of Bank Holding Funds for Documentary Credit 
It is to be noted here that section 5-117 (dealing with "Insolvency of Bank Holding 
Funds for Documentary Credit") was omitted in the Revised Article 5 of 1995. 
The author has consulted the American Law Institute (ALI) about the reason why 
the insolvency section has disappeared in the revised Article. The answer was that 
"The April 6,1995, Proposed Final Draft, however, has a "Table of Disposition of 
Sections in Former Article 5. " The table indicates that old section 5-117 was 
omitted in Revised Article 5 because it was "covered by other law. " The table does 
not offer any other information. It is likely that in the 40 years since old section 5- 
117 was drafted, some federal banking or bankruptcy laws were issued covering 
the topic". Similarly, Dolan states that the (1995) version "has no analogue to 
Section 5-117, leaving to other law, including, one would assume, the common 
law, the questions that Section 5-117 addressee'. 70 
Summary 
In many respects Article 5 is now much clearer, simpler and less detailed because 
of the explicit reliance it places upon standards of practice. It is not possible to list 
entirely in a short summary all of the problems under the original Article 5 that are 
solved in the revised version. As a result, we can now be confident that letters of 
credit are not only an important part of the credit granting and payment system, 
but they will remain at the forefront of commercial law well into the 21st Century. 
Thus because these changes give letters of credit the clarity and flexibility 
necessary for their successful operation, there is a case for saying that all states 
should act to adopt these important revisions as soon as possible. " 
70 Dolan, J., The Law of Letters of Credit. Commercial and Standby Credits. Revised edition. (Warren, 
Gorham and Lamont, 1996) p. (12-12). 
71 See comment on why states should adopt revised UCC Article 5, Letters of Credit (1995) at web site: 
http: //www. necusl. org/whystate/ucc5why. htnl. 
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